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parenthetical marks. To more closely render Persian words as they are pronounced in 
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are used in place of “i” and “u”). Words and proper nouns that are commonly found in 
English, such as jihad, Imam, Shiite, or Khomeini, will follow their already 
commonplace spellings. The one exception is the word Hezbollah, which is both the 
name of a Lebanese militant organization and a term used to describe various groups in 
Iran, such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah organization. To distinguish between these usages, 
transliteration for the Lebanese organization follows Arabic pronunciation (Hizbullah) 











This study examines the construction of a new political order in post-revolutionary Iran 
through the prism of its revolutionary armed forces. I specifically explore the place of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in this process, and focus on its role in 
establishing and maintaining state control. Like all governments, the Islamic Republic’s 
first obligation has been to ensure its survival.1 In doing so it has relied on various 
mechanisms of coercion and control. Military power has been central to this effort. The 
military in post-revolutionary Iran is composed of two main segments: regular forces and 
revolutionary forces. The former—which comprise an army, navy, and air force—are 
holdovers from the pre-revolutionary period and have mattered little to the political 
development of the Islamic Republic. The revolutionary forces, however, which include 
the IRGC, the Basij popular militia, and other associated forces, have had a significant 
impact on the shape and nature of the Iranian state. Unlike the regular armed forces, the 
IRGC was given the additional mandate of “safeguarding the revolution.” Exercising this 
broad responsibility has led to the gradual permeation of the organization’s influence in 
all sectors of the Iranian state, including the areas of domestic security, ideological 
promotion, cultural work, industrial development, foreign engagements, and politics.  
Despite the IRGC’s prominence in contemporary Iran, only a small handful of 
studies have engaged the subject directly.2 The bulk of these are studies on Iran’s military 
                                                 
1 Barnett Rubin, Armed Forces in the Middle East Politics and Strategy. London: Routledge, 2002, p. 2. 
2 While only a few works focus on the IRGC exclusively, most studies on post-revolutionary Iran provide 
some discussion of the organization and its participation in Iranian society. However, it should be noted 
that a few studies on post-revolutionary Iran have included substantial discussion and valuable insights on 
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capacities written from a strategic studies perspective.3 Although most of these studies 
provide useful analyses of the structure and capacities of Iran’s armed forces, they are 
generally limited by their narrow focus, their intended audience (mostly American policy 
makers and defense analysts), and their concentration on secondary English-language 
sources. As such they tend to embody several assumptions regarding the underlying 
cultural, religious, ideological, and social factors that have shaped Iranian society and its 
military organizations. Most problematic, at least in my estimation, is the use of terms 
like “fanatical,” “fundamentalist,” and “Islamic” to describe Iran’s leaders and military 
commanders. This is not to say that those terms cannot or do not have a place in such a 
discussion, rather it is to suggest that those terms left unpacked and poorly defined do 
little else but obfuscate the complex and nuanced reality of power and authority in Iran. 
They further perpetuate the belief held by many policy makers and analysts that Iran’s 
leaders and policies are driven in toto by an implacable irrationality that can neither be 
understood nor engaged toward any meaningful end. 
There are a few exceptions worth mentioning. Sepehr Zabih’s The Iranian 
Military in Revolution and War, for instance, offers a brief but valuable early history of 
the IRGC.4 Published in 1988, Zabih marshals a variety of Persian sources and includes 
sections on the IRGC and Basij as part of a larger study on Iran’s armed forces. The only 
real limitation of Zabih’s study is its temporal and thematic scope. Regarding the latter, 
Zabih’s chief interest in the IRGC is its place in Iran’s greater military sector and he only 
briefly considers the organization’s ideological, religious, and political roles. In addition 
to Zabih’s work are two studies by the Rand Corporation. The first, a study on Iran’s 
military published in 1987, is similar to Zabih’s work in both subject matter and in the 
period covered. While the authors’ treatment of ideological and religious factors is 
                                                                                                                                                 
the IRGC. See particularly, Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: the Politics of Managing Change. 
London: Chatham House, 2006; Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its 
Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007; 
Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002. 
3 See in particular, Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military in Transition: Conventional Threats and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. West Port: Praeger, 1999; Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, 
Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian 
Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions. Washington D.C.: Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 
1996; Steven M. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2009; Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the 
Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East. RAND, 2009. 
4 Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. London and New York: Routledge, 1988. 
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likewise limited, they provide an informative analysis of the early structure of the IRGC.5 
Unlike the aforementioned, the second Rand study is both recent and exclusively focused 
on the IRGC.6 This study, published in 2009, offers a broad overview of the IRGC’s 
current domestic activities and the organization’s impact on Iranian politics. Its greatest 
strength is a survey of the IRGC’s economic and financial interests, which although brief, 
provides the best introduction to the subject yet published in English. To this extent, this 
study is a valuable primer for policy makers and analysts for whom it was produced. 
However, the authors also perpetuate assumptions of IRGC fanaticism and as such do 
little to depart from the standard narratives of the organization and of the Islamic 
Republic in general. Further, as the authors’ focus is on the contemporary, they only offer 
a brief and incomplete analysis of IRGC history. 
Beyond these works, the only serious academic study dedicated solely to the 
IRGC is Kenneth Katzman’s Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Published 
in 1993, this book considers the IRGC an ideological military organization with a 
stringent political agenda.7 Katzman, a political scientist, uses Samuel Huntington’s 
theory of institutionalization to examine the internal make-up and development of the 
Revolutionary Guards. He concludes that although the IRGC has taken on the airs and 
some of the institutional characteristics of a professional military organization, its 
dedication to radical ideology and involvement in politics has prevented it from 
becoming a professional armed force. While his treatment of the IRGC and its internal 
development is valuable, Katzman’s work suffers from a few major limitations. First and 
most importantly, Katzman relies on only English language sources for his research. 
Some of these are legitimate and helpful translations and overviews of Persian articles, 
such as those provided by FBIS and the Iran Weekly Press Digest. However, because of 
this limitation, Katzman was unable to analyze or even consider the vast amount of 
materials published by the Guards and other Persian sources concerning or associated 
with the organization. Secondly, I would suggest and others have argued that the 
                                                 
5 Nikola B. Schahgaldian and Gina Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1987. 
6 Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Accessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps. RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009 
7 Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. 
Also see, Katzman’s "The Pasdaran: Institutionalization of Revolutionary Armed Force." Iranian Studies 
vol. 26, no. 3-4 (1993), pp. 389-402. 
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explanatory capacity of Katzman’s study is considerably restricted due to his use of 
Huntington’s institutionalization theory, which as a model developed to understand 
western-oriented political institutions, seems ill-fitted to explain the development of an 
unconventional, clerically-sponsored, and religiously-minded armed force in post-
revolutionary Iran.8 Third, while Katzman bases much of his argument on the Guards 
religious “radicalism” he never unpacks this term nor examines their actual writings on 
the subject. Finally, while Katzman provides useful information on IRGC history, the 
structure of his study scatters this information piecemeal throughout the book, which 
makes for a laborious and frustrating read. While these factors limit the success of 
Katzman’s investigation, they do not tarnish the strengths of his work. Indeed, his book 
provides astute observations on the IRGC’s structure and development, and offers a 
valuable analysis of IRGC factionalism. 
There are three major limitations in this body of literature: First, with the 
exception of Rand’s 2009 study, the majority of work produced on the IRGC is outdated, 
and no study to date has offered a current or coherent history of the organization. Second, 
while some of these studies (Zabih and both Rand publications) consider Persian 
materials, they largely do not explore the numerous publications of the organization or 
the many memoirs written by founding IRGC members and early leaders of the Islamic 
Republic. Third, while the IRGC’s ideological nature is consistently emphasized, the 
development of the organization’s ideological commitments, their cultural and religious 
dimensions, and the relationship between these factors and the organization’s place and 
work within Iranian society have not been adequately explored. The present study is 
intended to begin addressing these shortcomings. To this end, my analysis considers the 
various dynamics and pressures which have shaped the IRGC over the last three decades 
and which have influenced its impact on the post-revolutionary Iranian state. In the 
following pages I briefly discuss the larger questions and issues at work in this study and 
the framework that will structure my discussion. Next I will introduce the central and sub 
theses of this work and what these arguments can tell us about the subject. Finally, I 
provide a brief summary of the subsequent chapters and list some larger questions to 
which I will return in the study’s conclusion. 
                                                 
8 See James A. Bill’s commentary in Iranian Studies vol. 26, no. 3-4 (1993), p. 403. 
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Conflict, Military Power, and Politics 
The relationship between conflict and national politics is an underlying subject of this 
study. Over the last few decades countless studies in history, sociology, and political 
science have examined the war-making/state-making nexus. Macro-comparative 
investigations by scholars like Charles Tilly and Michael Mann (both rooted in the ideas 
of Max Weber) have produced useful theoretical models that place war and militaries at 
the center of state formation.9 Taken together, the overall model of war-making and state 
formation includes four major claims. First, the process of waging war created the 
institutional apparatus of the modern state, which relied on both technologies of 
extraction and coercion to mobilize the resources and man-power to make fighting war 
possible. Second, to facilitate the mobilization of resources and military personnel state 
leaders offered incentives such as the rule of law and representative government to their 
civilian populations. Third, through disarming its population and achieving the capacity 
to wage and fight war the state developed a near monopoly of legitimate coercive 
violence. Fourth, the development of civilian institutions eventually curbed the autonomy 
of military power and brought it under civilian control. This led to a division of coercive 
forces into those specializing in external conflicts (the military) and those concerned with 
internal threats (the police).  
This model is helpful for understanding the place of military power in the state 
formation of modern Europe; however its European bias limits the utility of its 
application elsewhere. That is, the European model of state formation through warfare is, 
as has been noted by some scholars, more exception than rule. For instance, in a study on 
the significance of war to the creation of states and national armed forces in Latin 
America, political scientist Miguel Centeno questions the viability of Tilly’s model of 
                                                 
9 See Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 
1990; “Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650,” in Irregular Armed Forces and their 
Role in Politics and State Formation. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira eds. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp. 37-81; and “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing 
the State Back In. Peter B. Evans et al. eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-191. 
Also see Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning 
to A.D. 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; and The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: 
The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
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state formation and military development for non-European states.10 Here Centeno posits 
that unlike the inter-state warfare—particularly the “total wars” of the first and second 
world wars—that helped define the national boundaries of modern Europe, Latin 
American states have been involved in only “limited wars” against mostly internal or 
marginal threats. Unlike the “total wars” fought by European states, fighting “limited 
wars” did not require the mobilization of large standing armies, the technological 
capacity to supply forces across large and disparate expanses, the requirement of a single 
and coherent national ideology, nor the development of professionalized and 
conventional militaries. Centeno’s work further suggests that the fighting of “limited 
wars”—as opposed to total wars—limited a state’s ability to concentrate the means of 
violence within society while European states were more successful in this regard. 
Though Centeno does see some parallels between the European and Latin American 
experiences in the twentieth century, specifically the direct link between armed conflict 
and state formation, he concludes that the above differences are significant and show the 
limited utility of Tilly’s model (and by extension other European-centric theories) for the 
study of non-European states.  
Centeno’s study brings to the fore another weakness in the literature on armed 
forces and politics: the focus on conventional militaries. Conventional militaries are 
generally conceived as centralized national institutions that are subordinate to the state. 
These militaries include hierarchical command structures, rigid institutional cultures, and 
an officer corps comprised of the social elite. Further, and perhaps most significantly, 
these armed forces are designed to concentrate on external threats, particularly those 
posed by neighboring states, and have only a limited sub-national role. The focus on 
conventional forces thus includes a number of assumptions regarding the place of 
military power in national politics. Studies on conventional militaries and their role in 
political development created an impressive body of literature during the Cold War. 
Foundational studies in this genre generally referred to as civil-military relations include 
                                                 
10 Miguel Centeno, “Limited War and Limited States,” in Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics 
and State Formation. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, pp. 82-95. 
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works by Samuel Huntington, Alfred Vagts, Alain Rouquie, and Karen Remmer.11 
Collectively these works explore the ways in which militaries have either promoted or 
prohibited transitions to democracy. Instead of being concerned with state formation per 
se, these studies present different takes on modernization theory, particularly on the idea 
that the subjugation of military power to civilian leadership is essential to establishing a 
democratic regime. The framework they present focuses on the relationship between 
regime type (e.g., democratic, totalitarian, or authoritarian) and military power. 
Democracies in this typology are defined as regimes wherein civilian control over the 
military has been achieved and where the military is subordinate to the interests of the 
state and as such has a limited political role. Authoritarian regimes are defined as those 
wherein the military plays a more significant role in political and governmental matters, 
shares some authority with the state, and can be used to partly suppress civil society. In 
totalitarian regimes, on the other hand, the military dominates the state and uses its power 
to crush internal dissent and curb political freedom in all areas of society.12  
These definitions have helped shape how politics and military power have been 
conceived by scholars and policy makers since the Cold War. However, a consequence of 
this static typology has been the perpetuation of certain assumptions regarding the 
relationship between regime type, military power, and politics, particularly in the post-
Cold War era. In their important edited volume Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in 
Politics and State Formation (2003) scholars Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira directly 
tackle many of these assumptions as well as some of those inherent in the state formation 
models of Tilly and Mann and argue that the existing literature has neglected the roles of 
unconventional, “alternative,” or irregular armed forces in national politics. To both 
highlight and begin to address this “intellectual blind-spot” the editors offer several 
persuasive articles by historians, sociologists, and political scientists that examine the 
place of irregular armed forces—such as militias, gangs, paramilitaries, youth groups, 
                                                 
11 See, Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism. New York: Free Press, 
1973; Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America. Trans. Paul E. Sigmund, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987; and, Karen Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America. Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989. 
12 Diane E. Davis, “Contemporary Challenges and Historical Reflections on the Study of Militaries, States, 
and Politics,” in Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in State Formation. Diane E. Davis and Anthony 
W. Pereira, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 8-10. 
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mercenaries, war veterans, and various types of police and security forces—in the 
political development of states from Europe and the United States to Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. Collectively, these studies aim to counter several misconceptions 
regarding military power. Their central thesis is that armed forces “do much more than 
make war.”13 As Davis argues: 
[S]cholars rarely examine the wide variety of diverse social and political 
and even economic institutions in which military personnel or other 
“armed forces” play a part. These include intelligence agencies, militia, 
paramilitary forces, police, and even veterans associations; and they entail 
an understanding of the ways that these forces contribute to the 
development of [state] policies . . .14 
Exploring the political impact of irregular forces in this way is the theme connecting the 
several studies collected by Davis and Pereira. Taken together, the editors make ten 
observations that contrast with previous assumptions regarding militaries and political 
development. Of these, four claims have particular relevance for the present study: First, 
the editors argue that irregular forces can play a significant role in a state’s efforts to 
monopolize coercive force and that their place in these efforts has been 
“underappreciated” by scholars. Second, they suggest that the “neat division” between 
external (military) and internal (police) forces characteristic of the political development 
of northwestern Europe does not occur in states where irregular military forces have a 
hand in domestic security. Third, the professionalization of military forces does not lead 
to increased civilian authority or control over armed forces; but rather, as the editors 
suggest, professional militaries can and often do intervene in politics in a variety of ways, 
the most extreme example being leading coups d’état. Finally, while mobilizing soldiers 
has been a major challenge for states, so too has retaining the political loyalty of veterans 
in the process of demobilization. The way that a state chooses to handle the question of 
war veterans can have a significant impact on postwar political development.15 
Davis and Pereira present a new approach to the study of politics and military 
power, one that focuses on alternative types of armed force, coercion, and conflict. In this 
way their work is an important intervention and a departure from the available models of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 394. 
14 Davis and Pereira, Irregular Armed Forces, 14-15. 
15 Ibid., 388-90. 
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political development. Though they do not attempt to boil down their findings into a rigid 
theory, their work nonetheless offers a new starting point for future studies on military 
power in society. In this way, Davis and Pereira’s volume is a call for a new generation 
of research that breaks from past assumptions and explores the connections between 
armed forces, coercion, and politics in novel and different ways. For these reasons I use 
Davis and Pereira’s framework as way to structure the present study on Iran’s 
revolutionary armed forces. I find their work valuable for understanding the larger 
questions surrounding the political dimensions of military power and feel that the Iranian 
example lends support to some of their key findings (specifically the aforementioned). 
However, the present study also addresses what I consider to be weak spots in Davis and 
Pereira’s volume. First, although Davis and Pereira emphasize the utility of their work to 
understanding contemporary and even future forms of warfare, coercion, military power, 
and political development, most of their case studies focus on long-term state formation 
from the seventeenth through mid-twentieth centuries and only three of the thirteen 
studies provided touch upon or focus on the post-Cold War period. Second, while Davis 
and Pereira cast a wide net by considering the role of irregular forces around the globe, 
they neglect the Middle East entirely and only present one piece (a comparative study on 
Western African states) that briefly considers armed forces in Muslim societies.16 Third, 
while the editors rightly address the assumptions of past literature, they follow those 
earlier works in ignoring the significance of culture, religion, and to a lesser extent, 
ideology. That is, like their predecessors, Davis and Pereira retain a bias for the secular 
state and do not take possible exceptions into account.17 They also do not examine the 
impact of culture on conflict and politics nor do they investigate connections between 
religion or ideology and military power.18  
                                                 
16 William Reno, “The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Absence of State-Building in West Africa,” in 
Irregular Armed Forces, 322-345. 
17 Davis and Pereira are not unique for their disregard of cultural and religious forces in state and political 
development. Both Tilly and Mann, for instance, were criticized for deemphasizing the roles of religion and 
culture in their theoretical models. See for example the critique of Mann’s theory in John A. Hall and Ralph 
Schroeder, eds., An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. For a critique of Tilly, see Jack Goldstone’s review of Coercion, Capital, and 
European States, “States Making Wars Making States Making Wars . . .,” Contemporary Sociology, vol. 
20, no. 2 (March 1991), pp. 176-78. 
18 They do however argue against the Cold War typologies that linked state-ideologies such as capitalism 
and communism with regime types such as democracies and authoritarianism. 
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These omissions hinder an otherwise important reorientation of the field. Yet they 
also present an opportunity for scholars of the Middle East and Islam to contribute to this 
discussion. Indeed, it is in the Middle East and Muslim societies more broadly where 
irregular armed forces have had perhaps the most significant impact in the post-Cold War 
era. Vivid examples such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Occupied Territories, 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have all been 
considered terrorist organizations, fanatical militias, or fundamentalist movements, but 
they have generally not been understood as state-building armed forces. This is less 
surprising for the non-Iranian examples which—with the exception of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan from 1996–2001—are seen as sub-state or non-state actors; however with 
the increasing political participation of these groups, particularly Hizbullah and Hamas in 
the last few years, it seems that such a reconceptualization is warranted. This is not to 
minimize the violence generated by these groups or their destructive impact on society; 
rather it is in recognition of what this violence may achieve for these forces politically. 
Thus, in order to better understand the political capacities and trajectories of such groups 
we must first broaden how we conceive of them. What I am suggesting then, and what I 
will be exploring in this study on post-revolutionary Iran, is that irregular armed forces 
continue to be important to the political development of states in the contemporary 
period. I believe that by viewing militant organizations and movements through 
frameworks of conflict, military power, and politics, we can attain a more coherent and 
historical perspective about how militancy operates within society and why its prevalence 
continues in the Middle East today. My focus, however, is on post-revolutionary Iran; 
and though this study does not explore comparisons between Iranian armed forces and 
the groups mentioned above, I nonetheless hope that the present work will show the value 
of this method for the study of militant organizations in other Muslim societies.  
Military Power in Post-Revolutionary Iran 
I make two major claims in this study: First, military power has been central to the 
shaping of post-revolutionary Iran. Second, the proliferation of military power is directly 
related to various politicized conflicts that have and continue to occur in post-
revolutionary Iran. In addressing these claims I depart from the traditional war-
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making/state-making nexus and instead examine how conflict broadly-defined has 
impacted the contemporary Iranian state. I use this term to denote actual violent 
campaigns of warfare, varying forms of civil unrest, and perceptions of foreign 
aggression. More specifically, the forms of conflict that I will consider include the 
internal armed conflicts that erupted following the revolution; the eight-year war with 
Iraq; Iran’s military involvement in foreign affairs; the sporadic but ongoing experience 
of anti-state terrorism by dissident groups and by groups operating within Iran’s ethno-
religious minority communities; the threat of Western-backed aggression perceived to 
varying degrees over the last thirty-years by Iran’s leaders; the intense and at times 
violent political factionalism within Iran’s leadership; and the cultural and ideological 
conflicts that exist at all levels of Iranian society and permeate its politics.  
Simply put, I suggest that Iran in the post-revolution has been in a constant state 
of conflict and that the way Iran’s leaders have chosen to engage these conflicts has led to 
the expansion of military power in the Iranian state. Standard definitions of military 
power generally only consider the lethal coercive capacities of conventional militaries. 
For instance, Michael Mann defines military power as the social organization of 
concentrated coercion and lethal violence.19 Such a definition, however, does not take 
into account the more complex relationship between irregular armed forces, national 
politics, and domestic society, especially as seen in post-revolutionary Iran. Nor does it 
consider the various non-lethal and extra-military roles that armed forces may play in 
society. For these reasons, I break from narrow definitions of military power and broaden 
the term to encompass all areas in which Iran’s revolutionary armed forces are influential 
and to include all mechanisms through which that influence is exercised. The 
organization of coercion is still at the heart of this definition; however, forms of coercion 
outside the physical or lethal, such as spiritual, psychological, and political coercion, will 
also be considered. 
I explore these issues within a thematic history of post-revolutionary Iran. That is, 
as this study moves forward chronologically chapter by chapter, it also moves laterally in 
examining different sub-topics and themes. Each chapter is in this way its own essay, but 
                                                 
19 Mann initially defined military power as the “social organization of physical force in the form of 
concentrated coercion,” but in his response to criticism (particularly that of Gianfranco Poggi) he refined 
his definition to “the social organization of lethal violence.” See, Anatomy, 351. 
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together they form a coherent history of the post-revolution. To begin, Chapter II, “From 
Ali to Khomeini,” gives a brief overview of Shiite Islam and the Islamic movement in 
Iran. My primary objective in this chapter is to introduce the Shiite religious tradition and 
to identify some of the central events in its early history. My intention is to explain these 
events as they are generally understood by lay Shiites and not to offer a critical analysis 
of Shiite history. These events, such as the succession of the Prophet or the martyrdom of 
the Imam Husayn, play a large role in contemporary Shiite culture and animate the 
Shiite-centric political ideologies of the Islamic movement and post-revolutionary period. 
A second theme of this chapter is the rise of clerical authority in Iran and the 
politicization of the clergy in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Clerical 
activism is a key feature of the Islamic movement in Iran and has been a dominant theme 
in the post-revolution. I also discuss the roles that political ideologies and militancy 
played in shaping the Islamic movement in Iran. These ideologies and the militant 
activism they inspired fueled Muslim participation in the revolutionary movement and 
played a role in the development of military power in the post-revolution.  
Chapter III, “Guardians of an Islamic Revolution,” is the first part of this study 
that focuses on the Revolutionary Guards. The early history of the IRGC has been poorly 
constructed in previous works, so this chapter aims to fill in those gaps while providing a 
detailed narrative of the organization’s formation and first several months of operation. 
Compared to the chapters that follow, this chapter covers a short period of time, from the 
collapse of the Pahlavi regime in February 1979 to the ratification of the Islamic 
Republic’s constitution in December of that year. This crucial period witnessed the first 
major test for the revolution as various factions and organizations struggled for control of 
the post-Pahlavi state. As an armed force organized by clerics loyal to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Revolutionary Guards served as the leading coercive apparatus of the pro-
Khomeini faction and helped this faction consolidate power in the early post-revolution. 
As I explore this process, I am equally concerned with providing an adequate pre-history 
of the organization and do so by examining the individuals, groups, and ideological 
disputes that led to its establishment. For most of this discussion I rely on the Iranian and 
foreign press reports that came out during the early months of the post-revolution; 
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however I also make use of the memoirs of founding IRGC members, clerical leaders, 
and other prominent activists of this period.  
Chapters IV and V cover roughly the same period, namely the Iran-Iraq war and 
its immediate aftermath (1980-1989); however neither concentrates on the war itself. I 
avoid focusing on the Iraq war for two reasons: First, there have already been several 
monographs and numerous studies on the war that include detailed accounts of the 
IRGC’s activities during this period; Second, by not rehashing the aspects of this conflict 
that have already been thoroughly covered by others, I am free to explore other questions 
that are more deserving of attention. Thus, in Chapter IV, “Exporting the Revolution,” I 
address the oft-cited question of Iran’s efforts to export its revolution to other states in the 
Middle East and the IRGC’s role in these efforts. I am particularly interested in 
complicating the widespread assumption that the IRGC was the primary proponent of 
foreign military intervention during this period. To this end I explore the different 
ideological and political factors that made the notion of exporting the revolution 
militarily a contested issue within Iran’s leadership. Proponents of exporting the 
revolution conceived the responsibility of Iran’s new government through a radical-
internationalist perspective and considered it the state’s primary responsibility to assist in 
the global unraveling of Western imperialism by all means at their disposal. Opponents of 
this interventionist approach to foreign affairs felt that it was contrary to Iran’s national 
interests to become intertwined in outside conflicts. Further, they contended Iran could 
not afford a dilution of its efforts in fighting the war with Iraq. These two positions 
highlighted a deep and fundamental divide between conservative and leftist factions in 
the Khomeinist movement and within the IRGC. The result of these disputes was a 
decline in leftist influence and the strengthening of conservative control over the state. 
The fifth chapter, “Image and Identity,” explores the development of IRGC 
identity through its own visuality. Here I focus on the images produced by the 
organization in its publications, primarily its official news organ Payam-e Enqelab 
(“Message of the Revolution”). I begin this chapter by discussing the organization’s 
approach to ideological promotion and cultural activism. This work was a broad effort at 
producing and disseminating materials that communicated the IRGC’s political, 
ideological, and religious positions to its members and to general society. Embedded 
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within these materials is a fascinating collection of visual imagery that has yet to be 
seriously explored. These images, from clip-art type iconography to photographs and 
political posters, offer unique expressions of the IRGC as an organization and of its 
membership. In exploring a selection of this imagery, I suggest that as the IRGC changed 
politically during the war so too did its self-conception. Further, I discuss how the IRGC 
conceived the war with Iraq and how it expressed its role in that conflict to its 
membership. Finally, I suggest what the development of the IRGC’s self-conception over 
this period reveals about the organization. In this way, this chapter is equally about 
identity, ideology, and politics.  
While Chapter V’s discussion ends at the conclusion of the Iraq war, the 
ramifications of IRGC identity formation are central to the cultural positions and political 
activism of war veterans in the postwar period. I take up this theme in Chapter VI, 
“Politics of Demobilization,” which explores the expansion of the IRGC, its subordinate 
forces, and war veterans groups into various extra-military state sectors. This chapter 
begins at a turning-point in post-revolutionary Iran, where the clerical leadership was 
forced to face two major challenges: constructing legitimate state authority after the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini and dealing with the process of demobilization in the postwar. 
These challenges were exacerbated by the deep divisions within the Khomeinist 
movement, and the way Iran’s leaders addressed these issues intensified factional 
conflict. A key transformation during this period was the decision by Iranian president 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to avoid total demobilization by instead expanding the 
purviews of the IRGC and its popular militia force, the Basij, to include domestic security 
and state-funded industrial construction. Although Rafsanjani hoped that such moves 
would help curry favor among these institutions for his political project, they largely had 
the opposite effect. Consequently, the expansion of these organizations gave the 
revolutionary armed forces a greater stake in state policies and more power with which to 
influence those policies. The permeation of military power into extra-military sectors 
paralleled the war veterans’ movement and helped assist that movement’s impact on 
domestic politics. 
Chapter VII, “Gifts for the Enemy,” examines the impact of post-9/11 American 
foreign policy on domestic Iranian politics. Here I argue that Iran was not only the main 
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beneficiary of the Bush administration’s wars in the Middle East, but that the Bush 
administration’s broader approach to containing the Iranian threat legitimized the further 
expansion of military power in domestic politics and facilitated IRGC influence in 
regional conflicts. In this way, the theme of Chapter VII is a continuation of that explored 
in Chapter VI; however, instead of examining the internal forces that encouraged an 
expansion of military power I highlight the external factors that have done so. Another 
difference between these two chapters is that Chapter VI explores the development of 
military power whereas Chapter VII explores the blossoming of military influence and its 
impact on the Iranian state. Concerning the latter, military influence and its proponents in 
the conservative clerical establishment helped propel hardline political factions to the 
fore of Iranian politics. This resulted in the contested presidential election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005, and the appointments of numerous former IRGC members and war 
veterans to prominent positions in the latter’s cabinet and in state institutions. Although 
the empowerment of hardline factions was largely a domestic process, it was legitimated 
on the basis that only this faction and their uncompromising politics could adequately 
defend the Islamic Republic from Western aggression. Ahmadinejad proved to be an 
active proponent of military power and furthered the permeation of its influence 
domestically and in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Collectively, these chapters provide a history of the IRGC and the development of 
military power in post-revolutionary Iran. While each chapter concentrates on separate 
questions and explores various sub-topics, they all relate either overtly or implicitly to the 
growth of military power and its impact on domestic politics in Iran. In Chapter VIII, the 
study’s conclusion, I return to Davis and Pereira’s framework and examine how the case 
of the IRGC and military power in post-revolutionary in Iran corresponds or departs from 
some of their central claims regarding irregular armed forces and political development. 
Specifically, I address these five questions drawn from Davis and Pereira’s work: 1) Why 
is there a blurring of military and police forces in post-revolutionary Iran? 2) In what 
ways have war veterans most impacted postwar political development? 3) Has the 
increased professionalization of the revolutionary armed forces led to increased civilian 
control over these military organizations? 4) Have the revolutionary armed forces helped 
the Iranian state develop a monopoly of coercive violence? 5) What factors led to the 
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proliferation of military power in post-revolutionary Iran and what does the current 
place of military power tell us about the nature of politics in the Iranian state?  In 
addressing and answering these questions, my two central claims regarding military 
power and conflict in Iran will be sufficiently established. Further, by moving beyond the 
traditional models of state-making and military development this book demonstrates how 
Iran’s particular experiences with conflict and military power have contributed to its 







From Ali to Khomeini: 




Today there is no longer any room for doubt that a teaching, an ideology, is among 
society’s most pressing needs ... Ideology calls for faith. An appropriate ideology should, 
on the one hand, rest on the kind of world view that can convince the reason and nourish 
the mind, and on the other hand, logically deduce attractive goals from its worldview ... 
Islam, being founded in such a worldview is a comprehensive and realistic teaching. It 
considers every aspect of human needs, whether this worldly or otherworldly, physical or 
spiritual, intellectual or emotional and affectual, individual or social.1 
 
—Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari 
 
We have two paths ahead of us: the first is martyrdom and departing for heaven, the 
second is victory over the enemies of Islam and establishing a government of Islamic 
justice. Therefore, we are not afraid of anything. We are not afraid of the army of 
America, nor are we afraid of the Soviet military. We are not afraid of any power.  
Because we have faith in the next life, faith in Day of Judgment, faith in meeting with 
God (liqa allah), and because we have faith that after death we will associate with the 
saints, the prophets, and the devoted, we are not afraid of death and we will make our 
country the graveyard of foreign soldiers.2 
 
—Abu Sharif, IRGC Operations Commander 
 
 
Religious ideologies played a significant role in Iran’s Islamic revolution. These 
ideologies—rooted in the writings of prominent clergy like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
and Shiite intellectuals like Ali Shariati—merged traditional Shiite beliefs with secular 
political thought. What emerged were highly politicized readings of Shiite history, which 
framed contemporary concerns through the lenses of divine justice and religious faith. In 
                                                 
1 Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic thought: God, Man and the Universe. Trans. R. 
Campbell. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985, p. 56. 
2 Speech by Abu Sharif (Abbas Aqa-Zamani) to members of the Revolutionary Guards, Payam-e Enqelab, 
no. 5, March 1980, pp. 36-38. 
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the post-revolution, the Islamic Republic has used ideology to legitimize its system of 
theocratic government by connecting it to the powerful traditions and spirituality of 
popular Shiism. Even as politics in the post-revolution have revealed significant 
differences in the interpretation of Islamic ideology by Iran’s leaders, elements of Shiite 
ideology continue to impact all levels of Iranian society. Thus in order to understand the 
religious dimensions of post-revolutionary politics and their impact on military power, 
basic understandings of both the Shiite tradition and the development of modern Islamic 
ideologies in Iran must first be provided.  
To this end, the current chapter discusses Shiite Islam and its development in Iran, 
from the beginnings of Islam through the Islamic movement of the twentieth century. It 
begins with a brief overview of the formation of Shiism, drawing attention to the key 
events that have come to define the religion and its traditions. It then discusses the 
development of Shiism in the premodern period and the rise of its clerical class. Next it 
explores the impact of Western imperialism on Iranian society and its affect on Shiite 
politics during the first half of the twentieth century. Finally, it considers the influence of 
Third-worldist politics on the development of Shiite political ideologies and activism. 
These ideologies gave rise to the Shiite revolutionary movement in Iran, which 
culminated in the 1979 revolution. After the revolution, the ideological thought of 
Ayatollah Khomeini came to dominate political life in Iran and pervade all levels of 
society. Though the primary aim of these sections is to briefly introduce the major 
elements of Khomeinist ideology, the place of militancy in pre-revolutionary activism 
and its roots in the Shiite tradition will also be stressed. I do not intend to draw a linear 
line connecting the violence of early Shiite events with the political violence of the pre 
and post-revolution; rather, I will focus on how early events in Shiite history have been 
used to frame and legitimate militant activism in modern Iran. In this way, grasping the 
religious and spiritual underpinnings of violent activism in the pre-revolutionary period is 
essential to understanding militancy and military power in the post-revolution. 
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PART ONE: SHIISM THROUGH THE 19th CENTURY 
The Formation of Shiite Islam 
After the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E. notables in the Muslim community disagreed 
on who would succeed the Prophet. This issue split the Muslim community into two main 
factions: those who supported Abu Bakr and his successors Umar and Uthman, and those 
who supported Ali ibn Abi Talib—the Prophet’s cousin, son-in-law, and most trusted 
confidant—and later his descendents. Those who supported Ali came to be known as the 
shi`at ‘Ali or the “partisans of Ali.” Although this was a political distinction, it was from 
Ali’s supporters (the Shia) that the Shiite religion gradually emerged as a separate and 
distinct variant of Islam.  As the dispute over the succession of Muhammad is at the root 
of Shiite Islam, it is important to understand how Shiites understand this dispute and how 
it has influenced Shiite religion and culture.3 
Numerous traditions (hadith) recognized by both Sunnis and Shiites attest to 
Muhammad’s favoring of Ali and the latter’s unparalleled valor and morality.4 For 
Sunnis, these traditions simply reinforce the notion that Ali was a central figure in early 
Islam and should be revered as such. Shiites, however, point to these traditions as 
evidence that the Prophet had intended for Ali, and later Ali’s sons, to succeed him in 
leading the Muslim community.  Perhaps the most important tradition supporting the 
Shiites’ claim is an account from the last year of the Prophet’s life. This account, 
recorded in a Sunni collection of traditions, states: 
We [the Prophet’s companions] were with the Apostle of God 
[Muhammad] in his journey and we stopped at Ghadir Khumm. We 
preformed the obligatory prayer together and a place was swept for the 
Apostle under two trees and he performed the mid-day prayer. And then 
he took `Ali by the hand and said to the people: “Do you acknowledge that 
I have a greater claim on each of the believers than they have on 
themselves?” And they replied: “Yes!” And he took ‘Ali’s hand and said: 
                                                 
3 For useful scholarly overviews of Shiism see, Moojan Momen’s An Introduction to Shi`i Islam. Oxford: 
George Ronald, 1985; and Heinz Halm, Shi'ism. Trans. Janet Watson and Marian Hill. 2nd edition. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Also, for a sociological history of Shiism in Iran see, Said Amir 
Arjomand, The Shadow of the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran 
from The Beginning to 1890. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
4 For an overview of these traditions, see Moojan Momen, Shi`i Islam, 12-17. 
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“Of whomsoever I am Lord [mawla], then ‘Ali is also Lord. O God! Be 
Thou the supporter of whoever supports ‘Ali and the enemy of whoever 
opposes him.”  And `Umar met him [`Ali] after this and said to him: 
“Congratulations, O son of Abu Talib! Now morning and evening [i.e. 
forever] you are the master of every believing man and woman.5  
To Shiites the implication of this tradition is clear. It shows that Muhammad appointed 
Ali his successor and indicates Umar (the future second Caliph) understood and 
acknowledged this fact. This is important to note because to Shiites it suggests that 
Umar’s later nomination of Abu Bakr as Caliph and the first successor to the Prophet not 
only betrayed the Prophet’s wishes but also went against Umar’s understanding of those 
wishes.   
Another significant episode involving the Prophet and Umar, known as the 
Episode of Pen and Paper, casts further doubt in the eyes of Shiites on Umar’s 
faithfulness and on his role in usurping Ali’s rightful successorship. This tradition, which 
is recognized but also understood differently by Sunnis and Shiites, recounts a 
conversation between the Prophet and his followers as he lay bed-ridden during the last 
days of his life. The tradition states: 
When the Prophet’s illness became serious, he said: “Bring me writing 
materials that I may write for you something, after which you will not be 
led into error.” `Umar said: “The illness has overwhelmed the Prophet. We 
have the Book of God [the Qur’an] and that is enough for us.” Then the 
people differed about this and spoke many words. And he [the Prophet] 
said: ‘Leave me! There ought not to be quarrelling in my presence.” And 
Ibn ‘Abbas [the Prophet’s cousin] went out saying: “The greatest of 
calamities is what intervened between the Apostle and his writing.”6  
Shiites understand this episode as Muhammad’s attempt to write a will and testament that 
would have confirmed ‘Ali’s role as successor. Umar’s interference in this matter is yet 
another reason why Shiites came to consider him a chief conspirator against Ali.  
Without a will Muslims were forced to choose a leader themselves. Soon after the 
Prophet’s death, Umar met with a group of Muslim notables in Medina to discuss matters 
of succession. It was during this meeting that Umar nominated and pledged his allegiance 
to Abu Bakr who was in turn elected by those present as the Prophet’s successor and the 
                                                 
5 Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, Vol. 4, p. 281. Translation provided in Momen, p. 15. 
6 al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab al-‘Ilm, Bab 40, Vol. 1, p. 41. Translation provided in Momen, p. 15-16. 
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Caliph (khalifa) of the Muslims. This election, however, had taken place in the absence 
of Ali, who—along with his wife Fatima (the Prophet’s daughter) and much of 
Muhammad’s family—was preparing the Prophet’s body for burial. Although angered at 
the nomination of Abu Bakr, Shiites believe that Ali held back formal protest for the sake 
of Muslim unity.7  
Although Ali continued to have his own avid supporters, there were two more 
successors (Umar and Uthman) to the role of Caliph before he held that office.  Ali’s 
ascension to the Caliphate came on the heels of the controversial reign and murder of the 
third Caliph, Uthman, in 656 C.E.  Uthman’s rule had brought the formidable Banu 
Umayyad clan to power. Under Uthman, the Umayyads, a native Meccan clan, had 
become entrenched in leadership roles throughout Muslim territory, including important 
governorships.  This gave the Umayyad clan a privileged and powerful position in the 
Muslim community, but also caused resentment among many Muslim tribes, which 
eventually led to Uthman’s murder. After Uthman’s death, Ali’s supporters urged him to 
accept the Caliphate.  Although reluctant, Ali ultimately accepted the role and became the 
fourth (and last) “rightly guided” Caliph. For Shiites, this was the first and only time in 
the history of Islam that the Muslim community was led by a faithful and true successor 
of the Prophet.8  
The tumultuous political climate that led to Uthman’s murder continued after Ali 
came to power. The Umayyad clan and their supporters disputed Ali’s election to the 
Caliphate and blamed his followers for Uthman’s murder. Many of the Umayyad 
relocated to Damascus to support their own candidate for Caliph, Muawiya Ibn Abi 
Sufyan, the military governor of Syria. After Muawiya refused to swear allegiance to Ali, 
a conflict erupted between the armies of the two Muslim leaders. A court of arbitration 
was called to settle the conflict diplomatically, though little progress was made. Instead, 
some of Ali’s supporters, who thought his agreeing to arbitration compromised his claim 
to the Caliphate, turned against him. This group, known as the Kharajites (khawarij), 
argued that Ali’s choice of arbitration was against God’s will, and thus for having gone 
                                                 
7 For a traditional Shiite understanding of this and other foundational events in Shiite history see, S. Husain 
M. Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
8 For an interpretive history on succession and early Shiism see, Wilfred Madelung, The Succession to 




against God, Ali was no longer a faithful Muslim. This act of declaring Ali a non-Muslim 
(takfir) was the philosophical basis for the Kharajites’ rebellion against Ali and their 
murder of him in 661. 
The murder of Ali ended the only period in Muslim history where a Shiite Imam 
led the Islamic community.  After Ali’s death, the Umayyad’s extended their control over 
Muslim lands and Muawiya was declared Caliph.  Support for Ali and his descendents 
continued, though most of his supporters were isolated to the frontiers of Muslim 
territory, including a strong presence in the garrison town of Kufa (modern-day southern 
Iraq).  Many of these supporters turned to Ali’s sons Hasan and Husayn to continue their 
father’s rightful struggle for leadership of the Muslim community.   However, shortly 
after his father’s murder, Hasan—the elder of the two and the second Imam in the Shiite 
tradition—renounced his claim to the Caliphate in order to avoid more bloodshed and 
disharmony among Muslims. Shiites believe that eight years after his abdication Hasan 
was poisoned to death by his wife on Muawiya’s behalf. 
It was not until the death of Muawiya and the ascension of his son Yazid to the 
Caliphate in 680, that Husayn—Ali’s second son and the third Shiite Imam—would press 
his claim to the leadership of the Muslim community. Yazid’s reputation as a morally lax 
drunkard made his successorship infuriating to many Muslims.  Urged by his supporters 
in Kufa, Husayn decided to make a bid for his rightful claim to the Caliphate. He led a 
small group of companions and family members toward the Umayyad ruled town of Kufa 
where he planned to join up with a few thousand of his supporters and lead a campaign 
against Yazid in Damascus. When the Umayyad governor of Iraq Ubaydallah Ibn Ziyad 
discovered news of this plot he executed some of Husayn’s leading supporters in Kufa 
and dispatched an army to block the Imam’s access to that city.  Despite being informed 
of this turn of events, Husayn continued toward Kufa only to be forced north of the city 
by Umayyad troops. Ibn Ziyad’s army surrounded Husayn and his companions, making 
them decamp in the barren desert plains of Karbala. For the next several days the 
Umayyad’s tried to coerce Husayn into renouncing his claim of leadership by cutting off 
the supply of fresh water to his camp. Finally, on the tenth day of the Muslim month of 
Muharram 680 C.E., after failed negotiations and Husayn’s refusal to pay tribute to 
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Yazid, nearly 4000 Umayyad troops stormed Husayn’s camp and slaughtered his 
companions.  
The Shiite recollections of this event—known as Ashura (literally the “tenth”)—
are tragic and brutal. Husayn and about seventy of his supporters were killed. His eldest 
son, Ali al-Akbar, died a valiant death fighting the Umayyad forces. Husayn’s half-
brother, Abbas, was killed after both his arms were cut off as he attempted to deliver 
drinking water to the women and children of the camp. Husayn’s nephew, Qasim, was 
killed on what was to be his wedding day in front of his bride. There is also the story of 
Husayn’s infant son Ali al-Asghar, who was killed in his father’s arms when an Umayyad 
archer shot the small child in the throat.9  In one popular Shiite oral tradition, Husayn is 
imagined to have lamented the deaths of his family and the tragedy that was to befall 
him:  
The infidels [i.e. the Umayyads] are one side, and my sorrowful self on the 
other. The rose has fallen in one direction, and the thorns in the other. O 
friends, in one quarter Akbar fell by treachery, a martyr ... Kasim [Qasim] 
the disappointed, has been killed on one spot, and on the other I myself 
experience the cruel oppression of the spheres. In one corner the mother of 
‘Ali Akbar is smiting her head, while the sorrowful bride of Kasim is 
moaning in another ... I am sore distressed at the unkind treatment 
received at the hands of the cruel heavens. Pitiful tyranny is exercised 
towards me by a cruel, unbelieving army! All the sorrows and troubles of 
this world have overwhelmed me!  I am become a butt for the arrow of 
affliction and trouble. I am a holy bird stripped of its quills and feathers by 
the hand of the archer of tyranny, and am become, O friends, utterly 
disabled, and unable to fly to my sacred nest. They are going to kill me 
mercilessly, for no other crime or guilt except that I happen to be a 
prophet’s grandson.10  
Ultimately Husayn was also killed and decapitated by Umayyad assailants.  A few 
women and children––among them Husayn’s son Ali Zayn al-Abidin (the fourth Shiite 
Imam) and his sister Zaynab––were spared, and along with Husayn’s severed head, taken 
to Yazid in Damascus. After the slaughter the camp was put to fire.  
                                                 
9 This story did not begin to appear in descriptions of the battle of Karbala until several centuries after the 
fact. See for instance, Heniz Halm, Shi`a Islam: From Religion to Revolution. Princeton: Markus Weiner 
Publishers, 1999, pp. 15-16. 
10 The Miracle Play of Hasan and Husain, Collected from oral tradition by Col. Sir Lewis Pelly, Vol. 1, 
London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1879, pp. 66 and 88. 
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The tragedy of Karbala is perhaps the single most important event in the early 
formation of the Shiite religion.11  Before the martyrdom of Husayn, the supporters of Ali 
and his sons practiced the same form of Islam as their non-Shia rivals. Indeed, historian 
Heinz Helm suggests that the tragedy of Karbala “marked the ‘big bang’ that created the 
cosmos of Shiism and brought it into motion.”12 It was through the mournful 
commemoration of Ashura that the Shia began to develop a separate religious identity.13  
The Kufan Shia began the tradition of commemorating Ashura soon after the events at 
Karbala. Members of this community were burdened with an intense shame due to their 
failure to aid Husayn and his companions against Umayyad aggression. Instead, out of 
fear of the Umayyad authorities, the Kufan Shia—who had encouraged Husayn to come 
to Kufa with the promise of joining his struggle—did not rebel and were left with a guilt, 
that for many, was worse than death.14 In remorse, these Shia began commemorating 
Ashura in informal gatherings during which they would pray for Husayn and his 
companions and beseech God for forgiveness. A subset of this community, led by 
Sulayman Ibn Surad, looked for a more emphatic solution to their suffering. This group, 
known as the Penitents (tawwabun), wanted to die as Husayn had died in an attempt to 
absolve their sins for failing to come to the Imam’s assistance.   Eventually they decided 
to lead a campaign against Umayyad forces that they intended lose. In early 685 they 
engaged a much larger Umayyad military contingent and most—as they had hoped—
were killed.  
Halm has argued that the movement of the Kufan Penitents marked the true 
beginning of the Shiite religion, as it “expressed all the essential elements and concepts 
of Shi`i piety. The willingness for self-sacrifice is the most outstanding feature, and it has 
remained unchanged to the present day . . .”15 Such thinking often links the campaign of 
the Penitents and their religious quest for martyrdom to the modern self-sacrifice (or 
“suicide”) operations undertaken by Shiite militants in such places as Iran and Lebanon, 
                                                 
11 Also see, Hodgson, Marshall G. S. "How Did the Early Shi'a Become Sectarian?" Journal of the 
American Oriental Society. Vol. 75, no. 1 (1955): 1-13. 
12 Halm, Shi`a Islam, 8-16. 
13 On the Ashura commemoration see, Yitzhak Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of 
'Ashura'." Die Welt des Islams 33 (1993): 161-181.  
14 S.H.M. Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi'a Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002, pp. 222-233. 
15 Halm, Shi’a Islam, 20. 
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but I would not suggest such a direct correlation. Instead, it is preferable to understand 
the sacrifice of the Penitents as part of the growing symbolism of Shiite piety and 
religious culture. As Halm suggests, the Penitents are part of the larger development of 
Shiite identity begun by the mourning faithful of Kufa. The ritualized practices of this 
group gradually increased in popularity and spread throughout the greater Shiite 
community. In this way, what originated as localized redemptive acts among the Shia of 
Kufa wherein the stories of the martyrs of Karbala, especially that of Husayn, were 
recounted, slowly emerged as the central tradition of Shiite Islam.   
Later Developments in Shiism and the Rise of the Clergy 
Following the events of Karbala and the campaign of the Penitents, the majority of 
Shiites turned inwards and practiced a quietist form of their religion for several 
centuries.16  Husayn’s defeat ended the period of Imam-led military revolts and ushered 
in a period wherein the Imams lived in virtual house arrest under Sunni rulers. This 
contributed to the depoliticization of the role of the Imams in the Shiite community and 
to their marginalization in the political sphere of the Muslim world.17  
Although understanding the lives of the eight Imams subsequent to Husayn is 
important, providing adequate discussion of their careers is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. However, a few brief points should be made.  Each of these eight Imams lived 
under some sort of house arrest and none were able to exercise complete political control 
over the Shia community.  They lived as political prisoners to the Sunni regimes that 
ruled the Islamic world during this period. Although these Imams remained the center of 
the Shiite community, they had limited political influence. In order to keep the Shia 
marginalized and oppressed, Shiites believe that all of the Imams (except for the Twelfth 
and final Imam) were killed by Sunni political forces, with most (like Hasan, the second 
Imam) murdered by way of poisoning.   
                                                 
16 This is not to say that other political revolts did not occur. See, S.A. Arjomand’s The Shadow of the 
Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
17 Denis McEoin, "Aspects of Militancy and Quietism in Imami Shi`ism." Bulletin (British Society for 
Middle Eastern Studies) Vol.11, no. 1 (1984), pp. 18-20. 
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The case of the Twelfth Imam is more complicated. Shiites believe that the final 
(Twelfth) Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, never died, but rather passed into a spiritual 
occultation. Shiites contend this Imam will one day return and lead the Shia in an 
apocalyptic battle against the forces of evil, purify Islam, and restore justice to the world. 
A tenth century Shiite text serves as an example of how Shiites imagine the return of the 
“Hidden” Imam:  
[A] cry (will come) from the sky (in such a way) that all the people will 
hear it in their own languages; a face and a chest will appear in the sky 
before the people in the centre of the sun; the dead will arise from their 
graves so that they will return to the world and they will recognize one 
another and visit one another; that will come to an end with twenty-four 
continuous rain storms and the land will be revived by them after being 
dead and it will recognize its blessings; after that every disease will be 
taken away from those of the Shi`a of the Mahdi, peace be upon him, who 
believe in the truth; at that time they will know of his appearance in Mecca 
and they will go to him to support him ... In his [the Mahdi’s] time, 
injustice will be removed and the roads will be safe. The earth will 
produce its benefits and every due will be restored to its proper person.  
No people of any other religions will remain without being shown Islam 
and confessing faith in it ... At that time, men will not find any place to 
give alms nor be generous because wealth will encompass all the 
believers.18  
The disappearance or occultation (ghayba) of the Imam Mahdi (“the rightly guided one”), 
and the messianic expectations surrounding his return (raj`a) are significant elements of 
the Shiite religion. The absence of the Twelfth Imam ended the line of Shiite Imams that 
began with Ali and led to a political and spiritual crisis within Shiism. The Shia believed 
that only an Imam could rightfully lead the Muslim community. Also, the Imam was the 
only one who had the authority to lead Friday prayers and declare an offensive jihad (i.e. 
a military campaign to spread the Islamic faith and expand its geographical domains). 
Without a living, infallible Imam interacting with Muslim society Shiites were forced to 
question the very legitimacy of temporal Muslim rule.  This quandary led to the rise of 
the Shiite ulama or clergy as the de facto leaders of the Shiite community in the absence 
of the Imam.19 
                                                 
18 Shaykh al-Mufid, Kitab al-Irshad. Translation provided in Halm, Shi`a Islam, p. 37. 
19 Said Amir Arjomand has written extensively on the Shiite tradition of occultation and to responses to the 
absence of the 12th Imam. See for instance, S.A. Arjomand, “Imam Absconditus and the Beginnings of a 
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The Shiite ulama, or clergy, were the first Shiites to grapple with the complexities 
of temporal rule without an Imam. 20  These scholars, trained in the religious sciences and 
Shiite jurisprudence, slowly emerged as the religious authorities within the Shiite 
community.  Over the next few centuries Shiite clergy established a similar legal system 
to that of their Sunni counterparts.21 Although these scholars developed a strong 
intellectual tradition during this period, which focused on rationalist arguments and 
textual evidence, popular Shiite piety continued to be centered on the oral narratives of 
the Imam Husayn and similar Shiite lore. By the sixteenth century, it was the power of 
these stories and the rituals surrounding their commemoration that continued to serve as 
the basis for popular Shiite identity and activism. Clerical influence remained marginal 
and mostly confined to important Shiite urban centers in Iran and Iraq.22 
A major turning point for Shiism came in 1501 when Ismail Safavi, the spiritual 
leader of a Shiite Sufi brotherhood, led a tribal military conquest of Iran and established 
that country’s first Shiite dynasty. Ismail, who had earlier claimed to be the Mahdi (or 
return of the Hidden Imam), declared himself shah (king) and decreed that Shiism would 
be the state religion of Iran. Although Ismail had originally claimed to be the return of the 
Hidden Imam, this fact was initially minimized and later ignored by his successors who 
instead claimed to rule on behalf of the Hidden Imam.  In this way, the Safavid shahs, 
who claimed to be the representatives of the Hidden Imam on earth, found a unique 
solution to the question of temporal rule, where they ruled at the pleasure of the Hidden 
Imam but still awaited his return.23 
                                                                                                                                                 
Theology of Occultation: Imami Shi‘ism Circa 280-90 A. H./900 A. D.” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 117, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1997), pp. 1-12; “The Consolation of Theology: Absence of the Imam 
and Transition from Chiliasm to Law in Shi‘ism.” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 
548-571; and, “The Crisis of the Imamate and the Institution of Occultation in Twelver Shiism: A 
Sociohistorical Perspective.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 
491-515. 
20 See, Newman, Andrew J.  The Formative Period of Twelver Shi'ism. Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000. 
21 On the development of Shiite jurisprudence see, Devin J. Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver 
Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998; Hossein 
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi'ite Islam: Abu- Ja'far Ibn Qiba Al-
Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi'ite Thought. Princeton: Darwin Press, 1993; and, Etan Kohlberg, 
Belief and Law in Imami Shi'ism. Aldershot, Hampshire, Great Britain, & Brookfield, Vt., USA: Variorum; 
Gower Pub. Co., 1991. 
22 See for instance, Said Amir Arjomand, Shadow of the Hidden Imam. 
23 See Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes in Early Modern Iran. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Center of Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, 2002; also, Sholeh Quinn, 
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Iran was majority Sunni at this time with only a small Shiite minority.  This made 
the spread of Shiism within Iran a difficult task for Shah Ismail and his successors.  To 
help them in their effort, the Safavid shahs turned to Shiite scholars from the Arab world 
and offered them state patronage to relocate to Iran.24 The introduction of Shiite scholars 
to the political scene helped the Safavid state routinize Shiite practice, law, and tradition 
within their territories. As the head of this campaign, Shiite clergy were granted a level of 
political influence they had not previously enjoyed.25 This created a sort of power-
sharing arrangement between the Shiite clerical class and the Safavid shahs, which 
granted the former jurisdiction over the religious affairs of the Safavid state while the 
latter claimed to rule at the behest of the Hidden Imam.  
                                                                                                                                                
Through the reign of the Safavid Shahs (1501–1722) Shiism gradually emerged as 
the religion of Iran’s majority.  The process of converting Iran was slow and gradual, and 
ultimately owed more to the growing influence of Shiite popular culture—especially the 
spread of narratives about the Imams Ali and Husayn—than to the empowerment of the 
Shiite clergy.26 The clergy, however, gained unparalleled influence over their Shiite 
constituents during this time, which made them among the most powerful political actors 
in Iran. 
By the nineteenth century, debates within the clerical ranks began to consider a 
way that would help centralize clerical control over the Shiite community. Up until this 
time, religious authority was dispersed among numerous clerics, who held generally 
limited and localized authority. The leading Shiite clergy wanted to establish a system of 
authority wherein the top-ranking cleric would be the central authority for all Shiites in 
the world.  These debates gave birth to the institution of the marja-e taqlid, or the “point 
of emulation”—an office to be held by the most senior Shiite cleric. This cleric, or marja, 
would be the person to whom all lay Shiites had to “emulate” or imitate in matters 
 
Historical writing during the reign of Shah Abbas: ideology, imitation, and legitimacy in Safavid 
chronicles. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2000. 
24 On the emigration of Arab Shiite scholars to Iran, see Rula Abisaab’s Converting Persia: Religion and 
Power in the Safavid Empire. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004; also see, Andrew J. Newman, "The Myth of the 
Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to 'Ali Al-Karaki and Safawid Shiism." Die 
Welt des Islams 33 (1993): 66-112. 
25 For more on the role of Shiite scholars in Safavid Iran, see Arjomand, Shadow of the Hidden Imam, 122-
159. 
26 On the spread of Shiism through popular culture in Iran during the Safavid period, see Kathryn 
Babayan’s Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs. 
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concerning religious life. In theory, there would be only one marja for the entire Shia 
world, and all Shiites would have to follow his decrees.27 However, the institution of the 
marja-e taqlid only lasted in this form through the tenures of the first two marjas. 
Afterwards, and through most of the twentieth century, several of the day’s top-ranking 
clergy could hold the rank of marja simultaneously. Their influence, instead of being 
universal, would be more regional in nature.28 
The creation of the institution of the marja-e taqlid was an important turning 
point in Shiite clerical authority as it expanded both the social and political influence of 
the clergy over Shiite society.  An example of this came during Iran’s Tobacco Revolt of 
1890–91—an episode that occurred in response to growing Western intervention and 
imperialism in the Muslim world.29 The British were especially active in this era, 
establishing imperial control over the Indian subcontinent and initiating exploitative 
commercial ventures across the Middle East. In one such venture, a British businessman 
was granted a monopoly over the production, export, and sale of all Iranian tobacco by 
the Qajar Shah of Iran (Qajar Dynasty, 1796-1925).  News of this concession in March 
1890—leaked to the public by anti-imperialist factions within the Qajar regime—caused 
popular protests across Iran. As historian Nikki Keddie explains,  
The tobacco concession elicited far more protest than any other because it 
dealt not with areas that were unexploited, or almost so, by Iranian 
businessmen, but rather with a product widely grown in Iran, and profiting 
many landholders, shopkeepers, and exporters.30  
 
Thus the tobacco concession affected nearly every strata of Iranian society. In December 
1891, a fatwa (religious edict) attributed to the Shiite marja-e taqlid of the time, Mirza 
Hasan Shirazi, was issued calling for a nationwide boycott of tobacco.  With the religious 
authority and legitimacy of the marja-e taqlid behind this order, Shiites of the region 
from every class and standing (reportedly including the Shah’s own wives) staged a 
                                                 
27 See, Meir Litvak, Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
28 For a comparative treatment of the institution of the Marja through the contemporary period see, Linda S. 
Walbridge, ed. The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the Marja' Taqlid. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
29 See, Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892. London: Cass, 
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successful boycott and massive protests that forced the Shah to cancel the concession.  
Although significant in and of itself, this event also marked the first time the Shiite 
populace was encouraged into political protest by a ruling marja, and signaled the 
emergence of the Shiite clergy as a leading force against Western imperialism.31  
PART TWO: THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN IRAN 
Roots of the Islamic Movement in the Twentieth Century 
The long twentieth century saw the disintegration of empires, the rise of nation-states, the 
emergence of two superpowers, and the fall of one.  This ebb and flow of global political 
power drastically affected the Middle East. The European powers of Britain and France 
reinvigorated their imperialistic hold on the Middle East in the first half of the century 
only to see these adventures collapse in the second.  Later, during the Cold War, Middle 
Eastern states were used as pawns in the global chess match between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  By the end of the century, the legacy of Western imperialism left 
much of the Middle East embroiled in political and social instability. 
The political impotence of Middle Eastern states and their leaders in resisting 
foreign domination caused unrest throughout the region. The influence of Western 
secularism drew the ire of religious traditionalists while the political oppression of 
Western-backed dictators inspired the activism of progressive elements. Dissent was 
fueled by the introduction and development of numerous political ideologies such as 
communism, socialism, and nationalism, which gained particular popularity among 
secularists and certain ethnic and religious minorities.  The spread of these ideologies 
also caused a backlash by the religious sector, which considered secularism (in all its 
forms) to be a major threat to Islam. In order to counteract the influence of these 
ideologies and Western secularism, Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders began to 
develop their own political ideologies, which put an emphasis on the superiority of Islam 
over all other political systems. These ideologies, commonly referred to as Islamism, 
political Islam, or fundamentalism, gave motivation and religious legitimacy to political 
                                                 
31 See, Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: the tobacco protest of 1891-1892. London: Cass, 
1966; also, Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar 
Period. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 184-221. 
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and militant organizations throughout the region. Although these ideologies have had a 
significant influence on both Sunni and Shiite societies, their impact on the latter, 
especially in Iran, has been more pronounced.32 
Muslim activism against the spread of Western culture and the adoption of 
Western forms of government was a powerful force in Iran during the first half of the 
twentieth century.  During Iran’s Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911—a popular 
movement that established a constitution and democratically elected parliament (majles) 
under Iran’s Qajar regime—Muslim leaders denounced the idea of a parliamentary 
government as a secular threat to Islam.33 Leading the anti-parliamentarianism campaign 
was Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri, a Shiite cleric and the chief organizer of clerical opposition 
to the Iranian parliament. Nuri articulated his faction’s objections to parliamentary 
government in a series of published letters distributed throughout Iran and the Shiite 
centers of Iraq.  Many of his objections concerned provisions in Iran’s constitution which 
expanded the rights of women, allowed for freedom of the press, and gave equal rights to 
nationalities and religions.  These innovations, Nuri argued, were against the “Sacred 
Law” of Islam and undermined the traditional authority of the ulama.  Further, Nuri was 
troubled by the European trappings of the Iranian parliament and constitution, which 
seemed to devalue the divinity of Islam. On this Nuri wrote: “Fireworks, receptions of the 
ambassadors, those foreign habits, the crying of hurrah, all those inscriptions of Long 
Live, Long Live! (zendeh bad)! Long Live Equality, Fraternity. Why not ... Long Live 
the Sacred Law, Long Live the Qur’an, Long Live Islam?”34   
Nuri wanted to secure the centrality of traditional Islamic law (sharia) in Iran, 
which he felt was being weakened and replaced by Western-inspired civil law. To ensure 
the integrity of Islamic law in Iran, Nuri’s camp pressed for and received changes to the 
                                                 
32 On the roots and development of political Islam see, Nikkie R. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal Al-Din Afghani. 
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constitution which made all parliamentary legislation subject to ratification by a 
committee of five top-ranking clerics.  In doing so, Nuri proved the power of the clergy 
in organizing resistance to any threat to Islamic law and traditional clerical authority in 
Iran. Although his faction ultimately crumbled—and Nuri later killed by constitutionalist 
supporters—he set a precedent within Iranian Shiism by giving the traditionally apolitical 
clergy a significant political role in the state government—a precedent that laid the 
foundation for Iran’s post-revolutionary theocratic government.35 
Nuri’s movement dwindled in the following years. With leading Shiite clergy 
returned to their traditional political quietism, Iran underwent a military coup d’état that 
toppled the Qajar dynasty and brought Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925-1941) and his family 
to power. The new Pahlavi regime, led by Reza Shah, instituted several modernizing and 
westernizing reforms inspired by the secular nationalism of Kemalist Turkey.  The new 
reforms took aim at traditional religion in Iranian society. Veiling for women was banned 
and other religious garb was restricted. Turbans were to be replaced by western hats and 
traditional robes for the western suit. Although Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his 
thrown in 1941 by the Allied powers, his son and successor—the ineffectual Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi—bore much of the fallout for his father’s policies.36 
One Shiite scholar vocal in opposition to the Pahlavi reforms was the young 
Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989).37 Like Nuri before him, Khomeini’s main concern at 
this time was the perceived dilutions of Islamic law and the clergy’s traditional role in 
society.  Khomeini not only considered clerical authority under attack by the secular 
Pahlavi regime, but also threatened by intellectuals and Muslim reformists. Khomeini 
was particularly worried about religious reformers, such as the Iranian historian Ahmad 
Kasravi, who he accused of espousing similar anti-clerical ideas as the Wahhabis of the 
Arabian peninsula. (Or, as Khomeini put it: the anti-clerical reformists who imitated “Ibn 
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Taymiyya and the savages of Najd” and “the camel-herders of Riyadh.”38) Khomeini 
argued: 
You [secular intellectuals and Muslim reformists] want to reduce the 
power of the clergy and to eliminate its honour among the people, you are 
committing the greatest treason to the country. The undermining of 
clerical influence produces defects in the country one hundredth of which 
hundreds of Ministers of Justice and Police Departments cannot repair.39  
Khomeini also took the Pahlavi regime to task for its reforms concerning dress, writing: 
“They have put chamber-pot-shaped hats over your heads and gladdened your hearts with 
naked [i.e. unveiled] women in the middle of the streets and swimming pools.”40  These 
statements exemplify Khomeini’s rhetorical approach to defending Shiite traditionalism 
and clerical authority from the onslaught of secularism and foreign influence. In this 
regard, his political project can be seen as an extension of Nuri’s during the 
Constitutional Revolution. This period of Khomeini’s activism marked the young cleric’s 
entrance into the political sphere; an arena he would come to dominate later in his 
career.41 
World War Two brought increased foreign influence and intervention to Iran.  
Both the British and the Soviets had strategic and economic interests in Iran and used 
their political might to undermine and weaken the Pahlavi regime’s autonomy.  The 
British and Soviet militaries respectively occupied southern and northern Iran during the 
war and continued to have troops on the ground for years to come. The Soviets used their 
supremacy in the north to instigate uprisings among the Azeri Turkish (1945) and 
Kurdish (1946) minorities of Iran’s northwest.42 The United States also had a small 
presence in Iran during this time, sending advisors such as Col. Norman Schwarzkopf to 
help develop Iran’s gendarmerie and internal security force along the American model.   
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Despite the political interests of the Soviets their paramount concern centered on 
Iran’s oil.43 However, while the Soviets and American’s were blocked from gaining oil 
concessions by Iran’s Majles, the British had already established a monopoly over Iran’s 
vast oil reserves in the south through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).44  Anglo-
Iranian’s control over Iran’s southern oil fields was granted in a concession by the Qajar 
Shah in 1909.  Resentment against this concession had been steadily growing throughout 
Iran since before the war and by the late 1940s it had become the number one issue 
among Iran’s opposition factions.  Iranian discontentment focused on two key issues: 1) 
the exploitative financial arrangement between the Iranian government and AIOC, which 
saw Iran receiving less that 25% of AIOC’s annual profits; 2) the appalling working and 
living conditions of Iranian laborers at the AIOC refinery in Abadan (southwestern Iran).  
The director of Iran’s petroleum institute during this period comments on the predicament 
of Iranian AIOC workers: 
Wages were fifty cents a day. There was no vacation pay, no sick leave, 
no disability compensation. The workers lived in a shantytown called 
Kaghazabad, or Paper City, without running water or electricity, let alone 
such luxuries as iceboxes or fans. In winter the earth flooded and became a 
flat, perspiring lake. The mud in town was knee-deep ... When the rains 
subsided, clouds of nipping, small-winged flies rose from the stagnant 
waters to fill the nostrils, collecting in black mounds ... and jamming the 
fans at the refinery ... Summer was worse ... The heat was horrid, the 
worst I’ve ever known—sticky and unrelenting—while the wind and 
sandstorms whipped off the desert hot as a blower. The dwellings in 
Kaghazabad, cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat, turned into 
sweltering ovens ... In every crevice hung the foul, sulfurous stench of 
burning oil—a pungent reminder that everyday twenty-thousand barrels, 
or one million tons a year, were being consumed indiscriminately for the 
functioning of the refinery, and AIOC never paid the [Iranian] government 
a cent for it.45  
These comments echo the sentiments felt by Iranian activists during this period. While 
the nationalist faction led by lawyer and Majles member Mohammad Mossadeq 
spearheaded the campaign against the AIOC, activists connected to senior Shiite 
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leadership took the most drastic steps.46 The Fada’iyan-e Islam, a small group of young 
radicals associated with the prominent Shiite cleric Ayatollah Abo’l-Qasem Kashani, 
gained considerable notoriety for a series of high-profile assassinations during the 1940s 
and 1950s.47 Formed in 1945 by Sayyed Mojtaba Navvab-Safavi, a young Shiite 
seminarian and former AIOC employee, the Fada’iyan-e Islam were the first Shiite 
Islamist organization to employ terrorism as a primary method of political activism. 
Similar to Khomeini, Navvab-Safavi first came to public attention in 1945 for his 
outspoken public lectures in Abadan castigating the “evil” anti-clericalism promoted in 
Ahmad Kasravi’s writings. A year later, Navvab-Safavi and two of his followers (with 
the blessings of Shiite religious leaders) assassinated Kasravi and the writer’s secretary.  
The assassination of Kasravi was hailed by some Shiite clergy as a righteous act.48 The 
Fada’iyan later articulated the motivation for Kasravi’s murder in their newspaper 
Manshur-e Baradari (The Brotherhood Circular): 
For the first time in 1324 [1946], the sparkling fire of these manly youth 
burned the life and existence of Ahmad Kasravi, who was the greatest tool 
of the British imperialists and who was the agent assigned to create 
division among Muslims and to prepare the grounds for exploitative 
domination ... The bullet that struck his brain forced the British to retreat 
for a few years.49  
Over the next few years the Fada’iyan continued to assassinate prominent political 
figures. Their most notorious killing was that of Iran’s Prime Minister, Ali Razmara. 
Razmara had been in charge of negotiating a new oil agreement with the AIOC, but the 
agreement he proposed to the Majles went against popular sentiment of the period, which 
favored nationalization of the oil industry. Blamed as the main impediment to oil 
nationalization, Razmara was assassinated in 1951 by the Fada’iyan. Navvab-Safavi later 
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took credit for the assassination in 1954 during a speech to the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, reportedly telling the crowd of fellow Muslim activists: “I killed Razmara.”50  
After the assassination of Razmara, Ayatollah Kashani broke off support for the 
Fada’iyan. Kashani had entered into the National Front coalition of Mohammad 
Mossadeq, and once the latter had been installed as Prime Minister in April 1951, 
Kashani could no longer be an advocate for the Fada’iyan’s anti-governmental violence. 
This split also signaled a growing divide between the more quietist senior clergy and the 
growing militancy of a younger generation. Even though the Fada’iyan saw their project 
as a continuation of Fazlollah Nuri’s pro-clerical struggle, their militancy and use of 
terrorism marked their movement as the beginning of something new. In the 
organization’s manifesto the Fada’iyan proclaim their readiness to restore Islamic purity 
to Iran, purge all signs and manifestations of Western imperialistic influence from 
Muslim society through the violence. To this end, the Fada’iyan warned Iran’s leaders: 
If you do not follow our instructions immediately or are slipshod in 
carrying them out, with the help of God, we shall destroy you and take 
revenge for the disrespect and crimes that you have committed against 
Islam and Muslims. We shall establish the just and rightful Islamic 
government and carry out all the rules of Islam. We shall put an end to the 
long-lived miseries of the Muslim Iranian nation with the help of God.51  
Thus, with the Fada’iyan a new ideological strand of Shiite Islam began to emerge: an 
ideology that promoted both pro-clerical and anti-imperialist positions through the direct 
political activism of militancy and anti-governmental terrorism.  
Mohammad Mossadeq came to power on an anti-imperialist platform that 
advocated the nationalization of Iran’s oil. With a broad coalition that included secularist, 
communist, and religious parties, Mossadeq began his short-lived tenure as Prime 
Minister (1951-1953) by signing a bill that nationalized Iran’s oil industry. This move 
infuriated the British, who not only considered Iranian oil to be their rightful domain but 
also feared that reverberations of Iran’s nationalization would undermine their interests in 
other parts of the Third World.52  The British set plans in motion to retake Iran’s oil 
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fields by force; however, US President Harry Truman intervened and called a halt to 
British aggression. Truman, who was sympathetic to the demands of the Iranians, tried to 
solve the dispute diplomatically. The intransigence of both the British and Mossadeq 
hindered Truman’s efforts from gaining any traction. The British and their allies 
organized a blockade against Iran’s oil exports which had a crippling affect on the Iranian 
economy and weakened Mossadeq’s position at home. When President Dwight 
Eisenhower took office in 1953, his administration quickly turned against Mossadeq due 
to the later unfounded fear that the increasingly alienated Mossadeq would turn to the 
Soviet’s for support. Through a conspiracy between the CIA, MI6, and anti-Mossadeq 
elements in Iran, the CIA orchestrated a coup d'état that toppled Mossadeq and reinstalled 
Mohammad Reza Shah on 19 August 1953.  This coup, codenamed “Operation Ajax,” 
marked an end to Mossadeq’s popular anti-imperialist campaign and introduced the 
United States as the dominant foreign power in Iran.53 
The Islamic Movement and Revolutionary Ideology 
After the 1953 coup, the clergy––who had largely turned against Mossadeq near the end 
of his tenure––briefly aligned themselves with the Shah’s regime and were allowed a 
limited degree of political freedom.54 Without prominent clerical support, anti-
governmental activism met with little success. For instance, a failed assassination attempt 
on the new Prime Minister in 1955 by a Fada’iyan member led to the arrests of several 
Fada’iyan activists and the execution of its top four leaders (including Navvab-Safavi) in 
1956.55  Such stiff government action forced most anti-imperialist and religious activists 
to remain underground for the next several years.  During this time, the Third World was 
experiencing great upheaval. Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal (1956), the Cuban 
revolution (1959), and the Algerian war for independence (1954-62), were but a few 
monumental episodes that signified the power of anti-imperialist movements and the 
successes they could achieve. Combined with the Shah’s repressive policies and the 
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increasing political influence of the United States, revolutionary movements and the 
literatures and symbols they produced helped fuel anti-imperialist and anti-governmental 
dissent in Iran.  By the early 1960s Iranian intellectuals and religious leaders began to 
develop their own revolutionary ideas that were both inspired by and in response to the 
ideologies of Third World resistance. These Islamic ideologies used Shiite culture and 
symbolism as mediums through which new forms of radical political idealism were 
expressed.56 
 The spread of revolutionary literature emanating from the Third World influenced 
some of Iran’s leading intellectuals. One of these, Ali Shariati, became familiar with 
revolutionary politics and ideology while pursuing a Ph.D. in sociology at the University 
of Paris.57 By 1962, Shariati had become convinced that only a revolutionary movement 
could topple the Pahlavi regime and liberate Iran from Western imperialism. In Paris, 
Shariati became familiar with the anti-colonialist works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz 
Fanon.  Frantz Fanon’s writings had a particular effect on Shariati, so much so that 
Shariati translated Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth (1961) into Persian, entitling the 
Persian edition Oppressed (mostaz`afin) of the Earth. In this book, Fanon addresses 
“natives” of the Third World encouraging them to rise up against Western colonialism 
and create new societies, which instead of merely imitating the West would find their 
own path. Drawing on his experiences fighting for the Front de Libération Nationale 
(FLN) during the Algerian war against France, Fanon argued that foreign dominion over 
Third World societies was inherently violent, and as such, required greater violence to 
overcome: 
The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and 
that of force first and foremost ... [C]olonialism only loosens its hold when 
the knife is at its throat ... [it] is not a thinking machine, nor a body 
endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it 
will only yield when confronted with greater violence.58  
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Inspired by Fanon, Shariati developed an entirely new interpretation of Shiism, 
reformulating the religion into a revolutionary ideology.  Shariati argued that God had 
created Islam as a dynamic ideology to lead the Muslim community (ummat) to a 
classless utopia. In this schema, Islamic terms such as towhid (monotheism) and jihad 
were recast as “social solidarity” and “liberation struggle.” The Imams Ali and Husayn 
became revolutionary heroes, with the latter likened to a premodern Che Guevera.59  
Husayn’s battle at Karbala became the ultimate metaphor for revolutionary struggle of 
the oppressed versus the oppressors. For Shariati, Shiism was a complete ideology 
superior to all other political systems including capitalism and Marxism—the latter 
having gained wide currency in Third World resistance movements.  In his words: 
Shiites do not accept the path chosen by history. They negate the 
leadership which ruled over history and deceived the majority of the 
people [i.e. Sunnism] through its succession to the Prophet ...  Shiites turn 
their backs on the opulent mosques and magnificent palaces of the caliphs 
of Islam and turn to the lonely, mud house of Fatima. Shiites, who 
represent the oppressed, justice-seeking class in the caliphate system, find, 
in this house, whatever and whoever they have been seeking [to over 
throw the existing order].60  
Shariati also considered the clergy and their centuries-old hold over Islam to be one of 
the main impediments to the progression of Muslim society. He argued that there were 
two versions of Shiism: “red” Shiism—the true essence of revolutionary Islam—and 
“black” Shiism—the stagnant tradition under the clergy (i.e. what Shiism had become).61  
In order to restore true, “red” Shiism, Shariati felt that it was incumbent upon 
intellectuals (rowshanfekran) to “rediscover and revitalize the original meaning of 
revolutionary Islam.”62  In this way Shariati considered both his writing and teaching to 
be laying the groundwork for the revitalization of Shiite Islam and revolution in Iran. 
Shariati’s message inspired scores of activists during the 1960s and 1970s.  He 
was considered by some leaders of the Iranian revolution of 1979 to be the ideologue of 
the revolution.  His mix of Marxist ideology, third wordlist anti-imperialism, Shiite 
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symbolism, and Iranian nationalism proved to be a powerful combination.  Young 
Muslim activists, who found the traditionalism of the clergy lacking in political 
sophistication and vigor, were inspired by Shariati’s leftist radicalism and its strong 
Islamic foundation.63  Most clergy, however, considered Shariati dangerous to Islam and 
a secular Marxist in disguise.  His pro-intellectual and anti-clerical stance enraged the 
religious leaders, who accused him of “Wahhabist” (i.e. anti-clerical) tendencies.  
Mohsen Makhmalbaf, noted contemporary filmmaker and a teenage activist during this 
period, relates how he was inspired by a local mosque preacher to confront and perhaps 
assassinate Shariati: 
And so, it was around this time that Shari’ati was coming to be known. 
We were already beginning to think more seriously about armed 
resistance, and so when this person Shari’ati came along and was starting 
to undermine Shiite causes, it seemed crucial to find him. I went with 
some of the other guys to investigate whether or not to kill Shari’ati ... I 
went [to his school] and listened to him speak, to hear what he was 
saying—I was thinking who is this person they [the clergy] say is 
attacking Imam Ali?  He spoke for four hours, and I never returned to that 
mosque. I became a devotee of Shari’ati . . . The next day I began 
distributing Shari’ati’s books, and they barred me from the mosque, from 
the library, people from the neighborhood began to avoid me, and I was 
treated like an infidel. But I kept on buying Shari’ati’s books and giving 
them to my friends ... I read all of his books from beginning to end, twice 
over. I became a new person.64  
Shariati was particularly popular on university campuses, where his radical 
reinterpretation of Shiism resonated with young middle-class Muslim students. Some of 
these students were inspired by Shariati’s call to take up armed resistance against the 
Pahlavi regime. The most important group to emerge at this time was the Mojahedin-e 
Khalq Organization (MKO).65  The MKO, or People’s Mojahedin, began in 1965 as a 
revolutionary guerilla movement committed to the Islamic ideology of Shariati and 
inspired by the liberation movements and anti-imperialist thought of the Third World. 
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They wanted to end foreign control over Iran, and in particular sever America’s support 
from the Pahlavi regime. After the 1953 coup, the United States had an increasingly 
visible presence in Iran. As the US was the main foreign patron of the Pahlavi regime, 
many Iranian activists considered America complicit in the Shah’s repressive policies.  
Thus, in order to undermine the Shah, the MKO decided to target American interests and 
personnel in Iran.  Like the Fada’iyan-e Islam before them, the MKO used targeted 
assassinations and terrorism as their method of political activism, murdering several 
American servicemen and civilian contractors in the 1970s.  However, unlike the 
Fada’iyan, the MKO were disconnected from the clergy and advocated against traditional 
Shiite authority.  By the mid-1970s the Shah had imprisoned and executed most MKO 
activists, though a small cell under the leadership of Masud Rajavi survived and 
expanded its ranks in prison, later emerging as a significant force after the 1979 
revolution.66  
Revolutionary ideas were also gaining steam within clerical circles during this 
period. The brief rapprochement between the clergy and the Pahlavi regime had fallen 
apart by the early 1960s as the clergy renewed its vocal criticism of the Shah’s social 
reforms.67 The Shah responded with a crackdown on clerical activists, culminating in the 
violent sacking of Qom’s main theological college, Fayziyyeh, in March 1963.  This 
event further radicalized a number of leading clerics and seminary students and provoked 
public outcry against the Pahlavi regime. At the head of this dissent was Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who had become the leading clerical opponent to the Shah.  Khomeini 
considered the Shah’s crackdown on the clergy an attempt to destroy Islam in Iran. In 
June of that year, during the Shiite commemoration of Ashura, Khomeini delivered a 
speech which likened the Shah’s oppression of the clergy to the violent oppression of the 
early Imams by the Umayyads. Just as the Umayyads had tried to destroy the family of 
Muhammad, Khomeini argued, the Shah’s actions proved the regime was “fundamentally 
opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class.” Khomeini also played on 
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anti-imperialist themes evoking the memory of the British and Soviet occupations during 
World War II, and suggested Israel had influenced the Shah’s attack.68 
By 1964, intense clashes between pro-clerical elements and government forces 
resulted in Khomeini’s exile. Traveling first to Turkey and then settling in the Shiite 
center of Najaf, Iraq for thirteen years, Khomeini continued to criticize the Pahlavi 
regime and call for its overthrow. It was during this period that Khomeini articulated his 
solution to the dilemmas facing Muslim nations as the establishment of Islamic 
governments.69 Khomeini argued that following the usurpation of Ali’s rule by Muawiya, 
Islamic society had been governed by monarchies that separated temporal authority from 
religious authority. It was this division—akin to the separation of church and state—that 
was the root of Islam’s present predicament. For Islam to truly reach its potential, 
Khomeini contended, Muslim states must be led by the clergy.  Khomeini termed this 
form of Islamic government the velayat-e faqih or the “guardianship of the jurist.” In 
Khomeini’s estimation, a true Islamic government must be headed by a senior cleric 
(marja-e taqlid) or by a committee of similarly high-ranking clergy (fuqaha). This role 
would give the ruling jurist (vali-ye faqih) the same temporal function (but not status) as 
the Imams. The jurist would be in charge of “the administration of the country, and the 
implementation of the sacred laws of the shari`a.”70 Khomeini argued that establishing 
the government of the jurist would “deliver Islamic countries from the clutches of 
imperialism,” and restore justice to Islamic society.71 
Although Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih was unpopular among the 
leading clergy of the early 1970s—as it went against the clergy’s traditional aversion to 
government involvement—his influence over the revolutionary movement in Iran 
continued to grow. Through the distribution of works and sermons, Khomeini’s 
popularity became widespread.  Khomeini used vague catchphrases––such as “Islam is 
for equality and social justice,” “Islam will eliminate class differences,” and “The duty of 
the clergy is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the rich”––which played to 
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populist sentiments and employed similar slogans to inspire the Shiite masses.72 One of 
these––the oft-cited “Every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala”––evoked the memory 
of the Imam Husayn and equated current socio-political upheavals with the Imam 
Husayn’s righteous struggle against injustice and oppression. By the revolutionary period 
of 1978-79, Khomeini had positioned himself as both a staunch anti-imperialist and a 
champion of Islam. The main elements of Khomeini’s political thought, what I will call 
Khomeinism—radical anti-imperialism, economically-conscious Shiite populism, and 
Islamic government under clerical rule—garnered him wide support among Islamist 
segments of the guerilla movement, activist clergy, and other revolutionary leaders.  Such 
support and that of the hopeful masses enabled Khomeini and his supporters to seize 
control of post-revolutionary Iran and establish an Islamic Republic under the rule of the 
guardian jurist (vali-ye faqih).  
Conclusion 
Early events in Shiite history, especially those involving the Imams Ali and Husayn, as 
well as the perpetual expectation of the Hidden Imam’s return, are not only foundational 
to the Shiite religious tradition, they are also central to contemporary Shiite politics and 
activism. For example, the events at Karbala have become a chief metaphor in Shiism for 
the battle against good versus evil, or justice against injustice. In times of political or 
social turmoil, the image of Husayn fighting against all odds at Karbala has been evoked 
by religious leaders, politicians, and lay-people to inspire the Shiite community into 
action.  The richness of this metaphor, its cultural and religious depth, as well as its 
eternal message, enables its use to describe virtually any conflict affecting the Shia 
world. This is especially true in pre and post-revolutionary Iran where the metaphor of 
Karbala has been an omnipresent fixture in political rhetoric and propaganda.  In this 
way, the formative events of the Shiite religion continue to imbue modern political 
rhetoric in Iran with both a sense of religious authenticity and spiritual significance. 
 Thus, the story of Shiite Islam remains central to modern political activism in 
Iran. From the conspiracy against Ali and the injustice of Husayn’s martyrdom, to the rise 
of the clerical establishment and the institutionalization of Shiite religious authority, the 
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controversies and legacies of Shiism’s history continue to animate its present. While 
history gives a semblance of unity to the Shiite tradition, it also exposes some of the 
latent fissures of Shiite society. For instance, though clerical authority is a central facet of 
Shiism, it co-exists with numerous strains of more popular-minded and sometimes anti-
clerical religious sentiment. In the modern period, the Islamic movement in Iran 
embodied both of these traditions. Clerical activists like Ayatollah Khomeini advocated 
against Western cultural influence and condemned religious reform as both were 
considered threats to traditional clerical authority. Militants like Navvab-Safavi took 
similar political positions as Khomeini and engaged in forms of coercive violence like 
murder as protest. Though Navvab-Safavi argued a pro-clerical line, and was initially 
supported by prominent clergy, he was also willing to work outside of clerical oversight 
and even clash with the clergy in the political realm. Ali Shariati introduced perhaps the 
most evocative religious ideology of this era, and did so by taking an overtly anti-clerical 
stance. Some of those activists that he inspired, such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, adopted 
this line as their own and put these ideas into effect through anti-governmental terrorism.  
Although these political positions were articulated through a Shiite cultural 
framework, they exemplify the looseness of this religious community as much as they do 
its coherence. That is, though they represent Shiite reactions to imperialism, they also 
represent the diverse understandings of what was threatened by Western domination and 
what was required to combat it. For Khomeini, the place of traditional clerical authority 
was most at stake and expanding clerical authority over the state was his proposed 
solution. Navvab-Safavi wanted to retain the traditional features of Islam and considered 
militant activism to be the most direct way of restoring traditional religion in Iran. 
Shariati, on the other hand, was immersed in nativistic responses to foreign domination 
and was as concerned with restoring authentic Shiite spirituality to Iranian society as he 
was with bringing Shiism out of its traditionalist doldrums and into a new political 
modernity. Like Navvab-Safavi, his writings also embraced armed struggle but to a 
drastically different end. 
I have emphasized certain historical episodes and modern political actors for two 
reasons: to provide a basic understanding of Shiite history and religious culture in Iran as 
background for subsequent chapters; and to introduce some of the key events and 
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individuals that influenced the IRGC and inspired militant activism in the post-
revolution. While I make sporadic examples of this in later chapters, it should be noted 
that individuals such as Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri and Mojtaba Navvab-Safavi, as well as 
other historical activists not discussed in this chapter, were celebrated by the IRGC for 
their religious activism. Indeed, Navvab-Safavi was heralded by the Revolutionary 
Guards as the “pioneer” of the Islamic movement in Iran and his anti-governmental 
militancy highly praised.73 With this in mind, it should be clear that lethal coercion and 
violent activism had a certain measure of legitimacy in the Islamic and revolutionary 
movements in Iran. As each of the ideologues and activists mentioned advocated political 
positions through a religious vernacular, the political activism they engendered likewise 
could claim to be in line with divine will. In short, what I am suggesting is that 
conceptions of legitimate violence based in traditional Shiite religion and culture have 
had a considerable impact on how violent activism has been understood and employed in 
modern Iran. That is, while the political violence generated by Shiite activists in the 
twentieth century had temporal causes and material aims, it was understood within a 
religious framework that allowed for such violence to be seen as a legitimate if not 
righteous response to perceived social injustice. This theme carries forward through the 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation and can be seen as the religious basis for military 
power in the post-revolution. 
 
                                                 






Guardians of an Islamic Revolution: 
Coercion and Consolidation in the Post-Revolution 
 (February–December 1979) 
 
 
I have said time and time again that to build a society on the basis of the principles of 
Islam is an ideological choice, not just a religious one. Islam in fact is an ideology, in 
which religion represents one aspect. In our view of the world, it is the people who 
interpret divine will and therefore the Islamic Republic can only be based on the peoples’ 
will, in other words, universal suffrage.1 
 
Our nation gave its blood to create an Islamic Republic, not a democratic republic.2 
 
—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
 
 
Violence and coercion have always been key elements in human affairs, but their specific 
forms and the meanings attached to them have changed constantly and are changing still. 
In particular, societies have always contested the distinction between “legitimate,” state-
sanction violence and coercion and its “illegitimate” counterparts, between war and peace 
and war-making and policing, between military and civilian, between insurrection or 
political violence and crime, and between legal and illegal violence, and have drawn the 
boundaries between these categories differently at different times. In making sense of all 
these distinctions, it might seem at first that little of general value can be said, except that 
coercion and violence form part of the interactive networks that hold large-scale societies 
together, as well as drive them apart (sometimes irrevocably), and that the capacity to 
assemble and deploy armed forces is an essential attribute of the state, without which it 
disappears.3 




                                                 
1 Khomeini’s January 1979 interview with Giancesare Flesca in Neauphle-le-Chateau, France, see 
“Khomeini Comments on Islamic Republic, Gas, Oil,” L’Espresso in Italian, 28 Jan. 1979, in FBIS-MEA, 7 
Feb. 1979. 
2 Khomeini’s 9 March 1979 speech in Qom, see “Khomeyni Speech at Qom Cemetery,” Tehran Domestic 
Service in Persian, in FBIS-MEA, 9 Mar. 1979. 
3 Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, p. 387. 
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On 5 May 1979, after three months of post-revolutionary confusion and turmoil, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (sepah-e pasdaran-e enqelab-e eslami) announced 
its establishment as an organ of the Provisional Government: 
In his exalted name: By the command of the illustrious leader of the 
Islamic Revolution, the Imam Khomeyni [sic], the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps has been established under the auspices of the 
Revolutionary Council. The Corps Command Council has been approved 
and sanctioned by the Revolutionary Council. It is hoped that the chosen 
responsible officials and the competent persons involved, with the support 
of Almighty God and in accordance with the approved rules, will strive to 
fulfill the momentous task of the Islamic revolution and will be successful 
in carrying out the duties entrusted to them.4 
The Revolutionary Guards’ primary responsibilities, as articulated by this and another 
statement released the next day, concern internal security and the combating of 
counterrevolutionary elements.5 The Guards Corps is to assist in the arrest, prosecution, 
and at times, punishment of suspected individuals. The organization is also tasked with 
supporting foreign liberation movements in their struggles outside of Iran. The 
organization makes clear that its existence is at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini and 
that its senior leadership has been vetted and approved by the Revolutionary Council. By 
claiming to act in “consultation” with the Provisional Government, the IRGC is careful to 
place itself alongside the government but not beneath it. This is indicative of the 
organization’s close allegiance to certain radical clerics and its distrust of the more 
moderate civilian government.  
By the time the Revolutionary Guards made these announcements, their 
organization needed little introduction to the Iranian public. Elements operating under the 
banner of the “Guardians of the Islamic Revolution” (pasdaran-e enqelab-e eslami) had 
been active throughout Iranian cities within days of Khomeini’s return on 1 February 
1979.6 The violent activism of these militants, often fighting alongside local 
                                                 
4 “Revolutionary Guards Corps Established in Iran,” Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 5 May 1979, in 
FBIS-MEA, 7 May 1979. This announcement followed a similar declaration by Ayatollah Khomeini, which 
was published in the revolutionary newspaper Enqelab-e Eslami (Tehran) on 6 May 1979. See Sepehr 
Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. London and New York: Routledge, 1988, p.225, no.3. 
5 “Aims, Responsibilities” Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 6 May 1979, in FBIS-MEA, 7 May 1979. 
6 Schahgaldian suggests that some elements operating as “guards” at this time included militants associated 
with socialist and communist organizations. However, he conflates these “guards” with the “Guardians of 
the Islamic Revolution” who were aligned with individuals and organizations supportive of Khomeini. See, 
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revolutionary committees (komitehs) and fundamentalist gangs (hezbollahis), quickly 
became a fixture of post-revolutionary turmoil. With Iran’s armed forces in disarray due 
to the purges, forced retirements, arrests, and murders of its officer corps, the Guards 
were also entrusted with matters formerly reserved for the military, including suppression 
of the ethnic uprisings and civil unrest that had erupted throughout the country.7 Indeed, 
by the time the formation of the Revolutionary Guards was announced, only a few 
months after emerging as a Khomeinist militia, they had already become one of the most 
active and controversial institutions of the post-revolution. 
This chapter discusses the establishment and early activities of the Revolutionary 
Guards from February 1979 to the ratification of the Islamic Republic’s first constitution 
in December 1979. It explores the emergence of the Guards in the midst of revolutionary 
violence and the early role of the IRGC as an official apparatus of the government. It 
highlights the roots and founding leaders of the organization, and discusses how the 
commitments of these individuals and the factions they represented influenced the 
IRGC’s martial and ideological roles in post-revolutionary Iran. During this period, the 
IRGC operated as the leading coercive element of Khomeini’s ideological and political 
campaign. Motivated by a commitment to Khomeini, revolutionary Islam, and a zealous 
distrust of the left, the Guards served as the spearhead for the post-revolutionary regime’s 
crackdown on leftist organizations and democratic influence. In this short but crucial 
period in Iran’s history, the IRGC was transformed from a poorly-funded, loose coalition 
of Islamist guerilla factions into a formidable armed force with a national reach. Closely 
allied with the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), the IRGC helped 
suppress and combat the ideologies and organizations considered to be in competition 
with or dissenting from Khomeini’s own vision of an Islamic state under the 
“Guardianship of the Jurisprudent” (velayat-e faqih). With the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the IRGC assisted Khomeini and his clerical supporters in 
commuting the diverse 1979 revolution into a distinctly Khomeinist enterprise. In this 
way, IRGC activism fused together the ideological and religious authority of the clerical 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nikola B. Schahgaldian and Gina Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1987, p. 66-67. 
7 On the scope and nature of the purges see, Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. 
London & New York: Routledge, 1988, pp.136-61. 
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leadership with the effective organization of physical coercion. Though the Guards began 
as a loose coalition of like-minded militant groups and guerrilla leaders, its affect on the 
post-revolution was pronounced. Indeed, as I suggest in this chapter, it was primarily the 
combined influences of clerical authority and armed coercion that enabled the success of 
the Khomeinist faction. This religious-military network proved more formidable than 
political and economic forces during this period and helped secure Khomeinist 
dominance of the post-revolutionary state. 
Revolution and a New Regime 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on 1 February 1979 after fifteen years of exile 
symbolized the end of monarchical rule in Iran. Arriving on the heels of the mass strikes 
and demonstrations that had crippled the Pahlavi regime and led to the flight of 
Mohammad Reza Shah on 16 January 1978, Khomeini’s return further emboldened the 
revolutionary forces. For the next several days armed revolutionaries clashed with the 
remaining state entities loyal to the Pahalvi regime. The most significant confrontation 
occurred between the revolutionaries and the military. Although numerous military 
defections had already occurred in the build up to the “three glorious days” of February 9 
to 11, the military remained the last bulwark against the revolutionary movement.8 The 
turning point came on 9 February when a group of 800 Air Force technicians and 
mechanics, known as the Homafaran, defected en masse and joined the revolutionary 
struggle.9 After watching a replay of Khomeini’s return on state television, Homafaran 
stationed at Dowshan Tappeh airbase in Tehran demonstrated in support of Khomeini, 
provoking a violent reaction by loyalist Imperial Guards. The confrontation soon turned 
into an armed conflict between the Imperial Guards and the rebelling Homafaran, who 
were later joined by militants from major revolutionary groups—the Marxist-Leninist 
People’s Fadai and the Islamist-Marxist Mojahedin-e Khalq organization (MKO)––in an 
effort to overtake the airbase. Fighting continued through the following morning when 
                                                 
8 Zabih, Military, 69-78. 
9 Nikki Keddie argues that the Homafaran and leftist guerilla groups were the chief elements in the military 
victory of the revolution. See, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2003, 238. Also see, S. A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic 
Revolution in Iran. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 124-127.  
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the fighters finally succeeded in overtaking the airbase’s barracks and looted the armory. 
The weapons from the armory were sent to mosques and other community centers to be 
distributed among revolutionary elements.10 
The repercussions of the Dowshan Tappeh takeover were massive. Revolutionary 
organizations, especially the People’s Fadai, used the event to bring their members and 
supporters together in a centralized manner, instilling a sense of group solidarity that 
helped in the effective coordination of further attacks.11 Revolutionary elements began 
attacking police stations throughout the city, leading to the capturing of additional 
armories and weapons-stores, which provided the militants with a flush of arms. The 
once proud military began to collapse from within. Mass defections of all ranks took 
place, including the top commanders of the Imperial Guards, Generals Neshat and 
Biglari, who ordered the complete surrender of their units.12 By the morning of 11 
February, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened a meeting during which a 
declaration of neutrality was drafted. The announcement of this declaration on state radio 
that afternoon sealed the fate of the Pahlavi regime and signaled victory for the 
revolutionary movement. 
The victory of the revolutionary movement ushered in a period of transition and 
consolidation. Although Khomeini was the clear charismatic authority and the so-called 
leader of the revolution, political power in the post-revolutionary regime was divided into 
two main camps: 1) the Provisional Government under Prime Minister Mehdi 
Bazargan—a prominent Muslim intellectual and leader of the pro-democratic Freedom 
Movement party—which was appointed by Khomeini but composed mostly of 
technocrats from the Freedom Movement and National Front; 2) the Revolutionary 
Council, led by Khomeini and dominated by anonymous members of the clergy.13 The 
                                                 
10 Arjomand, Turban, 124-127.  
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Provisional Government took charge of the fractured institutions of the police, 
gendarmerie, and military, and held responsibility for general administration. It played a 
subordinate role to the Revolutionary Council, however, which had influence over the 
vast network of revolutionary committees, mosque-oriented gangs (hezbollahis), the 
revolutionary courts, and the Revolutionary Guards. Beyond these official centers of 
power, the post-revolutionary regime also had to contend with the numerous guerilla 
organizations, political parties, independent clergy, and localized militias that did not fall 
under the control of either the Provisional Government or the Revolutionary Council.14 
Although the government controlled the police and military, both of these 
institutions were near-paralyzed by the damage they incurred during the revolution.15 The 
regular military, for instance, endured violent purges that decimated its officer corps. 
Both also suffered from an association with the previous regime, which gained them little 
favor in revolutionary circles. The vacuum created by the absence of these security forces 
at the local level was quickly filled by the numerous armed militias and neighborhood 
gangs that thrived in the resulting anarchy. Law and order took a back seat to vigilante 
justice and the extra-judicial settling of vendettas. The entire infrastructure of Iranian 
society, from basic governmental services to the rule of law, had been crippled by the 
revolution. In response, the Khomeinist aligned militias became increasingly active in all 
aspects of society across the country, partially filling the void left by the shattered 
security forces.  
It was in this context that that the Revolutionary Guards first appear. Initially, 
they were associated with the command staff (setad) of the Khomeini-appointed 
revolutionary committees (komitehs) and worked in conjunction with them and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nasab, Hajj Kazem Hajji Tarkhani, Lieutenant General Ali-Asghar Mas’ud, and Lieutenant General 
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Khomeinist militias.16 The Guards functioned similarly to other militias in that they 
primarily fought loyalist elements and were utilized to help secure important positions 
and telecommunications centers.17 At times, their areas of responsibility also included 
more mundane matters, such as directing traffic and trash removal.18 What separated the 
Guards from other militias, however, was the suggestion that they served in an official 
capacity under the post-revolutionary regime. This was partly due to Khomeini’s 
inclusion of the Guards in some of his early messages concerning Iran’s military. For 
instance, on 14 February Khomeini released a message to the “struggling soldiers” who 
had defected from the military in solidarity with the Islamic revolution. In this message, 
Khomeini commands these soldiers to “return to their relevant garrisons and units at the 
earliest opportunity and continue their sacred military service as the struggling soldiers of 
Islam.” He adds, “It is necessary that the soldiers in service—the guardians of the 
revolution and the fighting sons of Islam—report to their relevant garrisons as soon as 
this message reaches them” [emphasis added].19 In this way, Khomeini hinted at a more 
official role for the Guards, which, unlike the committees and unofficial militias, placed 
them in the arena of Iran’s national armed forces. 
The Provisional Government’s first official statement on the Revolutionary 
Guards implied something similar. During a 21 February press interview with the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Amir Entezam, the government announced that the Revolutionary 
Guards “Corps” would be formed and that the rules and regulations of its formation had 
already been established. Entezam suggested that the “decision” to establish the Guards 
Corps was made by the government, insinuating that the new Guards Corps was to be an 
organ of the Provisional Government.20 This interview is the first time that the 
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government referred to the Revolutionary Guards as a “Corps” (sepah).21 This distinction 
elevated the Guards—at least in name—from a disparate band of militants into an army 
(or corps) associated with the state and its national armed forces. This was an important 
(if superficial) transition for the Revolutionary Guards that publicly strengthened their 
organizational legitimacy.  
Despite this announcement, however, neither the government nor its Prime 
Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, seemed to have much confidence in the Corps as an effective 
military institution. In his 28 February address, Bazargan highlighted the immense 
damage that the Iranian military had suffered as a result of the revolution. While he 
stressed the need for the public’s cooperation in achieving stability, he also lambasted the 
revolutionary militias that called for the complete disbandment of the “imperialist” army 
and its replacement by a people’s army composed of the revolutionary militias 
themselves. On this point, Bazargan asked: 
Could the safeguarding of the realm and the defense of its borders—and at 
that a realm as vast as ours on which eyes are focused from the four 
corners of the world—be possible without an army? Could a people’s 
army or revolution guards be able so soon to take the place of regular, 
well-equipped armies, which possess aircraft, tanks, armored cars, and 
thousands of technical and military items? Could the training of such a 
cadre, which has been prepared after spending billions of dollars, be 
achieved so easily? Is there any country in the world, whether leftist, 
rightist, old or new, which could protect itself without an army?22 
Bazargan’s speech highlighted a tension between the radical revolutionary camp and the 
government. Like Khomeini, Bazargan stressed the importance of the military to Iran’s 
national sovereignty, an idea criticized by the left and certain segments of the Islamist 
bloc (including IRGC leadership) that considered the military a bastion of Pahlavi 
influence and a tool of Western imperialism.23 Khomeini and the government argued that 
the revolutionary militias (including the Guards) lacked the training, expertise, and 
discipline needed to effectively protect the vulnerable post-revolutionary regime from 
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outside forces.24 Both Khomeini and the government seemed to question the loyalty of 
the major leftist militias––the Fadai, MKO, and the Tudeh––and, while both the 
Revolutionary Council and the government appeared to be backing the Revolutionary 
Guards, neither seemed ready to trust them with the military’s arsenal.  
The government, however, continued to stress the Corps as a “national army” that 
would, in time, “operate as an army alongside” the other national armed forces.25 The 
government suggested that before the Guards could reach the stage of a martial institution 
complimentary to Iran’s other national forces a national recruitment effort would have to 
begin and the new (and existing) troops would need professional military training.26 Such 
public statements by the government portrayed the Guards as an institution that was in 
the initial stages of formation and had yet to begin its official duties.27 The reality, 
however, was that militants operating under the name of the Revolutionary Guards had 
been continuously active since early February. By late March, Guards had been involved 
in security details, arrests, arms collection, and armed conflict throughout Iran, most 
notably in the cities of Tehran, Shiraz, Abadan, Qom, Mashhad, Sari, Tabriz, and 
Gonbad-e Kavus. 
In each location, IRGC units seemed to operate independently and in different 
capacities.28 The Guards of Mashhad, for example, underwent military training with 
advisors from the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 29 and Guards in Abadan 
established a “naval unit” to patrol the area waterways and prevent political dissidents 
from leaving the country.30 In Gonbad-e Kavus, a contingent of Guards clashed with 
demonstrating Turkmen residents, setting a precedent for the IRGC in the suppression of 
the similar ethnic uprisings that began to erupt around Iran’s periphery. The Guards in 
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Tehran were involved in numerous operations aimed at securing key positions and 
combating dissent, while the Guards in Qom and Sari were largely involved in security 
details and weapons collection. Although its units were highly localized, the Corps also 
developed a more national, centralized presence in the form of a Command Headquarters 
(setad-e farmandehi), which released its first public announcement on 24 March.31 
The highly individual character of local IRGC units and the relative autonomy 
with which they operated led to numerous reports of abuses committed by the Guards. 
Most of the incidents arose as a result of the Guards’ broad effort of disarming the 
populace and its arrests and detentions of suspected counterrevolutionaries as an arm of 
the shadowy revolutionary courts—areas in which the committees were also involved. 
These abuses gained national and international attention after the press reported that two 
sons and a “non-Iranian”32 daughter-in-law of Iran’s second most popular cleric, 
Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, had been arrested, beaten, and detained for sixteen hours by 
elements of the IRGC. The main target of the arrest was Mojtaba Taleqani, a member of 
the Marxist-Leninist Paykar Organization,33 who was suspected of illegally possessing 
firearms.34 As a sign of protest, Ayatollah Taleqani, a key supporter of the government 
and co-founder of the Freedom Movement, went into hiding causing public outcry 
against the arrests and similar abuses linked to the Guards and committees.35 Taleqani’s 
widespread support among democratic and leftist organizations, as well as his allies in the 
Provisional Government (e.g., his protégé Mehdi Bazargan and other members of the 
Freedom Movement), led to numerous demonstrations calling for his return. These 
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protests, especially those organized by the MKO and Fadai, exposed a growing rift 
between the parties and organizations that looked toward Taleqani for moral legitimacy 
and those forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomieni.36 Faced with building public pressure and 
mounting discontentment both the government and Revolutionary Council were forced to 
address the incident. 
Through its own investigation, the Revolutionary Council concluded that neither 
the “official committees of the Imam [nor] the leadership of the corps of the 
Revolutionary Guards” were involved in the incident. However, they conceded that “not 
all the branches of the corps of the Revolutionary Guards” had “been brought completely 
under the control of the Revolutionary Council,” thereby suggesting some complicity on 
the part of the local Guards.37 Khomeini met with Taleqani in Qom to help resolve the 
issue, which led to some assurances by the former that committees would be purged of 
"seditious elements." Taleqani, for his part, blamed neither the committees nor the 
Guards directly, but rather suggested that the abuses of power had come from 
“irresponsible people” who had “penetrated the committees and made trouble in the name 
of revolutionary guards,” but who were not themselves “the real revolutionary guards."38 
 Khomeini soon altered his pledge in a meeting with the heads of Tehran’s 
fourteen revolutionary committees. Instead of “purging” or “abolishing” the committees, 
Khomeini suggested the committees should be “reformed” and “seditious” members 
removed. He blamed the abuses on agents of foreign powers—“most likely 
Americans”—and argued that they emboldened the opposition. Khomeini assured the 
committees that they would “remain in force until the authority of the Government is 
established,” which would be manifested by the “achievement of disarming.” Likewise, 
he added: “[w]e shall not remove the guardians [of the revolution], so that the way will 
not be free for our enemies. We shall strengthen the guardians and the committees until 
the day when the Government will be able to maintain a firm conduct of affairs . . .”39  
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The government’s response was also mixed, but appeared more critical of the 
IRGC. The Chief Public Prosecutor’s office curtailed the authority of the committees and 
the Guards by invalidating all official warrants for the “detention of persons or property, 
or for the search of houses” previously issued to both groups, thereby suspending them 
from such activity.40 In a press conference Amir Entezam denied that either Khomeini’s 
committees or the revolutionary courts had been involved in the matter. “Rather,” he 
asserted, it was “the guardians [of the revolution] [who] had arbitrarily got themselves 
involved in the incident.”41 A few days later, Prime Minister Bazargan partially 
contradicted his deputy by placing indirect blame on elements of both the committees and 
the Guards.42 Although he maintained the abuses were committed by rogue elements, he 
argued that vigilante tactics associated with these groups were undermining the goals of 
the revolution. Citing the Taleqani incident and numerous accounts of similar abuse, 
Bazargan continued: 
The Iranian nation has now acquired a state of instability. Everyone is 
asking about and is fearful that if the committees, the guards and those 
individuals who are acting in the names of the committees, guards and - 
most shamelessly and in a most cowardly way - in the name of the Imam - 
and have arms in their possession - continue to act in a similar vein, and 
should the current state of affairs continue as it is, what would ultimately 
happen to this realm, nation, people and our republic? When guilty and 
innocent people continue to be arrested for reasons of personal enmity and 
personal motives, life itself can no longer exist let alone progress . . .43  
The IRGC also publically addressed the issue. Concurrent with the 
announcements of their establishment and areas of responsibility (mentioned at the top of 
the chapter), the Guards released an additional statement blaming “opportunistic 
elements” for the recent abuses. They acknowledged that “for some time now a number 
of people, in the guise of members of [revolutionary] committees and officials of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, have been looting the people's property and 
households by threat and intimidation, entering houses in Tehran and the provinces.” 
They “condemned” these “ugly actions,” and reminded the public that “no official has the 
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right to enter houses on the authority of the Islamic Public Prosecutor without presenting 
his identity card and written orders from the Revolutionary Guards and the committee.” 
Finally, the Guards asked for the public’s help in identifying and turning in these rogue 
elements.44 In this way, the IRGC confirmed what had already been suggested by the 
post-revolutionary regime and blamed not its own cadre, but rather those who operated 
inappropriately in the guise of its organization. This admission could not have been very 
reassuring to the public. 
Early Leadership and Factions 
The Taleqani incident illustrated a growing division between the Khomeinist camp on the 
one hand, and the government, democratic organizations, and leftist groups on the other. 
It was a harbinger of things to come and an outgrowth of the Khomeinist camp’s push for 
power. However, it also demonstrated the confusion surrounding the IRGC. Who exactly 
were the “Revolutionary Guards” and how were they distinct from the other Khomeinist 
committees and militias? Neither the government nor the Revolutionary Council 
appeared to have a firm grasp of the organization and the dynamics of its membership. 
Part of the problem undermining the Corps, its functionality, and its position in the post-
revolutionary regime was the fluidity of its membership and lack of effective centralized 
control. Since its inception the ranks of the IRGC had been occupied by activists 
generally operating within more than one organization—such as the Mojahedin of the 
Islamic Revolution, hezbollah, committees, or even local gangs—simultaneously.45 The 
abundance of willing participants was as much a blessing as it was a detriment to the 
Guards. The lack of structure allowed individual units to act with impunity, sometimes in 
the interest of other parties, while the multiple responsibilities of the Corps were too 
many and too broadly defined to be successful in the short term.46 Lack of funding was 
also a problem. In the six months following its establishment, the IRGC received little 
support from the government despite its official mandate and was forced to rely on 
individual benefactors and confiscated property, arms, and vehicles to run its 
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operations.47 These issues highlighted the fact that the IRGC was still a new, struggling 
institution, which acted more like the hodge-podge collection of individual militias that it 
was and less like the official organ it was portrayed to be. Thus at the time of its first 
announcement on 5 May, the IRGC was still a poorly-funded, loosely bound meta-
militia, whose identity and politics were derived as much from the interests of individual 
Corps members as from Khomeini and the post-revolutionary regime.  
Many of the challenges facing the IRGC were rooted in the provenance of the 
organization. According to a founding member of the Guards, Mohsen Rafiqdust, the 
concept behind the establishment of a post-revolutionary armed force composed of 
Islamist militants was first introduced by Hojjat al-Islam Mohammad Montazeri. In a 
meeting held during the build up to the February revolution, Montazeri––an influential 
guerilla leader and the son of senior cleric Ayatollah Hosayn-Ali Montazeri––is said to 
have opined “Now that the revolution will be victorious, an armed force must be formed 
to safeguard the revolution.”48 Although no steps were taken at the time to create such a 
force, Montazeri suggested the idea to Khomeini. Shortly after the February victory, 
Montazeri approached Rafiqdust with the news that Khomeini had ordered the 
establishment of the Revolutionary Guards.49  
Overseeing the formation of the Guards, which was initially to be under the 
jurisdiction of the Provisional Government, were Montazeri himself and senior cleric 
Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of the clerically-dominated Islamic Republic Party (IRP). A 
mid-level cleric, Hojjat al-Islam Hasan Lahuti, was appointed Khomeini’s representative 
to the organization and the task of organizing the Guards’ leadership was given to 
Rafiqdust.50 Through meetings with the clerical leaders of the IRP (including Beheshti, 
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali Khamenei) and the representatives of several 
militant organizations, Rafiqdust and his associates established the IRGC, chose its 
official name, and appointed its first commanders. Ali Danesh Monfared became the first 
commander of the Corps; Gholam-Ali Afruz headed personnel; Engineer Zarami became 
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the head of training; a Mr. Mahmudzadeh led additional units; and Rafiqdust himself was 
charged with logistics. Shortly afterward, these individuals formed the Central Office 
(daftar-e markazi) of the IRGC, which held its meetings in a former SAVAK 
headquarters.51 
Although Rafiqdust had consulted various revolutionary leaders before 
establishing the IRGC, all were reticent to assimilate their forces into this burgeoning 
enterprise.52 Their main objection, typified by the position held by Montazeri, was the 
Guards’ lack of autonomy.53 These revolutionaries had built a career on resisting state 
control, and even though their revolution had been victorious the new regime was still too 
young to inspire much trust. Further, militants such as Montazeri and Abbas Aqa-Zamani 
(more commonly known by his nom de guerre “Abu Sharif”), were internationalists who 
were as (if not more, in Montazeri’s case) committed to assisting liberation movements 
outside Iran as they were to creating a new society within it. Losing the independence and 
freedom they had fought so long for in order to join a state-controlled, national army may 
not have been very appealing. 
Despite a refusal to absorb their forces into the IRGC, Montazeri and Abu Sharif 
(who also had strong ties to hezbollahi groups) were closely aligned with the organization 
from its inception.54 They represented two of the four factions that made up the heart of 
the early IRGC.55 The leaders of these factions—which also included Mohammad 
Borujerdi (representing the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution organization) and 
Rafiqdust and his associates Monfarad and Zarami—formed the core of the 
Revolutionary Guards and elected the organization’s first Central Council (shura-ye 
markazi) from among their ranks. Further elections created the Command Council, which 
included members of each faction: Javad Mansuri and Mohsen Kolahduz from Pasa 
became the chief IRGC commander and head of training, respectively; Abu Sharif was 
charged with operations; Yusef Forutan of MIR headed public relations; and Rafiqdust 
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remained the head of logistics. 56 The establishment of these leadership councils and the 
involvement of each major faction paved the way for additional members from these 
factions and other groups to participate in the IRGC.57 
Although each faction influenced the makeup and direction of the Corps, the 
individuals who had perhaps the greatest impact on the organization came from the 
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution (MIR).58 Much of MIR’s success in post-
revolutionary politics was due to the patronage they received from Khomeini and other 
revolutionary leaders. With Khomeini’s support, MIR activists were placed into high-
ranking positions throughout the post-revolutionary regime, including key leadership 
posts in the IRGC and the revolutionary committees.59 Although MIR activists made up 
only a small fraction of the overall Corps ranks, they were entrusted with many of the 
organization’s top leadership positions.60 Some of these initial appointments included 
Borujerdi, who helped in the establishment of the IRGC and later became its western 
regional commander, and Mohsen Rezai—a founding member of MIR and part of its 
central committee—who served as MIR’s second representative to the Corps. Other 
senior MIR members, such as the aforementioned Yusef Forutan and Morteza Alviri also 
became influential in the organization. Alviri, who was appointed to the Command 
Council, also served on the central council of the revolutionary committees.61  
The involvement of MIR members in the new regime made the status of MIR as 
an independent and active organization unclear. The confusion surrounding MIR’s status 
permeated the highest levels of the government, which at one point erroneously stated the 
organization had been absorbed into the IRGC.62 Any official relationship between the 
two was denied by MIR, however, which declared that the organization was “in no way 
connected with any Government organ.”63 Although MIR remained independent, its 
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influence on post-revolutionary institutions, particularly the IRGC, was pronounced. 
Indeed, the MIR faction eventually became the dominant faction in the Revolutionary 
Guards leading to the appointment of Mohsen Rezai as the head Corps commander in 
1981—a post he held until 1997. 
Despite its importance in post-revolutionary politics, MIR itself was a recently-
branded organization. It was established in the wake of the February 1979 revolution as 
an umbrella organization for seven regional revolutionary groups: Mansuran (the 
Victorious, led by Mohsen Rezai), Movahhedin (the Monotheists), Towhidi Saf (the 
Monotheistic Group, led by Mohammad Borujerdi), Fallah (the Peasant group, led by 
Alviri), Towhidi Badr (the Monotheistic Badr group),64 Falaq (the Dawn group), and 
Ommat-e Vahedeh (Unified Nation, led by Behzad Nabavi). Some of these groups (such 
as Towhidi Saf and Mansuran) had been in existence prior to the revolutionary upheaval 
of 1978-79; however, others (such as Ommat-e Vahedeh) were established in the midst of 
it. The key commonalities shared by each of these groups were their involvement in anti-
Shah activism and their disillusionment with the revolutionary left.  
MIR’s disdain for the left stemmed as much from its members’ specific religious 
leanings as it did from their collective experience with leftist organizations, particularly 
the Islamist-Marxist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO).65 The fallout between 
Islamists and the MKO took place on a number of fronts, but its epicenter was Evin 
prison in Tehran. The prison experience during the 1970s, as described by numerous 
accounts of former political prisoners, was a combative arena of ideological 
contestation.66 Every group struggled to spread its ideological message among the 
inmates and increase adherents to its cause. The clash of ideas and politics resulted in a 
general divide between the secular left and the Islamist-minded prisoners. However, the 
Islamist-minded sector also began to split as more and more individuals became 
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disenchanted with the Marxist leanings and autocratic culture of the MKO (then the 
largest of the Islamist-minded organizations).67 This split reflected a more general 
deterioration of support for the MKO—and the Islamic left in general—outside of prison, 
particularly within the clergy, throughout the 1970s.68 Within the prison system, the 
MKO utilized rumors and accusations to undermine their opponents and cast suspicion on 
dissenters. As one former jailed activist recalls, “they [the MKO] ... began spreading 
[false] rumors ... any person who wasn’t a part of their organization was automatically 
considered to be associated with SAVAK.”69 The fallout of this experience split the 
Islamists into two opposing factions: those who supported the MKO and those who did 
not.70 This emergent Islamist camp was motivated not only by its opposition to the 
Pahalvi regime, but increasingly by its opposition to the leftists and the MKO, which they 
considered equally dubious. Yet, even as these Islamists moved to oppose the Islamic 
left, their new organizations profited from the experience and knowledge they had gained 
as members of the MKO. 
It was within this charged, divisive atmosphere that the components of MIR 
began to take shape. For instance, one of the seven founding organizations of MIR, 
Ommat-e Vahedeh (the Unified Nation group), was established in 1978 by newly-
released political prisoners opposed to the MKO. Mohsen Makhmalbaf, noted 
contemporary filmmaker and original member of Ommat-e Vahedeh, discusses the 
impetus behind that group’s establishment and MIR’s initial raison d'etre: 
[I]n 1977 I separated myself from the [MKO]. Earlier, I had a very close 
relationship with them, but I didn’t say anything for fear of SAVAK’s 
taking advantage of the situation. But they themselves began spreading 
rumors about me, so I was forced to speak out against them . . . And when 
I decided to break with the organization, at first I tried to simply remain 
silent, but that became impossible. And when I began speaking out against 
them, of the fifty-six people who were in our section, about twenty-eight 
broke off from them in sympathy with me . . . [and] they just made their 
own group. A group which was solely in opposition to the [MKO]. This 
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group later evolved into Ommat-e Vahedeh . . .71 So when I was released, 
I was worried about the oppression I had experienced from the [MKO] in 
prison would be unleashed on the entire populace should they come to 
power. You might not believe it, but even with the worst conditions that 
I’ve observed under the ruling clerics, I’d still prefer their rule a thousand 
times to that of the Mojahedin. They’re Stalinists! The Mojahedin are a 
catastrophe waiting to happen . . . When I left prison, I joined [MIR]. You 
see, to prevent the leftists and the [MKO] from imposing their program 
upon the people, in order to oppose them, all of us grassroots groups 
began to build organizations that would stand up against them.72  
Makhmalbaf’s recounting of his falling out with and subsequent rivalry to the MKO is 
illustrative of the experiences of other top MIR and IRGC activists such as Behzad 
Nabavi (leader of Ommat-e Vahedeh), Morteza Alviri, and Mohsen Rezai.73 Other 
prominent members of the post-revolutionary regime, including IRGC commander 
Monfared, Abbas Duzduzani (who attended early IRGC leadership meetings), and the 
future Prime Minister and President of the Islamic Republic, Mohammad Ali Rajai, were 
also former MKO members who had turned against the left.74 Those who moved away 
from the MKO tended to turn toward the clergy in general and Khomeini in particular for 
guidance. The split pitted the largely anti-clerical MKO against the more pro-clerical 
Islamists and created a divide along political, ideological, and religious lines.  
In an effort to undermine the left and prevent it from gaining influence in post-
revolutionary Iran, MIR self-consciously formed an ideology and identity that were in 
direct opposition to the MKO. MIR constructed a veneer that appeared more 
authentically Islamic than the Islamist-Marxist MKO, but retained fixtures—such as the 
term “Mojahedin”—to challenge the latter’s near trademark association with the 
revolutionary movement.75 This type of outward or symbolic challenge to the MKO is 
perhaps best represented in MIR’s official emblem. MIR’s emblem can be seen as a 
visualization of its ideological and political bases. It simultaneously affirms the 
organization’s motivating principles while denunciating those held by the MKO. From 
the images below (Fig. 3.1), we can see the emblems of both the MKO and MIR, 
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respectively. Both share graphic similarities. Each includes a quote from the Quran, a 
clenched fist holding a rifle, a geographical reference, the name of the organization, and 
the year of its founding. The MKO’s emblem, however, includes additional Marxist 
symbols––the five-pointed star, the anvil (representing the working class), and the sickle 
(representing the peasantry); an outline of Iran (representing the group’s nationalistic 
agenda); leaves (suggesting a desire for world peace); and a graphical representation of 




Figure 3.1. MKO and MIR emblems 
 
Most of these symbols are excised from MIR’s emblem and are replaced with 
more explicit Islamic motifs. At the center of the design sits a prominent representation 
of the Arabic negative article “la,” out of which grows a clenched fist holding a rifle.77 
The Arabic “la” stands for the Muslim proclamation of faith “la ilaha ilallah . . .” 
(“There is no God but God . . .”), which is also written on the banner in the upper right 
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hand of the emblem. These elements, combined with the Quranic verse at the bottom 
right hand of the design, are overt testaments to the religiosity of the organization and are 
employed to counter the MKO’s Marxist imagery.78 Likewise, MIR replaces an image of 
Iran with an image of the globe as a way of distancing itself from the nationalistic 
sentiments of the left, while retaining a similar commitment to internationalism. In a 
sense, MIR’s emblem stripped away what its members found objectionable in the MKO 
to reveal the religious core of a new brand of Islamic revolutionism. This visual turn not 
only symbolizes the shifting ideological and religious sentiments of the Islamist 
revolutionary bloc, but it also forms the graphic template adopted by the IRGC (and later 
by Lebanese Hizballah).79 MIR’s emblem can thus be seen as the branding of an 
emergent anti-leftist, pro-Khomeini faction, which helped form the foundational ideology 
and religiosity of the IRGC and shape post-revolutionary politics. 
Through their rivalry with the MKO and general enmity of the left, MIR members 
in the IRGC, committees, and elsewhere in the post-revolutionary regime increasingly 
used their positions to subvert their rivals. The campaign against the left took different 
forms. Islamist propaganda accused the left of being a front for Western powers, 
fomenting counterrevolutionary sentiment among ethnic minorities, and of undermining 
the position of the clergy. The left’s vocal support for ethnic minorities and their embrace 
of “foreign” ideologies provoked much of this sentiment, but it was their advocacy of 
secularism, or in the case of the MKO, a Shariati-style anti-clerical Islam that threatened 
much of the clerical establishment. Khomeini continuously attacked the left on this point, 
even though many of the leftist organizations had publicly voiced their support for him 
and other senior clerics.  
Countering the (New) Opposition 
The Khomeinist movement against the left gained momentum after a shadowy terrorist 
organization began assassinating rumored members of the Revolutionary Council.80 The 
group, known as Forqan, came to the fore after they claimed responsibility for the 
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assassination of Maj. Gen. Mohammad Qarani on 20 April 1979;81 however, it was their 
assassination of the prominent Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, on 1 May that 
gained them lasting infamy. Ayatollah Motahhari was a leading ideologue of the 
revolution, a close ally of Khomeini, and an ardent critic of the left. His writings 
articulated Islam as a political “ideology” opposed to capitalist materialism and socialist 
atheism. After Motahhari was assassinated, reports began to emerge linking the murder to 
Forqan and its motives to be anti-clerical in nature. One report cited an anonymous phone 
call to an Iranian media organization that claimed Forqan had killed Motahhari for being 
the suspected “head of the Revolutionary Council” and as part of the group’s greater 
“struggle against mullahism.”82 In response, Khomeini publicly lambasted the left, critics 
of his clerical camp, and the press for being “traitors” to the revolution and for acting 
against the will of the people.83 His outspoken criticism of the press, which had already 
caused the closing of one major Iranian newspaper,84 caused another major newspaper 
(Kayhan) to purge its staff of suspected anti-Khomeinists and leftist sympathizers.85 
A month later, Forqan claimed responsibility for the shooting of another 
prominent ally of Khomeini, mid-level cleric Hojjat al-Islam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
This attack, which failed to kill Rafsanjani despite two bullet wounds to the torso, added 
more vitriol to the wave of anti-leftist activism. The left was again blamed for being 
behind a plot against the clergy and for being assisted by the U.S. in that effort. Khomeini 
directly accused the U.S. for being behind the plot, stating “from among the webs of 
these terrors one [can] see the footsteps of superpowers and international criminals . . . 
America and the other superpowers must know that they cannot assassinate our 
revolution.”86 However, he also implicated the left in a statement released around the 
same time, "[n]o individual and no group is allowed to insult the clergy, and if it happens 
the offenders should be prosecuted and punished by the local revolutionary court."87 The 
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subtext of this message was not lost on Khomeini’s supporters who read it as a 
condemnation of the left and a religious sanctioning for anti-leftist activism.88 
The Forqan assassinations lent credence to Khomeini’s campaign against the left 
and gave his forces the legitimacy and sympathy needed to engage in the overt 
suppression of leftist and democratic organizations. The Guards, the committees, and 
other unofficial Khomeinist groups led the ground war against these organizations and 
began to operate more openly and more aggressively against them. Some of the pressure 
exerted on leftist organizations by Khomeinist forces seemed to have its desired effect. 
While both the MKO and People’s Fadai had earlier acknowledged Khomeini’s position 
of authority, the latter announced that it had gone so far as to propose changes to its 
constitution to bring it in line with Khomeini and his faction.89 These changes, most of 
which contradicted the group’s Marxist-Leninist ideological foundation, included articles 
that claimed: the Fadai would act according to “divine Islamic law, the Koran, and the 
exalted commandments of Islam”; the Fadai would support the establishment of an 
Islamic Republic; the Fadai would “perform its mission according to the instructions and 
orders of Imam Khomeyni and his policy”; the Fadai would “conduct its activities 
publically and openly and avoid any kind of clandestine actions”; and the Fadai would 
“recognize and not dispute the orders of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.”90 
These were dramatic (if politically motivated and superficial) concessions on the part of 
the Fadai. They are not only evidence of Khomeini’s political authority, but also speak to 
the growing influence and status of the Revolutionary Guards as an official arm of that 
authority.  
The move against the left also brought the IRGC to the ethnic (non-Persian) 
regions of Iran, where leftist influence was strong and where some leftist groups had been 
active in the organizing of pro-autonomy movements within regional minority 
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communities.91 Instead of quelling unrest, the presence of the Guards in these areas and 
their heavy-handed tactics sparked violent protests from local communities. For example, 
in early and mid May the IRGC began establishing local units in Khuzestan and 
Kermanshahan,92 provoking a backlash from the local population in both regions.93 In 
Khuzestan, a leader of the local Arab community specifically blamed the Revolutionary 
Guards for inciting conflict between local activists and a Guards detachment.94 
The fighting in Khuzestan mirrored the ethnic unrest that had already erupted 
between the Guards, regime forces, and the ethnic Turkmen, Baluchi, and Kurdish 
populations in the northeast, southeast, and western regions of Iran, respectively. While 
the local populations in these areas blamed the Guards and other Khomeinist elements for 
initiating the violence, the regime blamed foreign influence and “counterrevolutionaries” 
for stirring up ethnic and religious tensions that did not previously exist.95 The 
government blamed the left, and singled out the Marxist-Leninist People’s Fadai for 
fueling the violence. Prime Minister Bazargan, in a speech to the Revolutionary Guards, 
denounced the Fadai for its “treachery” against the revolution and for having a “hand” in 
all of the incidents of ethnic unrest throughout the country.96  
Although they had the support of Khomeini and the government to crackdown on 
leftist organizations, the Revolutionary Guards’ official grounds for doing so was rooted 
in the government’s efforts of disarming the public and unofficial militias.97 As the head 
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of the disarmament campaign the IRGC continually clashed with organizations and 
groups that refused to give up their weapons. This included the Islamist-Marxist MKO, 
whose leadership, in a 4 June interview, proclaimed that so long as “the imperialist 
interests have not been touched, we will not give up our arms.”98 The dispute between the 
MKO and the post-revolutionary regime over arms led to direct conflict between the 
Mojahedin and the IRGC. In early July, the Guards training facility in Qom was attacked 
by armed assailants. While the attackers were not initially known, the MKO was accused 
of the plot and its local headquarters was raided by the IRGC and its supporters.99 The 
Revolutionary Guards legitimated this raid by claiming they had seized a large stash of 
weapons belonging to the Mojahedin. Although the MKO protested the actual number of 
weapons confiscated—suggesting the IRGC had inflated the number for political 
purposes—it argued that Mojahedin members “only carry weapons to protect 
[themselves] against plots of imperialism and SAVAK . . .”100 The MKO also called for 
talks with the government to discuss the issue of disarmament, suggesting they would 
abide by Khomeini’s decision on the matter (so long as it was in their favor).101 The 
public seizure of arms from the MKO’s Qom headquarters emboldened the disarmament 
efforts of the IRGC. The incident led to a further declaration against armed groups by the 
regional prosecutor’s office and charged the Revolutionary Guards to “use all of their 
ability and Islamic decisiveness to disarm, arrest, and detain any person or persons found 
carrying arms.” The order continued, “[t]he formation of armed groups, except with 
respect to the aforementioned officials [IRGC, security officials, and the military], is 
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forbidden anywhere and those contravening this order will be regarded as enemies of the 
revolution and plotters against the Islamic Republic.”102  
The illegalization of arms gave the IRGC and other official security organizations 
the legal mandate to pursue the armed militias that were antagonistic (or at least not 
sufficiently obedient) to Khomeini. Effectively, this meant that the major leftist militias, 
including the MKO, People’s Fadai, and Tudeh, had become legal targets of the post-
revolutionary regime. The government added to the anti-leftist climate by publicly 
denouncing that camp as “anti-Islamic” and questioning the true intentions of its 
associated organizations. In his 1 August message to the nation, Prime Minister Mehdi 
Bazargan stated: 
Those familiar anti-national and anti-Islamic groups who claim to defend 
freedom, democracy and support the interests of the masses and security, 
let us assume that they have good intentions, and they really do support 
freedom and democracy at the same time as being socialist or Marxist, and 
that they are not the mercenaries and agents trained and under the 
command of the foreign enemies of Iran. They too, with the disturbances, 
problems and anxieties they create and the confusion, sabotage and 
subversion which takes place, if it were anything like the opposition 
demonstrated by the Leftist parties or the opposition party against the 
government of the time in democratic countries, with publicity campaigns, 
presentation of candidates towards their coming to power, it would be 
acceptable. They could come and take over the government and if they 
enjoyed the support of the majority of the people they could act on their 
plans which would inevitably follow their own principles. But they are not 
doing that here; they are committing acts of sabotage and subversion, here 
they are trying to create confusion and shake the foundations of the 
Government.103 
Through such public denunciations of the left by Khomeini and the government, the 
movement against dissent gained increasing public support. The embattled leftist 
organizations, while still popular among students and the intelligentsia, were losing the 
ground war to Khomeini. The flowing tide of anti-leftist sentiment and support for 
Khomeini’s campaign became evident in the wake of a crackdown on the press. A new 
law passed by the government enabled the shutting down of newspapers critical of the 
post-revolutionary regime. Soon the offices of Iran’s leading newspaper, Ayandegan, 
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were occupied by the Revolutionary Guards and its operations shut down. Foreign 
correspondents, notably Americans from the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, 
and NBC were also ordered to leave the country.104 In response, major leftist and 
democratic organizations––save the MKO which did not participate––organized mass 
protests in Tehran calling for an end to “censorship.” 105 The protests, which swelled to 
an estimated 100,000, were met by smaller, but more violent counter-protests led by the 
pro-Khomeini Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution and overseen by the Revolutionary 
Guards.106 The following day, the official offices of the MKO and the People’s Fadai 
were attacked by armed Khomeinist gangs chanting “Communism is destroyed! Islam is 
victorious!”107 Although the left and democratic opposition were able to display the 
immense size and passion of their support base, the Khomeinist faction was able to 
enunciate its political superiority through intimidation and violence. 
The Clergy and a New Constitution 
The mass protests following the closing of Ayandegan, as well as the continuing fighting 
in the Kurdish regions of western Iran, were an outgrowth of a larger conflict between the 
Khomeinist camp and the leftist and democratic opposition over the drafting of a 
constitution for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Beyond the street activism of the 
Khomeinist militias, committees, and IRGC, the clerically-dominated Islamic Republic 
Party (IRP) was another front in the post-revolutionary power struggle. As it gained 
strength, the Khomeinist faction succeeded in pressuring the Provisional Government to 
include members of the IRP in the cabinet. In late July, Prime Minister Bazargan invited 
four IRP members into his administration: Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani as Interior Minister, 
Hashemi Rafsanjani as Deputy Interior Minister, Ali Khamenei as Defense Minister, and 
Mohammad Javad Bahonar as Minister of Education. This placed clergy in leading 
positions in both the Revolutionary Council and the Provisional Government, gave 
Khomeini greater political leverage, and put his supporters in the position to allot more 
funding for the IRGC and other revolutionary organs (nehads). This allowed the IRP—as 
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the chief proponent of Khomeini’s doctrine of the “guardianship of the jurisprudent”—
the wherewithal to push its agenda in all avenues open to the post-revolutionary regime. 
IRP members also dominated the 11 August election of the “Assembly of Experts”—a 
publically elected council that would oversee the drafting of the Islamic Republic’s 
constitution—which gave Khomeinists the strongest voice in the ensuing constitutional 
debates.  
With the death of Ayatollah Taleqani in early September the democratic and 
leftist opposition lost its leading clerical supporter and a chief bulwark to Khomeinist 
aspirations. Taleqani’s absence emboldened Khomeini’s political project. Khomeini 
appointed his trusted ally Ayatollah Montazeri as the new Friday congregational prayer 
leader for Tehran—an influential position previously held by Taleqani—and charged the 
Revolutionary Guards with the security detail for these massive ceremonies.108 Montazeri 
used the pulpit to articulate both the Khomeinist line and his own revolutionary agenda. 
Montazeri, like his son Mohammad, represented the radical-internationalist segment of 
the Khomeinist camp, which strove to bring Iran’s revolution to other parts of the Muslim 
world to combat “global” Zionism and imperialism. In an October interview, Montazeri 
mentions using his new position as prayer leader to promote these ideas and argues: 
“[W]e, as Muslims, must be interested in each other’s affairs and support one another 
whenever we can. This is the duty of every Muslim. I would like to assert that we in the 
Muslim revolution [in Iran] cannot remain calm or sleep on silk while the rest of the 
Muslim peoples and countries are encountering danger, injustice and oppression—
oppression by dictatorships and imperialism.”109 
The notion of combating imperialism, in all its forms, was central to the 
operations of the IRGC. For instance, the local IRGC unit of Abadan declared a day of 
fasting in solidarity with a hunger strike undertaken by Palestinian prisoners in Israel. In 
their message to the Palestinians, the Abadan Guards “promise” the destruction of the 
“illegitimate offspring of world imperialism-zionism [sic]” (Israel) and the “liberation” of 
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the Palestinians.110 Fighting imperialist and Zionist “plots” was at the heart of the 
IRGC’s (unofficial) campaign against leftist organizations and its (official) operations 
against “counterrevolutionaries” associated with the left. This is especially true for the 
ongoing conflict between the government’s forces (led by the IRGC) and the forces 
associated with the leftist Kurdish Democratic Party and the Marxist-Leninist Komala 
organization. The language used by Iran’s leaders to describe the ethnic unrest led by 
these leftist groups in Iran’s western Kurdish regions made the terms “imperialist” and 
“counterrevolutionary” nearly synonymous. While the army described its role in the 
fighting as “cleansing” the “cities in the west of the country . . . from alien elements and 
the stooges of imperialism,”111 the IRGC assured its readiness “to eradicate all the 
counterrevolutionary elements . . . in the country—or even outside the country.”112  
The growing voice of the radical-internationalist sector of the Khomeinist faction 
emphasized the issue of anti-imperialism (and everything it conjured up) along side the 
idea of the “guardianship” and Islamic government. Anti-imperialist forces across the 
ideological spectrum were further radicalized when a 1 November meeting between 
Bazargan and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski in Algiers became 
public. The public protests against this meeting, which many feared was a prelude to the 
return of American influence in Iran, disgraced the Bazargan government. Leftists and 
Khomeinists were equally outraged by the revelation, but only the latter managed to take 
full advantage of the situation. Ownership of the anti-imperialism issue—which had been 
championed by the left—was emphatically placed within the grasp of Khomeini by the 4 
November storming of the US embassy. Even though the IRGC had been protecting the 
US embassy and had resisted previous attacks, its members did not intervene in this 
attempt and may have helped facilitate it.113 The Khomeinist student group “Students in 
the Line of the Imam,” who had planned the attack and succeeded in sacking the building 
and capturing its employees, may have had contacts with the Guards through the MIR 
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and Montazeri factions.114 The US embassy takeover and hostage-taking began what 
sociologist Said Arjomand has called, “Khomeini’s phantasmagorical struggle with the 
imperialist Satan,” and made fear of a US-led counterrevolution an animating facet of 
Khomeinist political discourse.115 
The embassy takeover, which was partly organized to protest the 1 November 
Algiers meeting and the Shah’s protection by the US (where he was being allowed to 
pursue cancer treatment), proved to be the death knell for the Provisional Government. 
Humiliated and defeated, Bazargan resigned in protest on 6 November and the 
government fell with him. This left the regime in the hands of the clerically-dominated 
Revolutionary Council. With the political tide rising in their favor, the Khomeinist 
faction in the Assembly of Experts succeeded in including the “guardianship” in the draft 
constitution (article 105) and was able to pass the most controversial articles (107-110) 
associated with that office.116 The new constitution, which was ratified in a popular 
referendum on 2-3 December, gave the ruling jurist (now Khomeini) “absolute power 
without the slightest responsibility.”117 It also made Khomeini the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces and IRGC, and gave him the authority to appoint and dismiss the head 
commanders of each. The democratic opposition looked to senior cleric Ayatollah Kazem 
Shariatmadari, who had been a leading critic of the constitution and the “guardianship,” 
to articulate its discontent.118 Despite a short-lived uprising in Shariatmadari’s home 
province of Azerbaijan by his allied Islamic People’s Republican Party (IPRP)—which 
was quickly crushed by Khomeinist militants led by the IRGC—leftist and democratic 
organizations were too weak and divided to challenge the new constitution.119 
The events of November and December 1979 have been referred to as the “second 
Islamic revolution” and a “clerical coup d’etat.”120 By exploiting the issue of imperialism 
and the fear of an American-sponsored counterrevolution, the Khomeinist forces—led by 
                                                 
114 Katzman, Warriors, 36-37. Katzman specifically mentions MIR’s Behzad Nabavi and IRGC 
commander Javad Mansuri as having possible links with this student group. 
115 Arjomand, Turban, 139. 
116 On the constitutional debates and the role played by Khomeinist-aligned clergy during this process, see 
Bakhash, Ayatollahs, 75-88. 
117 Arjomand, Turban, 139. 
118 Bakhash, Ayatollahs, 89. 
119 Arjomand, Turban, 139-141.  
120 Ibid., 139.  
 75
 
Khomeini and his clerical lieutenants in the IRP—became the dominant political force in 
post-revolutionary Iran. Through their dominance of the Assembly of Experts, the 
exploitation of the anti-imperialist climate following the US embassy takeover, the fall of 
the Provisional Government, and the passing of the theocratic constitution, the 
Khomeinist clergy were now in the position to rewrite the revolution in their own name. 
If clerics were the leaders of the new state, the Revolutionary Guards were their 
enforcers. The IRGC led the violent campaigns against dissenting and oppositional 
forces, and through official patronage by the state, made Khomeini’s will the law of the 
land. The IRGC laid the groundwork for the clerical enterprise of the Islamic Republic 
and was now in the position to truly guard an Islamic revolution.  
Conclusion 
I argue that the success of the Khomeinist faction in this period was primarily achieved 
through a social network that combined religious authority with military force. This 
network had three main components:1) Ayatollah Khomeini as leader and moral 
authority of the revolution; 2) the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic Party; 3) the 
IRGC and other pro-Khomeini militias. Khomeini’s popular standing provided the 
legitimacy needed for the clerical leaders of the IRP to speak and act on behalf of the 
broader Islamic movement. This enabled clerics to advance the Khomeinist ideological 
line within both state institutions (i.e., the Provisional Government and Assembly of 
Experts) and within revolutionary organs (i.e., the Revolutionary Council, Guards, 
Committees, and Courts). The ability of Khomeinist clergy to influence all major sectors 
of the state also helped stymie the work of their democratic rivals who dominated the 
ranks of the Provisional Government. By working against the moderate forces in 
government and the leftist militias outside of it, the Khomeinist clergy limited the 
viability of political power in the early post-revolutionary period.  
With the government’s political influence made ineffectual by the violent 
coercion of the Khomeinist revolutionary organizations, the economic resources available 
to the government were also marginalized. This is especially evident in regard to military 
power. While the Provisional Government directed the majority of its defense funds 
toward the state military and security forces, Khomeinist leaders were able to undermine 
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these institutions by effectively mobilizing alternative martial resources on ideological 
grounds. This enabled the poorly-funded and ill-equipped IRGC and committees, and 
other allied militias to counter state military institutions both directly (through the violent 
purging of these institutions) and indirectly (by fostering public mistrust of these 
institutions based on their ties to the previous regime). In this way, clerical leaders were 
instrumental in the mobilization and deployment of coercive violence against their 
ideological rivals. The IRGC, as a nexus between Khomeinist clergy and military power, 
were most effective in translating the end-game of Khomeinist ideology into acts of 
coercion and violence. Without the organization of coercion by military organizations, 
the political project of the Khomeinist clergy would not have succeeded. And without the 
mobilization of ideological authority, the revolutionary forces would not have had the 
legitimacy to act coercively against democratic and leftist influence. Thus, although the 
Khomeinist faction profited from the infighting of their rivals and the political missteps 
of the government, it was primarily an ideological-military network, and the exercise of 







Exporting the Revolution:  




If our revolution does not have an internationalist and aggressive viewpoint the enemies 
of Islam will once again enslave us culturally and politically.1 
 
—Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (1980) 
 
 
It is not that a revolution is nothing if it is not international, but it is certainly bound to be 
a lot less than the makers of the revolution intended. Revolutionaries are therefore forced 
to be internationalist as well as cautious because of the external pressures that post-





Like those who preceded them, whether in France in the late eighteenth century or in 
Cuba in the mid-twentieth, Iran’s revolutionaries shared a belief that their victory would 
lead to the success of other likeminded movements across the globe. This belief stemmed 
as much from the hope produced by their triumph as from the thought that inspired their 
activism. Drawing from the Third Worldism of Ali Shariati to the pan-Islamic sentiments 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, a wide spectrum of Iranian revolutionaries accepted (at least in 
spirit) the notion that Iran bore some responsibility to assist its oppressed brethren in the 
Islamic and Third Worlds. Moreover, Iranian activists recognized that Iran’s lot under the 
Pahlavi regime was the result of larger international forces (e.g., imperialism, Zionism, or 
capitalism), the destruction of which would require a more robust and successful global 
revolutionary movement. To this end, some of the Islamic Republic’s leaders adopted a 
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radical or revolutionary approach to internationalism, which primarily understood foreign 
relations as the management of conflict rather than cooperation. 
Although there are varying definitions of internationalism, political scientist Fred 
Halliday offers a typology that divides this concept into three categories: liberal, 
hegemonic, and revolutionary. Liberal internationalism (e.g., international commerce, or 
the United Nations), Halliday suggests, is a “belief that independent societies and 
autonomous individuals” can, through interaction and cooperation, “evolve toward 
common purposes” such as “peace and prosperity.” Hegemonic internationalism (e.g., 
European imperialism) sees this integration taking place through “asymmetrical” and 
“unequal terms,” though still considers such integration desirable and “good.” 
Revolutionary internationalism, on the other hand, views international relations through 
the lens of conflict.3 A common characteristic of this type of revolutionary or “radical” 
internationalism is militaristic intervention, or the collaboration between revolutionary 
states and like-minded militant groups as a means of impacting the domestic affairs of 
foreign states. This conception of intervention is rooted in both the ideology and the 
acknowledgement of revolutionary states that international factors shape and to a large 
degree determine the success of a revolution. Militaristic intervention is seen as a way of 
preserving a revolution, if not expanding it. Yet the survival of revolutionary states is 
equally dependent on a cautious navigation of international relations such that a 
revolutionary state will not offer assistance to such a degree as to prejudice its own 
existence. Thus, while revolutionary states may be animated by an interventionist spirit, 
their ultimate need for international cooperation and support leads to the tempering of 
interventionist ambition.4 
In this chapter I link the idea of interventionism with the concept of “exporting 
the revolution” promoted by Iranian leaders and the IRGC through the 1980s. This 
concept provided to a considerable degree the ideological and moral bases for Iranian 
involvement in foreign countries—particularly in Lebanon, which will serve as this 
chapter’s primary example. However, the experiences of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) 
gradually changed how this concept was understood, and by the end of the war 




internationalist rhetoric no longer mandated militaristic intervention. This change in 
thinking coincided with growing factionalism within the Khomeinist movement. 
Although internal division stemmed from a number of issues, including disagreements on 
economic and social policy, the issue of foreign intervention played a central role in 
dividing Iran’s post-revolutionary leadership. This led to an internal shift in the IRGC, 
with the top commanders moving closer to Iran’s more pragmatic and conservative 
leaders (Rafsanjani and Khamenei) and distancing the organization from its left-leaning 
revolutionary base. As the IRGC was the main instrument for both promoting and 
conducting interventionist policies, the disinclination of its head commanders toward 
military interventionism limited (but did not eliminate) foreign involvement. To this end, 
IRGC leaders supported the Islamic Republic’s crackdown on pro-intervention radicals 
near the end of the war and helped undermine this faction by supporting the state’s moves 
against prominent radical activists and by purging their supporters from IRGC ranks. By 
the end of the war, the growing conservatism of IRGC leadership and the consequent 
marginalization of its left-leaning, interventionist-minded membership led to the 
organization’s increasingly close association with conservative politics and policies.  
Roots and Early Expressions of Revolutionary Internationalism 
Outside of the Marxist and Maoist organizations, which shared a strong commitment to 
the socialism-imbued Third Worldist movement, left-leaning elements within Iran’s 
Khomeinist movement were perhaps the most vocal proponents of revolutionary 
internationalism.5 Much of this sentiment focused on the plight of the Palestinians, 
whether in the Occupied Territories or in Lebanon, and that of Muslim communities 
elsewhere (such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, or the Philippines). Outside of the Bazargan 
cabinet, which publically rejected the idea of foreign intervention,6 many Iranian leaders 
issued general calls to “export the revolution.”7 However, specific calls for foreign 
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intervention generally followed the particular political agendas of the individuals making 
them. For instance, Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani, who was close to Bahrain’s Shiite 
resistance, called for Iran to annex Bahrain if the ruling Sunni Al-Khalifa family did not 
become an Islamic republic in the Iran model or if the Shiite majority could not topple the 
regime (presumably after whichever one failed to materialize first).8 Despite Rohani’s 
staunch support for Iran’s coreligionists in Bahrain, his comments elicited harsh rebukes 
from both Iranian government officials and leading radicals like Mohammad Montazeri, 
who told the Kuwaiti state press that Rohani did not represent the regime and was 
actually a CIA agent.9  
The reasons for Montazeri’s complete rejection of Rohani’s politics were perhaps 
many, yet they were at least partially rooted in Montazeri’s own pet project: mobilizing 
support for the Palestinians in Lebanon. Like many leaders and officials of the Islamic 
Republic, Montazeri had spent considerable time in Lebanon working and fighting with 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian and Shiite factions 
before the revolution.10 Montazeri had established a strong network in Lebanon and 
actively lobbied for Iran to take a leading role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this 
way, Montazeri’s disagreement with Rohani had more to do with the placement of 
priorities than ideology, and was connected to the former’s efforts in marshalling support 
for the Palestinian resistance among key Arab regimes—regimes such as Kuwait that 
were alarmed by Rohani’s expansionist rhetoric. Like Rohani, however, Montazeri’s 
activism brought him into conflict with Iranian officials. At one point, for instance, 
Montazeri and a group of several hundred supporters occupied an airport for fifteen days 
and eventually staged a sit-in at the Foreign Ministry building in protest over the 
government’s refusal to let them fly to Lebanon to fight alongside the Palestinians.11 
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Though Montazeri ultimately succeeded in transporting some of these volunteers 
to Lebanon,12 his approach to foreign intervention was considered extreme and 
uncompromising by revolutionary officials. Montazeri’s father, Ayatollah Hosayn-Ali 
Montazeri, famously apologized for his son in a public letter blaming the latter’s actions 
on a psychological disorder he developed due to the torture he suffered while imprisoned 
under the Pahlavi regime.13 The Ayatollah’s apology and criticism of his “extremely 
revolutionary-minded” son (khayli enqelabi fekr mi-kard) was seen as significant due to 
the elder’s own outspoken support for “exporting the revolution.”14 Indeed, along with 
his son, Ayatollah Montazeri was seen as a leading proponent of revolutionary 
internationalism within the Khomeinist faction. Unlike other activists, Ayatollah 
Montazeri’s statements on the subject also carried the weight of a senior religious 
authority. Thus, his status and credentials enabled the Ayatollah to become the chief 
ideologue for interventionism in the Islamic Republic. 
Ayatollah Montazeri’s views on interventionism are rooted in his conception of 
fundamental Muslim ethics. For Montazeri, Muslims above all have a duty to help one 
another. He suggests that just as Islam is imbued with a political nature, the responsibility 
Muslims have for one another’s welfare likewise extends into the arena of global 
politics.15 It is here that Montazeri locates Iran’s duty to assist foreign Muslims. Speaking 
to a Jerusalem Day celebration in Tehran, Montazeri outlines his conception of foreign 
assistance: 
Assistance is not only verbal. One day at the orders of our great leader 
(Khomeini) we declared a day as Jerusalem Day. It meant that all Muslims 
should stand up with their thoughts directed at Jerusalem. But it is not 
sufficient that we merely come out with some slogans on that particular 
day in favor of Jerusalem. Words are the prerequisites of deeds. Do you 
know what is happening to the Muslims in the south of Lebanon? Do you 
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know what is happening to the Palestinian refugees? Do you know what 
problems are being faced by your Muslim brothers in Afghanistan? Are 
you aware of the condition of 6 million Muslims in the Philippines? Are 
we going to their assistance? Or are we going to jeopardize their interests 
instead of assisting them? These are our duties. Jerusalem Day [is] only a 
slogan which [is] to be followed by deeds.16  
Statements such as this did little to distinguish Ayatollah Montazeri’s form of 
internationalism from the interventionist activism of his son or Ayatollah Rohani. 
Further, government officials, and later Ayatollah Khomeini, made clear that Iran’s calls 
for “exporting the revolution” did not suggest any intentions of physical or martial 
intervention in foreign countries.17 Montazeri was thus forced to qualify his thoughts. An 
example of this is found in an exchange between Montazeri and an Arab journalist. When 
asked by the journalist how support for foreign liberation movements was possible 
“without constituting interference in the affairs of other states,” Montazeri replied that 
support for liberation movements was an “Islamic task” and “the duty of all Muslims,” 
adding: 
Take our brother Muslim Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, for example; 
we must support them with everything we have and not be content with 
mere slogans. The funds and weapons we have must be made available to 
our sons and brothers there. . . I would like to reassert that we in the 
Muslim revolution cannot remain calm or sleep on silk while the rest of 
the Muslim peoples and countries are encouraging danger, injustice, and 
oppression . . . by dictatorships and imperialism. What we seek to do does 
not constitute interference in other countries’ internal affairs. We are 
acting in accordance with the Koranic verse: ‘The believers, men and 
women, are protectors of one another; they enjoin what is just and forbid 
what is evil.’ Geography does not exist here, as you can see. You Muslims 
should not ask us to read the verse thus: ‘The believers, men and women, 
in Iran . . .’18 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 On this point, Khomeini said: “When we say we want to export our revolution, this is what we have in 
mind, this is what we want to export: we want to export the same spirituality which has emerged in Iran . . . 
We do not want to draw our swords and take our guns and attack . . . We want to export our revolution, our 
cultural revolution and our Islamic revolution to all Islamic countries. Once this revolution is exported, 
wherever it is exported, it will solve problems. What you must first do is to awaken your peoples [as Iran 
has done in] its revolution.” See, “Khomeyni addresses representatives of liberation movements,” Tehran 
Domestic Service in Persian, 9 August 1980, FBIS-MEA, 11 August 1980. 
18 Emphasis added. “Montazeri interviewed on Muslim solidarity, Gulf ties,” Paris An-Nahar wa Ad-
Duwali in Arabic, 22-28 October 1979, FBIS-MEA, 29 October 1979. 
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Although Montazeri does not call for outright military involvement in foreign 
countries—at least not to the effect of either his son or Rohani—his conception of 
“exporting the revolution” certainly envisions an interventionist role for Iran. The 
distinction between material intervention and non-material (e.g., moral or spiritual) 
intervention, however, would continue to be made by Iranian officials throughout the 
decade. While Montazeri’s stated views changed near the end of the Iraq war, his calls 
for intervention were what drove the internationalist efforts of the IRGC and Iran’s 
Foreign Ministry through much of the 1980s.  
The Iraq Conflict and an Emergent Conservatism 
On 22 September 1980, Iraqi forces began a full-scale invasion of Iran.19 The main thrust 
of the invasion aimed at capturing Iraqi-claimed land on Iran’s side of the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway and parts of Iran’s oil-rich southwest province of Khuzestan. Iraq’s superior 
military technology and coordination proved disastrous to Iranian defenses, which were 
already in the midst of the Khomeinist-led purges that had decimated the regular 
military’s officer corps and destroyed its institutional cohesion. Despite stalwart Iranian 
resistance, the Iraqi military was able to capture key positions inside Iranian territory, 
including the strategically important city of Khorramshahr. Through the next several 
months, Iraqi forces continued to lay siege to southern Iranian cities, especially Abadan 
and Dezful, and were able to strengthen their positions on the Iranian side of the Shatt al-
Arab. 
The defeats suffered by Iranian forces exasperated the domestic political crisis in 
Iran. As commander-in-chief, President Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr was held responsible for a 
failed military strategy.20 This, combined with his already antagonistic relationship with 
                                                 
19 A sizeable body of literature has been produced on the Iran-Iraq war. For a detailed narrative of the 
conflict, see Dilip Hiro The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Routledge, 1991. For 
more analytic and comparative studies of the war, see Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and 
Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Gerd Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991; 
and Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War. London: I.B. Tauris, 1988. For a brief 
examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the context of modern warfare in the Middle East see, Bassam Tibi, 
Conflict and War in the Middle East. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. 
20 President Bani-Sadr adopted a mostly conventional strategy in confronting Iraqi belligerents. His 
influence was strong in the regular armed forces but did not penetrate the command of the Revolutionary 
Guards, which remained closely aligned with the clerical leaders of the IRP and Prime Minister 
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the IRP and Khomeinist bloc, led to his impeachment in June 1981. The fall of Bani-Sadr 
paralleled a period of open resistance to the Khomeinist government by leftist 
organizations. The fighting between the IRP-aligned forces led by the IRGC and the 
oppositionists resulted in thousands of casualties. As opposition forces suffered severe 
losses in the fighting, the MKO initiated a series of suicide bombings and assassinations 
that targeted the clerical leadership—a vigorous campaign that continued through 1982.21 
The MKO, which had suffered the greatest losses of the opposition, was accused of 
(though denied) bombing the IRP headquarters on 28 June, which resulted in 73 dead, 
including party secretary Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and the leading advocate for 
revolutionary internationalism, Mohammad Montazeri. Less than two months later, 
another bombing killed IRP leaders Ali Rajai and Hojjat al-Islam Javad Bahonar—then 
the acting President and Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic, respectively.  
With the impeachment of Bani-Sadr, the IRP and its associates took power of the 
three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. This enabled clerical 
leaders the control and cooperation needed to establish a coherent defense strategy, which 
included a more central role for the IRGC and its commanders. In four major offenses 
from September 1981 through May 1982, the combined Iranian armed forces were able to 
gradually break Iraqi lines, retake Iranian territory (including Khorramshahr), and force 
an Iraqi retreat. With Saddam’s aspirations of taking the oil-rich sectors of Khuzestan no 
longer feasible, he returned to his original stated objective of reclaiming Iraqi rights over 
the Shatt al-Arab and reconfiguring the southern border with Iran. This turn of fortunes, 
however, emboldened Iranian leaders and the Iranian military who now felt they had the 
upper-hand in the war with Iraq.22 
The Iraq conflict caused an internal struggle within the Khomeinist faction. While 
the war engendered a sense of patriotism in Iranian society that lent support to the regime 
and its clerical leaders, differing political values within the broad ruling coalition began 
to surface. Such diverging trends had an impact on the IRGC, whose leadership began to 
forge an even firmer relationship with the IRP and more explicitly identified their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mohammad Ali Rajai. Bani-Sadr charged the regular military with battling Iraqi forces in the countryside, 
which left the IRGC to defend Iranian cities. See, Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq, 26-30; and Hiro, 
Longest War, 47-52. 
21 Abrahamian, Mojahedin, 220-22. 
22 Hiro, Longest War, 68-69. 
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organization with clerical rule.23 A political alliance with the clergy and a more 
conservative approach toward policy were largely behind IRGC head commander 
Mohsen Rezai’s resignation from the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution organization 
(of which he was a founding member). Although MIR members continued to hold 
prominent roles in government, some MIR leaders began to slowly distance themselves 
from the growing conservatism of the IRP and its clerical cadre. MIR and other activist 
factions, including those aligned with Ayatollah Montazeri, continued to advocate 
revolutionary ideals in the areas of social, economic, and foreign policy; however, the 
IRP (now under the guidance of President Ali Khamenei and Majles Speaker Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani) had begun moving away from these areas of revolutionary change 
in order to focus on Iran’s immediate domestic concerns and the war with Iraq.24  
The factors that contributed to Rezai’s departure from MIR are detailed in a 
September 1981 letter of resignation.25 Although Rezai claims that his responsibilities as 
IRGC commander and his role in the war effort are partly behind his resignation, he also 
expresses dissatisfaction with MIR’s leadership and politics. Rezai considers MIR’s 
political independence to be contrary to the needs of the regime. “Government organs” 
(such as the IRGC, committees, or Construction Jihad), Rezai suggests, are committed to 
serving the needs of the state, whereas “independent” groups (such as MIR) are more 
guided by self-interest. In this way, Rezai accuses MIR of promoting its own interests 
over those of the government and blames its political activism for causing “discord in the 
line of the Imam.” Rezai also questions MIR’s commitment to religious leadership, 
suggesting that its politics and “organizational zeal” (ta‘assob-e sazmani) are tantamount 
to a disregard for the will of the clergy. This, he emphasizes, is the organization’s major 
failing, insisting: “leadership of the revolution must be in the hands of the clergy 
[rohaniyyat] and religious authorities [marja‘iyyat].”26  
In order to bring MIR back in line, Rezai offers a number of suggestions. First, 
MIR should “discontinue its political activities and distribute its members among 
                                                 
23 For instance, at an IRGC seminar in Shiraz a resolution was passed that proclaimed “unquestioning 
support for the velayat-e faqih,” the clergy, and Ayatollah Khomeini. “Resolution passed by Shiraz 
Revolution Guards,” Shiraz regional in Persian, 21 February 1981, in BBCSWB, 25 February 1981. 
24 Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics, 47-50. 
25 The Persian text of Mohsen Rezai’s resignation letter as well as a facsimile of the hand-written letter can 
be found in Saidi, Sazman, 137-40, and 294-96 for the facsimile. 
26 Ibid., 137-40. 
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governmental organs.” It should “promptly form a united Islamic front with the Islamic 
Republic Party” and resolve any ideological (i.e. political) contradiction with the clergy. 
MIR should also provide a “greater role for the Imam’s representative” to the 
organization and allow the clergy (through its representative) to “determine the political 
line of the organization.” Finally, MIR should recognize the “proper stance toward . . . 
the clergy” and strengthen the “political and social role” of these religious leaders.27  
Through his resignation letter, Rezai is advocating Khomeinist unity for the sake 
of domestic stability in a time of war and is arguing against any political activism that 
runs contrary to the policies laid down by Khomeini and the IRP. As the leader of the 
Revolutionary Guards, Rezai is most concerned with fighting the war against Iraq, and 
sees this conflict—and not domestic or unrelated foreign issues—as the nation’s 
paramount concern. He sees independent political action and the promotion of policies 
that run counter to the increasingly conservative positions of government-aligned clergy 
to be a threat to the regime’s existence. In this way, Rezai signals a clear break between 
the IRGC and MIR along political lines and on the role of clerical political authority. His 
letter represents the growing conservatism of Iran’s leadership and its revolutionary 
institutions, which sought to dampen revolutionary zeal (ta‘assob)—a zeal that called for 
social justice and an uncompromising internationalist foreign policy—and focus domestic 
resources toward combating Iraqi aggression.28  
Battling Baathists All the Way to Jerusalem 
The success of the spring 1982 offensives filled Iran’s political and military sectors with 
confidence. The victories served to simultaneously justify the moral superiority of the 
Islamic revolution, the ideological strength of its forces, and the asymmetrical tactics of 
the Revolutionary Guards. Iran’s Supreme Defense Council—a seven member board 
appointed by Khomeini consisting of political and military leaders charged with directing 
war policy—and commanders of its armed forces became not only convinced of their 
capacity to defend Iranian territory, but also in their ability to wage war. A loose 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 For the political divide between the conservative and radical-revolutionary factions during this period, 
see Moslem, Factional Politics, 50-67. 
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alignment of these hawkish leaders argued that Iran should parlay its successful military 
operations into a counter-invasion of Iraq.29 The result, Iran’s counter-invasion of Iraq, 
ushered in a new stage in the war. Through the next six years, Iran’s offensives were met 
with occasional but limited success. Despite some victories inside Iraq, the realties of 
occupying and holding territory against the galvanized and better equipped Iraqi defenses 
proved too formidable for Iran’s armed forces to overcome. Iraqi forces (backed in part 
by the US, France, and Arab Gulf states), now in the position of defending their cities and 
territory, effectively prevented Iran from realizing its stated goals of igniting an Islamic 
revolution in Iraq and overthrowing the Baathist regime.  
The self-assurance that drove Iran’s war policy in Iraq also inspired 
extraterritorial ambitions. Iran’s leaders framed the Iraq war as one front in the Islamic 
world’s larger struggle against imperialist and Zionist influence. The Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon on 6 June 1982—and the ongoing Soviet conflict in Afghanistan—supported 
this line of thinking. Although it had long been part of Khomeinist rhetoric, support for 
the Palestinian cause became a central theme in the wartime mission promoted by the 
Revolutionary Guards. Before Iran’s counter-invasion in 1982, the Revolutionary Guards 
called for the establishment of a multi-national Muslim force to liberate the holy city. The 
idea for this force, called the “Jerusalem Army” (sepah-e qods), arose from a meeting of 
foreign Islamic organizations in Iran in 1981.30 Regarding this force, the IRGC 
announced: 
Now, the Iranian nation eagerly awaits the establishment of the Jerusalem 
Army. The authorities of the revolution and especially the Foreign 
Ministry desire that this problem will be placed at the front of our 
problems so that, as Ayatollah Montazeri once said, we are going to dear 
Jerusalem and from there we will liberate the forests [jangal] from the 
arrogant criminals. And if the Islamic Republic through radio and 
television propagates the [the idea of] establishing the Jerusalem Army 
throughout the Islamic world—in spite of Zionist plots—millions of 
Muslims will be ready to liberate Jerusalem.31 
                                                 
29 Hiro, Longest War, 86-87. 




Referencing Ayatollah Montazeri’s calls for exporting the Islamic revolution, the IRGC 
claimed that the liberation of Jerusalem was its “task before all tasks,” but argued that 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion had blocked its “assault” (hamleh) on the holy city. The 
IRGC further suggested that the “greater victory” of delivering Jerusalem from Israeli 
occupation could only be achieved after the “lesser victory” of defeating Saddam 
Hussein.32 Thus, Iraq became seen as both the literal and figurative gateway to Jerusalem 
and the first step towards the ultimate emancipation of Muslim societies. The IRGC 
employed the idea of liberating Jerusalem in an effort to inspire (and perhaps appease) its 
rank-and-file, who embraced interventionist ambitions more wholeheartedly than the 
organization’s conservative top command. In this manner, the underlying conservatism of 
Mohsen Rezai and Iran’s Supreme Defense Council is evident in the priority given to the 
Iraq war in the “greater” quest for Jerusalem. For, only after the war with Iraq is won can 
Iran begin its “assault” on Israel. The longer the war went on, however, the more distant 
the prospect of liberating Jerusalem grew and the more hollow the cheering of such 
slogans became. 
Exporting the Revolution: the Case of Lebanon  
Despite the IRGC’s implicit Iraq-first policy, factions within the organization were 
heavily involved in the political push to expand the revolution abroad. Since its inception, 
the IRGC had been a vocal proponent of revolutionary internationalism. As the 
organization claimed before the war: “We will export our revolution throughout the 
world. As our revolution is Islamic, the struggle will continue until the call of ‘There is 
no God but God . . .’ echoes around the globe.”33 The organization initially conceived its 
role in this effort as protecting foreign “liberation movements and the pursuit of the rights 
of the oppressed,” and held this charge as one its official responsibilities (vazayef) 
contained in its organizational charter.34 At the heart of the Guards’ foreign efforts was 
Ayatollah Montazeri, whose religious authority afforded legitimacy to those who 
supported a more aggressive foreign policy. Montazeri also had a strong support base 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Payam-e Enqelab. No. 5, April 1980, p.39. 
34 This duty is listed in the IRGC’s first official charter, Payam-e Enqelab. No. 4, March 1980, p.37. 
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within the IRGC and helped foster clerical oversight and collaboration in the 
organization.35 His patronage led to the creation of the IRGC’s Office of Liberation 
Movements (OLM), which was to translate the Ayatollah’s vision into political, religious, 
and military operations outside of Iran. To this end, the OLM—initially led by 
Mohammad Montazeri until his death in June 1981 and later by Mehdi Hashemi—
announced that its primary mission was to develop contacts between the Guards and 
outside Muslim organizations that were “fighting for freedom from the servitude and 
fetters of Western and Eastern imperialism and global Zionism.”36 The office’s scope of 
operations was conceptually wide; however, the majority of its efforts were devoted to 
expanding Iranian influence in Lebanon, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan.37  
The establishment of OLM made foreign operations an actual (and not simply 
rhetorical) part of the IRGC’s mandate. More so than any other conflict, the ongoing civil 
war in Lebanon and the Israeli occupation of that country provided the IRGC with an 
opportunity to directly work toward its strategic and moral goal of liberating Jerusalem. 
Israel’s aggression not only further motivated the internationalist-minded cadre into 
action, it also served to temporarily mobilize support for foreign intervention among 
Iran’s more conservative civilian and military leaders. Indeed, a day after the Israeli 
invasion the IRGC Central Headquarters and the Joint Staff of the armed forces issued a 
statement stating that Iran would send soldiers to Lebanon to “engage in [a] face-to-face 
battle against Israel, the primary enemy of Islam and of the Muslims.” The statement 
added: 
The self-sacrificing members of the Islamic revolution guards corps, the 
mobilization [units] of the guards crops and the brave fighters of the 
                                                 
35 After a meeting with Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom, IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai said: “it has been 
arranged that the ideological section of the corps be supervised by a canonist [Shiite cleric], who in 
addition to having the ideal religious qualifications should have perfect knowledge of current political and 
revolutionary issues.” “The Revolution Guards in Iran,” Tehran Home Service, 29 October 1981, 
BBCSWB, 31 October 1981. 
36 “Iran revolution guards’ ‘liberation movements unit,’” BBCSWB, 6 February 1981. 
37 The IRGC developed extensive ties with several different Shiite militant groups in Afghanistan. 
However, factionalism and a lack of organization within the Afghani groups limited Iran’s impact in that 
country. For Iran’s involvement in this regard, see Nimatullah Ibrahimi, “The Failure of a Clerical Proto-
State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984,” Working Paper Series Number 2, Crisis States Research Center, London: 
Destin LSE, 2006. Also, Montazeri’s and the IRGC’s roles in assisting Afghan Mojahedin organizations 
are discussed in the confessions of Sayed Ebrahim, a member of the Afghani Sazman-e Fedayan-e Islam, 
see “Confession by Captured Insurgent Trained in Iran,” Kabul home service, 17 March 1985, BBCSWB, 
30 March 1985. 
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armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran who are engaged in 
unceasing battle against the criminal Ba'thist regime, will, by expanding 
these fronts, fight against that regime's collaborator, the primary enemy of 
the Muslims, thereby engaging in unceasing face-to-face battle with world 
imperialism.38 
Soon after, Iranian president Ali Khamenei announced that the IRGC had begun to train 
fighters to send to Lebanon, arguing: 
 To us, there is no difference between the fronts in the south of Iran and in 
south Lebanon . . . We are prepared to put our facilities and necessary 
training at the disposal of all the Muslims who are prepared to fight 
against the Zionist regime. We believe that victory will belong to the 
Muslims, and to those who are on the side of truth.39  
By the end of June, over 1000 Revolutionary Guards were reported to have landed in 
Syria for operations in Lebanon.40 
As mentioned earlier, Iranian activists had had a long relationship with their 
Palestinian and Shiite counterparts in Lebanon.41 Although many of Iran’s top leaders 
had spent time in Lebanon prior to the revolution, two main networks of Iranian activism 
in that country can be indentified.42 The first centered on Mustafa Chamran and the Amal 
militia he helped organize among the followers of the Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr in 
southern Lebanon.43 Musa al-Sadr and Chamran began Amal in an effort to give a greater 
political voice to the historically disenfranchised Lebanese Shiite community. Through 
the 1960s, Shiites in Lebanon were the poorest and least powerful religious community in 
Lebanon. Owing to the confessional system of government designed for Lebanon by 
French imperial powers after WWI, political, economic, and military power was divided 
along confessional lines. The disputed 1932 census found that Shiites were Lebanon’s 
                                                 
38 “Iranian Military to Fight for Lebanon,” Tehran home service, 7 June 1982, BBCSWB, 9 June 1982. 
39 “Iran: In Brief; Khameneh’i on training and help for Lebanon,” Tehran home service, 17 June 1982 
BBCSWB, 19 June 1982. 
40 Other reports put this number at around 1500. “Iran’s Guards Rally to Beirut.” Newsweek, 28 June 1982. 
41 For an overview of Iranian-Lebanese interaction during this period see, H.E. Chehabi ed., Distant 
Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006, pp. 180-230. Also 
see, Haleh Vazeri, “Iran’s Involvement in Lebanon: Polarization and Radicalization of Militant Islamic 
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42 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National 
Identities. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 94-99. 
43 Much of Chamran’s experience in Lebanon (including his relationship to Musa al-Sadr and the 
establishment of Amal) has been posthumously compiled from his writings, interviews, and speeches. See, 
for instance, Mostafa Chamran, Lobnan. [Tehran?]: Bonyad-e Shahid-e Chamran, 1983. On Chamran’s 
impact on the Shiite community of southern Lebanon, see: Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon, 89-118. 
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third largest religious community, following the Sunnis and Maronite Christians, who 
were second and first respectively. With Maronites and Sunnis at the top of power and 
influence in the new nation, the Shiite community was left to languish. By the time the 
Iranian-born cleric Musa al-Sadr arrived in 1960 to his ancestral home of southern 
Lebanon as the new religious judge of the southern city of Tyre, he found a largely 
impoverished  rural community of village farmers and share croppers. In time, Sadr’s 
project became one of uniting the Shiite masses into a viable political movement. With 
the help Chamran—a devoted revolutionary and American-trained scientist—Sadr 
succeeded in awakening the political spirit of Lebanese Shiites, which enabled the 
southern Lebanese community to confront political injustices imposed on them by both 
the Lebanese central government and the Palestinian resistance fighters who had come to 
southern Lebanon following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970.44 Though the 
Shiite movement in Lebanon struggled in the mid-1970s due to the outbreak of civil war 
in 1975-76, it was reignited by al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978 and by the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.45 After the revolution, Chamran retained close ties with Amal leaders, 
and as an early associate of the IRGC and later as Iran’s Defense Minister, he had short-
lived success in bringing the interests of that organization inline with the Islamic 
Republic. Chamran’s efforts in this regard—including the inclusion of roughly 600 
Lebanese Amal volunteers into Iranian military ranks to combat Iraqi aggression—were 
temporary and dissipated after his death on the warfront in June 1981.46 
The other major Iran-Lebanon network, which comprises the foundation of Iran’s 
current involvement in Lebanon, was established by the Iranian activists who largely 
opposed Musa al-Sadr, Chamran, and Amal due to their insufficient support for the 
                                                 
44 On the politicization of the Lebanese Shiite community see, Augustus R. Norton, “Changing Actors and 
Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 482, (Nov. 1985), pp. 109-121.  Also, for a history on Amal see, Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite 
Lebanon. 
45 Musa al-Sadr disappeared on a trip to Libya in 1978. Although many of his followers believed that he 
had gone into a spiritual occultation similar to the 12th Imam in Shiite lore, over time in became widely 
assumed that al-Sadr had been the target of a political assassination orchestrated by the Libyan leader 
Muammar Qaddafi and the PLO in retaliation for al-Sadr’s opposition to the PLO’s presence and military 
activities in southern Lebanon. 
46 Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi‘ite Lebanon, 101-03. 
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Palestinian resistance.47 This faction, headed in part by Mohammad Montazeri, Ali 
Akbar Mohtashami, and Jalal al-Din Farsi, had established strong ties with Shiite clerical 
activists in Beirut and the Bekaa (Biq‘a) valley. Mohtashami, for instance, had taken 
several trips to Lebanon beginning in 1970 and helped establish strong relationships with 
Lebanese clerics in the Bekaa region. From his first visit to the area, Mohtashami had 
grown especially fond of the Shiites of the Bekaa. He found them more religious than 
their counterparts in Beirut, brave, and particularly “disposed toward the clergy” (beh 
rohaniyyat ‘alaqehmand hastand).48   
Montazeri, Mohtashami, and others like Abu Sharif also established strong ties 
with the PLO and were part of a loose transnational network in the 1970s that helped 
bring Iranian anti-shah activists to Lebanon for guerrilla warfare training in Palestinian 
camps. Yahya Rahim Safavi, an early IRGC commander and later commander-in-chief 
from 1997 to 2007, was just one of the young Iranian activists that trained and fought 
with the PLO during this time.49 Through a network that involved Mohammad Montazeri 
and Ali Jannati (the son of prominent Shiite jurist Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati), Safavi 
travelled from Damascus (where he had come to evade arrest in Iran for anti-shah 
activities) to Beirut and trained in small arms and explosives in a PLO camp. Safavi later 
served as a scout and night guard for the Fatah organization in southern Lebanon, and 
although he vigorously supported the Palestinian resistance, he was disappointed by the 
lack of piety within PLO ranks. On this point he writes: 
 None of the members of Fatah said their obligatory prayers [namaz]. 
When I asked them ‘Why don’t you say your prayers?’ They replied: ‘God 
willing, in Jerusalem.’ In other words, ‘When we liberate Jerusalem we’ll 
say our prayers.’50  
Commenting on the Palestinians’ ignorance of Islamic law, Safavi expresses shock when 
one Fatah member tells him that not all dogs are ritually impure (najes), but rather: 
                                                 
47 Amal had partially been established to protect the interests of the southern Lebanese Shiites from the 
Palestinian organizations that had taken control of that area. This led to an ongoing violent conflict between 
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48 Sayyed Ali Akbar Mohtashami, Khaterat-e siyasi-e Sayyed Ali Akbar Mohtashami. Vol. 2. Tehran: 
Khaneh-ye Andisheh-ye Javan, 2000, p. 108. 
49 Safavi discusses his experiences in Lebanon in his memoirs, see: Yahya Rahim Safavi, Az jonub-e 
lobnan ta jonub-e iran: khaterat-e sardar-e Sayyed Rahim Safavi. Ed. Majid Najafpour. Tehran: Markaz-e 
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50 Ibid., 105. 
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“black dogs are impure and white dogs are pure.” Safavi was also troubled by the 
perceived loose sexual morality of Fatah members, particularly that the outward display 
of physical affection between men and women was tolerated and that genders were not 
segregated in instances of travel or military deployments.51 
Due in part to this ideological and cultural divide, the ties developed between 
Iranian activists and secular Palestinian resistance organizations proved less durable than 
those forged between Khomeinists like Mohtashami and activist clergy in the Bekaa.52 
(This is particularly true concerning the PLO, which fell out of favor with Khomeini and 
ultimately sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war.) Indeed, after the revolution 
Mohtashami was able to bring substantial state support to his Shiite network in Lebanon 
through his office as Iranian ambassador to Syria. In this capacity, Mohtashami was 
instrumental in brining together a collection of like-minded militants and low-level clergy 
in the establishment of a new type of Lebanese Shiite resistance—a movement that later 
coalesced into the Hizbullah organization.53 Hizbullah was unique in that it was among 
the first (and ultimately one of the few) non-Iranian entities to adopt central Khomeinist 
concepts such as the “guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih). The organization’s 
leaders fully embraced this concept and turned to Ayatollah Khomeini as their supreme 
political and religious authority.54 This gave Khomeini and his intermediaries (such as 
Mohtashami and the IRGC) tremendous influence within Hizbullah and, by extension, 
Lebanese politics. Apart from the adoption of Khomeinist ideology, Hizbullah’s name 
(which was in part suggested by Khomeini) and its official emblem (which is based on 
the IRGC emblem, see Figure 4.1 below) serve as lasting manifestations of Iranian 
influence.55 
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Figure 4.1. Lebanese Hizbullah and IRGC emblems.56 
 
 
From the beginning of its introduction to Lebanon, the IRGC helped organize and 
train the new Shiite resistance.57 The IRGC served as a conduit for Iranian support and 
helped bring military expertise to Hizbullah. Guardsmen worked hand in hand with their 
Lebanese counterparts and became inextricably linked to the violent activism that became 
an early hallmark of the Shiite resistance. Although the IRGC did not overtly engage in 
military operations, through its coordination with Hizbullah and associated Shiite 
militants, it became implicated in various terrorist attacks against Israeli and western 
targets, including the simultaneous bombings of the US and French barracks in 1983, the 
bombing of the US embassy in 1984, and a number of killings and kidnappings from 
1985–1988.58 
Combined with the Iranian counter-invasion of Iraq, the involvement of the IRGC 
in domestic Lebanese terrorism became seen as proof of the Islamic Republic’s desire to 
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57 Hamzeh, Path of Hizbullah, 25. 
58 On Iran’s connection to terrorism and hostage-taking in Lebanon during this period, see Magnus 
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export its revolution through military means. While Mohsen Rezai publically 
downplayed the Guards presence in Lebanon, and rejected the idea that it was part of a 
broader war against “anti-Islamic conspiracies,” the organization did at times describe its 
involvement in Lebanon as “exporting the revolution.”59  Overall, the IRGC divided its 
work in Lebanon into four different categories. The first, which is the only category 
explicitly identified as “exporting the revolution” (sodur-e enqelab-e eslami), concerns 
“cultural activism” and the propagation (tabligh) of religious, cultural, and ideological 
thought. In this arena, the Guards describe their efforts as distributing revolutionary 
literature (including the speeches of Khomeini and Montazeri), and bringing in religious 
scholars from Iran to promote religious instruction and spread revolutionary values in 
Lebanese towns and villages.60 The second area of IRGC involvement was the martial 
and ideological training of the Shiite resistance. The former, which the IRGC says 
compromised 60% of this effort, was undertaken by guardsmen, while the latter 
(ideological training) was headed by Iranian clergy. The third and fourth areas were 
respectively described as the funding of and recruitment for the Lebanese resistance.61 
The IRGC considered its experience in Lebanon an extension of the Islamic 
Republic’s general efforts to spread its ideology and religious fervor outside of Iran. To 
Brother Mosleh, commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon, Iran’s influence in Lebanon 
was successfully reshaping the latter’s Shiite population along the lines of the Islamic 
Republic:  
The Muslims of Lebanon, especially the Shiites of Lebanese Hizbullah, 
consider themselves the offspring of the Islamic Revolution and therefore 
know that they have a duty to imitate [taba‘iyyat kardan] the Islamic 
Revolution.62  
He further suggests that Iran’s positive impact in Lebanon is evinced by the proliferation 
of images of Khomeini throughout the country and by the popularity of Iranian flags 
(which were sold together with Lebanese flags in Shiite areas). To illustrate this point, 
Mosleh shares an anecdote of a Guards patrol unit in the Bekaa: 
                                                 
59 “Iranians fighting in Lebanon” (interview with Mohsen Rezai), BBCSWB, 24 November 1983.  
60 Interview with Brother Mosleh, IRGC commander in Lebanon, Payam-e Enqelab. No. 138, 8 June 1985, 
p. 70. 
61 Ibid., 70-71. 
62 Ibid., 73. 
 96
 
One day [as we were driving through a village] a little girl approached our 
vehicle and said: ‘Brother, I would like a picture of the Imam 
[Khomeini].” At the time I said that we didn’t have any pictures of the 
Imam in the car, but then I noticed we had one in the windshield. I gave 
this picture to the little girl. She took the picture and kissed it. This is 
evidence of the people’s love for the Imam.63 
Thus, as Mosleh suggests, the net effect of Iran’s presence in Lebanon is the 
transformation of the Shiite laity into a revolutionary population and increased goodwill 
toward the Islamic Republic. It is these results—i.e.,  the expansion of Iran’s ideological 
and political influence abroad—that the IRGC identifies as the primary goal of exporting 
the revolution to Lebanon. The militarization of Shiite activism and the direct 
confrontation with Israeli forces in that country are expressed as secondary. 
Waning Interventionism, Rising Conservatism 
Even though a small presence of IRGC officials remains in Lebanon to this day, many of 
its troops began to pullout in 1985 as resistance to Iran’s extraterritorial efforts in general, 
and in Lebanon in particular, became a charged subject in Iranian politics.64 This shift in 
policy was a consequence of the growing international pressure against Iran’s 
involvement in Lebanon (i.e., terrorism and hostage-taking) and simmering political 
divergence within Iran’s leadership. By 1984, President Khamenei and Majles speaker 
Rafsanjani publically acknowledged that there was an internal ideological dispute 
between conservatives and left-leaning radicals within the Khomeinist bloc. Although 
this split had been apparent years before (e.g., as evinced by Mohsen Rezai’s resignation 
from MIR in 1982), the intensification of the Iraq war and its impact on Iranian society 
brought factionalism to the political fore. Each faction included prominent members of 
the regime, including Khamenei and Rafsanjani for the conservatives (who Khomeini 
tended to support on foreign policy), and Mohtashami, Behzad Nabavi (the leader of 
MIR), Mir-Hosayn Musavi (the Prime Minister), and Ayatollah Montazeri for the more 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 “Leaflets and songs show Iranian link to Beirut's 'Party of God'”, Christian Science Monitor, 29 April 
1985. This process continued through the early 1990s, by which time the vast majority of IRGC troops had 
been removed from Lebanon. See, Hamzeh, Path of Hizballah, 69-71. 
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revolutionary-minded left.65 This ideological conflict and related political infighting 
permeated major political parties and led the dissolution of MIR (1986) and the IRP 
(1987) thereby undoing the alliances that had laid the foundation for Khomeinist 
dominance in post-revolutionary Iran. 
While disagreements over social and economic policy were significant 
contributors to the factionalism within the Khomeinist movement, the area of foreign 
policy, and more specifically the issue of foreign involvement, proved central to the 
political divide.66 More conservative elements led by Rafsanjani regarded foreign 
involvement to be a waste of resources, harmful to Iran’s international standing, and a 
distraction from the conflict with Iraq.67 On the latter issue, Rafsanjani was supported by 
Khomeini and the leading architects of the Iraq war, including IRGC commander Mohsen 
Rezai, who wanted to concentrate Iran’s military resources on victory in Iraq. To bolster 
Iran’s lagging war effort, Rafsanjani opened up unofficial contacts with the US and Israel 
to explore arms purchases.68 Although Iran had been secretly purchasing American arms 
through Israel with Khomeini’s assent since the beginning of the war, a need to replenish 
its stockpiles pushed Rafsanjani to seek a direct covert deal with the US.69 Through 
intermediaries in his cabinet and abroad, Rafsanjani sought shipments of US anti-tank 
TOW missiles in return for a cessation of Iran-sponsored terrorism in Lebanon, a promise 
to release four American hostages held captive by Hizbullah, and a suggestion of an 
eventual rapprochement with the US. To help seal the deal with the Americans, 
Rafsanjani invited an US and Israeli delegation to Tehran to discuss the plan. While the 
secret meeting failed to produce an agreement, a commitment was made between the US 
delegation (headed by Robert McFarlane, former National Security Advisor to Ronald 
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Regan) and Rafsanjani’s representatives to keep back channels open for future 
discussions.70 
 The radical-left faction associated with Ayatollah Montazeri, Mehdi Hashemi 
(former member of the IRGC Central Council and head of OLM), and Mohtashami, 
largely opposed Rafsanjani’s overtures.71 Montazeri, for instance, personally criticized 
Rafsanjani for the secret meeting in Tehran.72 For this faction, which had broad support 
within IRGC ranks, it was Iran’s moral and political responsibility to assist Muslim 
resistance movements and propagate the values of the Islamic revolution across the 
region. Further, as combating the influence of imperialism and liberating Jerusalem 
remained at the forefront of their idealistic agenda, the internationalist faction rejected 
any warming of relations between the US and Israel. Lebanon, for this group, was seen as 
a successful example of what exporting the revolution could achieve and as a crucial 
front in the war against imperialism and Zionism that required continued support.73 Thus, 
any negotiations with the US, particularly any involving a deal promising a scaling-back 
of Iran’s Lebanese presence, were anathema to the radicals and would provoke a reaction.  
The conservatives, however, proved the more formidable coalition. Simultaneous 
with seeking a US arms deal, Rafsanjani sought to weaken his rival Montazeri by 
undermining the influence of the latter’s leftist base. With the crucial support of 
Khomeini, Rafsanjani was able to remove the Office of Liberation Movements from the 
IRGC and merge it with the Foreign Ministry thereby bringing the office’s operations 
under the direct control of the government and curtailing its semi-autonomy. While this 
was a blow to radical-interventionists, Mehdi Hashemi (Montazeri’s relative through 
marriage) and his supporters were able to continue their foreign operations with the 
financial and political support of Montazeri. However, after Hashemi was arrested by 
Saudi security agents for attempting to smuggle explosives into that country for a 
purported attack during the annual Hajj in Mecca, the interventionist faction began to fall 
apart.74 Hashemi returned to Iran where he was detained and an investigation into his 
activities commenced. While Montazeri vigorously protested the arrest in letters to 
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Khomeini,75 some of Hashemi’s associates leaked information to a Lebanese newspaper 
exposing the covert negotiations and attempted arms purchases between Rafsanjani, the 
US, and Israel, setting off what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair.76  
The attempt to undermine Rafsanjani backfired. Despite political pressure from 
the leftist factions, Khomeini intervened on Rafsanjani’s behalf and blocked attempts for 
an official investigation into the matter. With Khomeini’s backing, Rafsanjani led a 
crackdown on radical activists resulting in the mass arrests of Hashemi and Montazeri’s 
supporters, including “hundreds” from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards.77 By 1987, 
the radical-left faction, which had become tainted by its association with Hashemi (who 
was forced to publically confess to crimes against the Islamic revolution and 
subsequently executed that year), had lost much of its influence within both the IRGC 
and the government.78 In 1988, Rafsanjani further constrained this bloc by removing 
Mohtashami from the Lebanon desk at the Foreign Ministry and replacing him with the 
former’s brother. With this act, Rafsanjani sent a clear signal that Iran’s foreign policy 
would no longer follow an interventionist path and would instead conform to the policies 
of the conservative-led administration.  
In August 1988, Iran and Iraq agreed to a ceasefire, effectively ending the eight-
year war. The end of the war also marked the political decline of the radical left. This 
faction lost its main patron when Ayatollah Montazeri resigned from his position as 
Khomeini’s successor in March 1989 after the former’s sharp criticism of the state’s 
violent suppression of political dissidents caused a fallout between the two clerics.79 
Although the Islamic Republic and the IRGC would continue limited foreign 
involvement after the war, the style of interventionism promoted by Montazeri, 
Mohtashami, and Hashemi—i.e.,  the militaristic exportation of the revolution abroad—
would not return to the political mainstream. Indeed, in the months leading up to his 
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resignation, Montazeri himself had begun to move away from this position. His emergent 
attitude, which he began to articulate around this time, encapsulates the Islamic 
Republic’s general postwar line on exporting the revolution: 
The question of exporting revolution . . . is not a matter of armed 
intervention. The aim was, rather, by building our country on the basis of 
Islam's command and making the customs of the Prophet and the 
immaculate Imams our model; by implementing the aims, ideas and values 
which have been stressed and cherished by Islam, to have our country and 
our revolution become a model for other deprived countries and countries 
oppressed by and subject to cruelty from the superpowers. They would 
[then] choose our way to liberate themselves from the yoke of 
80arrogance.   
Conclusion 
 foreign engagements, and 
ultimat
as a model for its later foreign involvement in post-2003 occupied Iraq (discussed in 
                                                
This chapter has traced the rise and decline of radical-interventionism and its proponents 
in Iran. Associated with the Khomeinist left, this project promoted direct involvement in 
foreign conflicts through military means. Interventionists argued that foreign involvement 
was both Iran’s duty as an Islamic and revolutionary state and key to furthering its geo-
strategic interests. Under the rubric of “exporting the revolution,” interventionists sought 
to establish like-minded entities abroad and support liberation movements already 
engaged in resistance. For these activists, foreign involvement required a sustained 
commitment on the part of the state in order to succeed and was thus considered on par 
with or even more important than Iran’s domestic concerns. Internal factionalism, 
however, constrained Iran’s foreign involvement. The conservative faction became 
increasingly at odds with the political and economic costs of
ely forced radical activists from positions of influence. 
Beyond serving as an example of interventionism, this chapter has focused on 
Iranian involvement in Lebanon for two reasons: 1) as Lebanon is not contiguous with 
Iran (unlike Iraq and Afghanistan), the process that led to Iranian involvement in that 
country was more clearly inspired by a radical approach to foreign affairs; 2) Lebanon 
was (and remains) Iran’s most successful foreign engagement and can arguably be seen 
 
80 “Montazeri statement on Muslim unity and export of the revolution,” BBCSWB, 1 November 1988. 
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Chapter VII). Iran’s success in Lebanon relied on pre-existing transnational social 
networks that were maintained after the revolution by a loose coalition of activists, 
military leaders, government officials, and religious authorities who all shared a personal 
commitment to the Lebanese Shiite community and Palestinian resistance. Without this 
network of like minded individuals, and without the power and influence their positions 
afforded them, Iran’s relationship toward Lebanon during this period likely would have 
not involved military intervention. Lebanon is also an interesting case because although it 
took radicals to bring Iranian involvement to Lebanon, it has been conservatives who 
have sustained it. 
The case of Lebanon also provides a good example for examining approaches to 
internationalism during the first decade of the Islamic Republic. As mentioned in the 
introduction, a revolutionary state can employ intervention as a means of securing its 
regime at home by expanding its influence abroad. Yet external pressures may make 
foreign intervention difficult or even counterproductive to pursue. Thus, in order to 
sustain its revolution at home, a revolutionary state may be forced to refrain from foreign 
involvement in order to bolster its international standing and goodwill. This is precisely 
the route traveled by the Islamic Republic. Although some revolutionary factions 
considered foreign intervention necessary, the immense economic toll of the Iraq war and 
outside political pressures made it an unsustainable path for the Iranian state to pursue. 
From Khomeini to Rezai, conservative leadership felt compelled to constrain foreign 
engagements in order to focus military, economic, and human resources on the Iraq war. 
The conservatives’ suppression of pro-intervention activists, however, did not end Iran’s 
foreign involvement. On the contrary, Iran’s conservative leadership realized the value of 
foreign military engagements. To this end, future conservative leaders Khamenei and 
Rafsanjani continued to work with Rezai and the IRGC to protect and sustain Iran’s 
strategic investments (such as Hizbullah) abroad. And while Iranian conservatives 
abandoned an interventionist ethos, they continued (and continue) to embrace a foreign 
policy grounded in revolutionary internationalism, albeit of a more cautious stripe. In this 
manner, the implications of intervention expanded the reach and scope of military 
influence in governmental decision-making. Even as Rezai partly constrained military 
involvement in Lebanon, he oversaw its continuation. This afforded his organization 
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significant influence in the realm of regional affairs and made military power an 
inseparable facet of Iran’s regional role. 
Finally, this chapter has been about the political disintegration of the Khomeinist 
movement during the war. This process was marked by the expansion of conservative 
influence at the top of state leadership and the consequent decline of the radical left in 
positions of power. The political trajectory of the IRGC was shaped by this larger 
process. Although it began as a militia allied with the broader Khomeinist movement, the 
IRGC included several factions that had differing expectations of the revolution. Under 
the leadership of Mohsen Rezai the IRGC moved increasingly toward the conservative 
wing of the Khomeinist movement. Rezai firmly aligned the IRGC with conservative 
clerical authority and encouraged clerical oversight of the Guards. He also marginalized 
the more leftist factions of the Guards and helped push out radicals like Mehdi Hashemi 
from command positions. This was a precursor to the outright purging of Hashemi and 
Montazeri’s supporters from Corps ranks. In this manner, Rezai was able to slowly move 
the IRGC away from the revolutionary-minded factions and draw it closer to the 
conservative establishment. Even though Ayatollah Montazeri continued to have 
significant support among the lower-ranks of the IRGC through the 1990s, Rezai initiated 
a close political alliance with Khamenei and his conservative clerical constituency that 





Image and Identity: 




I am a Guard. A seeker on the path of the heroic men of Ashura. I have raised my head to 
shield the sapling revolution. I am the gardener of its cinquefoils . . . 
 
With no gratitude and no expectations, I am a Guard.1 
 
—Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
 
 
Revolutionary images are not spontaneous. They are premeditated in the deepest and 
most enduring layers of a people’s collective imagination. The revolutionary semiotics 
teaches its mobilized participants what to believe by telling them, in sign language, what 
signifies what.2 
 
—Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi 
 
 
Armed forces do much more than make war.3 
 
—Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira 
 
 
The utilization of symbols rooted in Shiite tradition and culture helped portray the 
Revolutionary Guards as an ideal Islamic military force. Achieving that, the 
organization’s architects believed, would require its members to posses the religiosity and 
faith-driven fervor of Islam’s earliest heroes and embrace or be taught the ideological and 
political commitments of the revolution’s founders.4 To this end, the IRGC set stringent 
(though sometimes vague) religious requirements for its soldiers and policed its ranks for 
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ideological and political dissent—leading, for example, to the purge of leftists, Bani-Sadr 
supporters, and allies of Mehdi Hashemi at different points in the 1980s.5 However, 
constructing an Islamic military was also the work of imagination. For instance, when 
debating the color of its uniforms, the Guards’ Central Council decided upon plain 
green—the color most associated with the Prophet.6 Likewise, the birthday of Imam 
Husayn was approved by Khomeini as the day an annual celebration of the IRGC called 
“Guard’s Day” would take place. This move not only aligned the Guards with Islam and 
Shiite history, it symbolized the belief that the IRGC (and the Islamic Revolution more 
broadly) was a continuation of Imam Husayn’s epic struggle against injustice. By 
donning the color of the Prophet and marking its establishment on the same day as the 
birth of the Prophet’s grandson and Shiism’s greatest hero, the IRGC inserted itself into 
the pantheon of Shiite history as the symbolic and literal standard-bearer of a new form 
of Islamic militancy. The Guards became, in effect, the new warriors of Karbala.  
Thus, seemingly as important as the orthodoxy of its ranks was the manner in 
which the organization conceived of itself and conveyed this conception to its members 
and the public. Events such as Guard’s Day—which presented IRGC soldiers to Iranian 
authorities and the general public in a grand display of military potential, religious virtue, 
revolutionary dedication, and an unwavering willingness to die in the path of 
Khomeini—were part of this effort. However, the Guards also employed less grandiose 
methods to help shape self and public perception. To this end, the IRGC produced 
various types of textual and visual materials that helped communicate its values to rank-
and-file members and those outside the organization. Although much of the Guards’ 
work reflected the government’s broader propaganda (tablighat) and cultural (farhangi) 
campaigns, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war, the materials produced by the 
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organization played an important role in forging an outward identity for the 
organization.7  
This chapter discusses how the IRGC conceptualized its organization and 
membership visually. From its official emblem to the graphic artwork in its publications, 
the IRGC employed visuality to transmit various messages concerning the organization, 
its membership, and its role during the war. Like Iran’s government, the Guards favored 
the visual medium because it could effectively convey political, religious, and ideological 
notions to the public through culturally familiar metaphors and symbols.8 Unlike textual 
publications, which required literacy, a basic education, and time to read, visuals could be 
grasped quickly and effortlessly by the general Iranian viewer. However, I acknowledge 
that beyond the outward or “frank” reading of images, lie other shades of meaning. 
Roland Barthes, for instance, speaks of an “obtuse” meaning of images; a meaning not 
necessarily intended by the artist (what he calls the “obvious” meaning), but one 
perceived or felt by the viewer.9 Thus, based on my own personal reading, I will also 
explore the less overt, more emotive aspects of IRGC images.  
This chapter is divided into two main parts. Part one, “contexts,” gives an 
overview of the materials (such as books, posters, and audio-visuals) produced and 
distributed by the IRGC during the war. As visuality plays a prominent role in these 
materials—and is meant to perform a similar ideological and cultural function—this 
section offers a certain perspective, or context, for the images at the heart of the chapter. 
Part two, “texts,” presents a sampling of images through which some of the prominent 
modes and themes of IRGC visuality are explored. Here I begin with a discussion on the 
IRGC’s official emblem, the most significant, ubiquitous, and familiar visual 
representation of the organization. I then move on to discuss some specific images from 
the IRGC’s chief publication—the journal Payam-e Enqelab—produced during the war. 
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9 Roland Barthes, The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art, and Representation. Trans. 
Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985, p.41-62. 
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In discussing these images I show some of the ways in which the IRGC developed 
and maintained a sense of identity during this period. By identity, I do not mean to 
suggest the self-conceptions held by individual guardsmen and guardswomen. To 
understand how these soldiers and volunteers understood the organization or their place 
within it would require a completely different approach and data set. Rather, the notion of 
identity discussed in this chapter belongs to and is produced by the organization. Identity 
here is as much an idea expressed as a performance of symbols, moods, and themes. 
Thus, by interrogating these categories through examples of photography and graphic art, 
I explore how the IRGC used visual mediums to form an understanding of itself, its 
members, and the Iraq conflict.  
PART ONE: CONTEXTS 
An Overview of IRGC Publications 
Corps membership swelled in the organization’s first years of operation, increasing from 
an estimated 10,000 guardsmen by the end of 1979 to 25,000 in mid 1980, 50,000 by the 
end of 1981, and up to 350,000 by 1986.10 In addition, the IRGC took over command of 
the Basij-e mostaz‘afin (Mobilization of the Oppressed) popular militia, and was charged 
with the martial and ideological training of its ranks (which grew to over 600,000 by 
1986).11 The majority of these new guardsmen and basijis (which is how I will refer to 
members of the Basij militia), mostly young men drawn from the poor urban classes, 
differed from their commanders in both experience and ideological sophistication. 
Though they lacked the years of activism and ideological commitment of the leadership, 
new recruits shared a deep-rooted faith in Shia Islam and a zealous commitment to the 
revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini.12 IRGC publications thus became a tool used by the 
organization to help build on these commonalities and educate its expanding ranks. 
                                                 
10 Schahgaldian, Iranian, 94. 
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Central to this effort was Payam-e Enqelab (Message of the Revolution), a bi-
weekly political journal that served as the organization’s official newsletter (organ).13 
Though it was similar in both form and content to other political journals that emerged 
after the revolution, Payam was unique in that it was primarily aimed at the IRGC’s rank-
and-file. Like its sister publication Omid-e Enqelab (Hope of the Revolution), which was 
geared toward the Basij, Payam used articles, posters, interviews, and other content to 
express the spiritual, ideological, and political values of the organization. After the Iraqi 
invasion, the journal focused on the organization’s role in the war effort, offered 
narratives of particular campaigns, and celebrated those killed in action through countless 
articles and artwork devoted to its “war martyrs.” IRGC editors also reserved space in 
each issue for international news and coverage on resistance movements throughout the 
third and Islamic worlds. In this way, Payam-e Enqelab created a space in which a sense 
of identity and purpose could be fostered among IRGC members and among interested 
civilians. 
Beyond its political journals, the IRGC produced various books, booklets, and 
pamphlets aimed at both its rank-and-file and the general public. After the Iraqi invasion, 
these publications began to focus on the geo-political context of the war and its deeper 
connections to Islam and Shiite history. An example is the series Let’s Learn from the 
Quran, which began publication in 1981. The first volume of this series, War and Jihad 
in the Quran, coupled Arabic Quranic passages related to the subjects of warfare and 
jihad with translations and explanations in Persian. The anonymous authors—presumably 
low-level clergy—argue that they compiled this booklet because “the enemies have 
[waged war] on the Quran and hadith.” By providing an entryway to the Arabic Quran 
through Persian translations, the authors claim that guardsmen will be armed with the 
“fist of the Islam” in their battle with the “infidels of the world” and the “infidel Iraqi 
Baathists.”14 The Persian translations also suggest the IRGC’s awareness of their rank-
and-file’s general illiteracy of Arabic.  
                                                 
13 Payam-e Enqelab began publication in March 1980 and has continued with intermittent breaks through 
the present. 
14 Jang va Jehad dar Quran. Tehran: Vahed-e Amuzesh: Setad-e Markazi-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e 
Eslami, 1981, (Preface). 
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Other publications, such as those produced by the IRGC Political Office, more 
directly dealt with the war. An example is War and Transgression: the Imperialist Front 
against the Islamic Revolution, which, with chapters like “Imperialist France, a colluder 
with Saddam?” and “Will America protect Saddam?” situates the early Iraq war into a 
larger context of imperialist and Western threats to the Islamic Republic.15 The Political 
Office also produced materials aimed at outside audiences, such as English and Arabic 
versions of Payam-e Enqelab, which instead of being translations of the journal’s Persian 
edition were part of the Islamic Republic’s coordinated white propaganda (tablighat) 
campaign aimed at influencing non-Iranian publics.16 Similar publications by the 
Political Office include A Glance at Two Years of War, an English translation of a 
Persian IRGC report that summarizes the organization’s operations, strategy, and 
victories through mid 1982.17  
                                                
In addition to the Political Office, the IRGC’s Public Relations and Educational 
units supervised the production of materials aimed at fostering ideological awareness 
among the ranks.18 Later in the war, the IRGC established research centers and 
universities devoted to training guardsmen in and producing materials on Islamic 
ideology, politics, and military science. For instance, in 1984 the Guards opened the 
Center for Investigation and Research in Qom, which produced “ideological and 
political” materials specifically geared for IRGC and Basij soldiers at the front.19 As a 
collaboration between lay guardsmen and clergy from the Qom seminary, this center 
produced books such as Wars of the Prophet, which presents the battles fought by the 
Prophet Muhammad as parables for the war with Iraq in order to imbue the latter with a 
parallel sense of spiritual significance. Beyond this, the most important training initiative 
undertaken by Guards during the war was the founding of Imam Husayn University and 
 
15 Jang va Tajavoz: jebhe-ye impirialisti ‘alayh-e enqelab-e eslami. Tehran: Daftar-e Siyasi-e Sepah-e 
Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1981. 
16 The Propaganda Staff of the newly-established Supreme Defense Council of Iran issued an order soon 
after the invasion which required all government organs to pursue a coordinated propaganda effort. See, 
“Directive issued by Iranian Propaganda Office,” Tehran home service, 16 October 1980, BBCSWB, 18 
October 1980. 
17 A Glance at Two Years of War. [Tehran?]: Political Office: Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps 
(Tarjomeh: Setad-e Tablighat-e Jang-e Sepah), 1982. 
18 Payam-e Enqelab. No. 4, 19 March 1980, 37. 
19 Jang-ha-ye Payambar. Tehran: Vahed-e Amuzeshi-e `Aqidati-e Siyasi-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqilab-e 
Eslami, 1984, p. 3-4. 
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its Institute of Military Sciences and Technology in Tehran, which opened in May 
1986.20 
Cultural Activism in a Time of War 
IRGC publications are an outgrowth of the organization’s commitment to ideological and 
cultural activism. Indeed, just six-months into the Iraq war, the organization claimed that 
“ninety-percent” of its non-combat operations were devoted to promoting ideology. This 
work, which the IRGC defined as “cultural activities” (fa‘aliyyat-ha-ye farhangi), was a 
broad-based effort of promoting the religious and political values championed by the 
organization, the IRP, and esteemed clergy like ayatollahs Montazeri and Motahhari.21 
As cultural activism was a central duty of the IRGC throughout the war—and remains as 
such through the present—it is valuable to consider how the IRGC conceived of this 
effort. An example of this is provided in a February 1981 organizational review published 
in Payam-e Enqelab. This report, briefly discussed below, sheds light on how the Guards 
aimed to promote their political and ideological commitments, the mediums they found 
most valuable, and the material they found most convincing.  
The IRGC divides this report into two sections specifying the work of its units in 
producing and distributing textual publications and audio-visual materials in provinces 
throughout Iran. Concerning the former, the IRGC report claims that its units established 
over 2400 libraries throughout Iran’s major provinces in this period. In these and already 
existing libraries, the Guards donated 629,102 books and further distributed 
approximately 482,000 booklets throughout the country. In addition, Guards units 
produced approximately 440,000 publications not including the organization’s political 
journals. These publications were not only donated pro bono publico; many were also 
sold for profit resulting in 9.75 million rials in revenue for IRGC units,22 including 3 
million in sales from the strategically important southwestern provinces.23 Although the 
                                                 
20 Payam-e Enqelab. No.162, 10 May 1986, p. 48. 
21 Payam-e Enqelab. No.26, 16 February 1981, p. 46. 
22 Because of the fluctuating value of Iranian currency during this period, it is difficult to come to a precise 
rate of exchange with the US dollar; however, 9.75 million rials in 1981 was probably around 10,000 USD. 
23 Ibid., 47-48. 
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precise numbers are not mentioned, “ideological and political” publications were also 
given to “liberation fronts” outside of Iran.24 
The audio-visual and “artistic” (honari) materials produced by the IRGC during 
this period includes several media types. Part of this initiative organized 4049 film 
showings around the country and the production of 85 theatrical presentations. Provincial 
units also distributed nearly 60,000 audio cassettes. These cassettes focused on various 
religious topics, such as excerpts from the Quran (6000) and Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
Guardianship of the Jurisprudent (3000), but the most widely distributed cassette 
(21,000) included sermons of the martyred revolutionary ideologue, Ayatollah 
Motahhari, whose work was becoming increasingly popular among more conservative 
Khomeinists. The IRGC distributed these items directly throughout its local bases and 
through organized “art exhibitions,” which showcased and sold books, cassettes, and 
slideshow presentations to the public (the Guards held 1620 such exhibitions during this 
period).25 
The most utilized artistic medium by the IRGC was the political poster.26 Guards 
units produced and distributed roughly 9 million sets of posters both within Iran and 
abroad. These posters—like the political posters produced by other official agencies and 
parties during the war—were often resized and altered to become the artwork for 
pamphlets, billboards, or even postage stamps.27 In this way, IRGC posters (examples of 
which will be discussed later on) were commonly reproduced in issues of its official 
journals, particularly as inside and outside covers. Although they ranged in content and 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 54. 
25 Payam-e Enqelab. No.26, pp. 48-51. 
26 On the role of political posters and visuality more broadly during the revolution and Iraqi conflict, see 
Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, Staging a Revolution; Gumpert and Balaghi, eds., Picturing Iran; 
Hanaway, William. "The Symbolism of the Persian Revolutionary Posters" in Barry Rosen, Ed. Iran Since 
the Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional Conflicts, and the Superpowers. New York: Columbia 
University, 1985; Michael M.J. Fischer and Mehdi Adebi, Debating Muslims. Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1990; and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big 
Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994. For a discussion on the influence of Iranian political posters on those produced by Shiite 
organizations in Lebanon during that countries civil war, see Zeina Maasri’s Off the Wall: Political Posters 
of the Lebanese Civil War. Foreword by Fawwaz Traboulsi. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009. And for 
discussions of the political poster as a genre, see Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Revolutionary Tides: the Art of the 
Political Poster 1914-1989. Milan: Skira, 2005; and, Margaret Timmers, ed., The Power of the Poster. 
London: V&A Publications, 1998. 
27 Chelkowski, “The Art of Revolution and War: the Role of the Graphic Arts in Iran,” in Picturing Iran, 
128-129. 
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composition, the posters produced by the Guards generally depicted issues related to the 
political, religious, and martial dimensions of the war.  
PART TWO: TEXTS  
Branding a New Resistance 
Similar to other revolutionary groups, such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Mojahedin 
of the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC emblem is the primary enunciation of its 
organizational identity.28 As mentioned earlier, the IRGC based its emblem on that of 
MIR and in so doing assumed a similar antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the Islamic left.29 
Like the MIR emblem, the IRGC emblem (Figure 5.1 below) depicts the Arabic negative 
article “la” in the center of the design out of which extends a clenched fist holding a 
rifle.30 The “la” stands for the Muslim proclamation of faith “la ilaha ilallah . . .” 
(“There is no God but God . . .”) and the clenched fist holding the rifle stands for armed 
resistance. Above the rifle sits a verse from the Quran—“Prepare against them whatever 
arms and cavalry you can muster . . .”—which is used as a rallying cry for righteous 
militancy.31 To the right of the “la” is the representation of a book, symbolizing the 
Quran, and to the right of that is the organization’s name in Persian (i.e., Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps). Out of the Quran extends a branch with leaves, suggesting 
both the desire for peace and the garden of heavenly paradise (ferdows or jannat). This is 
superimposed on a representation of the globe, evoking notions of internationalism while 
downplaying the organization’s national focus. At the bottom of the image rests the 
Persian year of the organization’s establishment (1357, or 1979).  
Like the literary emblemata of early modern Europe, the emblems of modern 
political organizations are products of their time. Concerning the former, literary and 
visual scholar John Manning argues, “Grounded in a historical moment, emblems can be 
                                                 
28 For a detailed discussion of MIR’s emblem see Saidi, Sazman, 78-79. 
29 This is especially true in regard to the IRGC’s antagonism towards the Mojahedin-e Khalq. 
30 Fischer and Abedi suggest that the usage of the “la” negative article in this form is influenced by Ali 
Shariati and his publications, which bore the negative article “on the cover of all of his books and published 
lectures.” See, Michael M.J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in 
Postmodernity and Tradition. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990, 344. 
31 Q:8:20 
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misunderstood, or be totally incomprehensible, unless there is an awareness of the 
immediate temporal context. Chronology, the moment of utterance, is a clue to 
meaning.”32 Although the designs created by Iranian revolutionary organizations are not 
as obtuse as the subject matter Manning is referring to, they are nonetheless steeped in 
the political and cultural moment from which they emerge. Their visual components are 
designed to be overt political statements. Yet, while emblems are static, the groups they 
represent can be dynamic. As time passes an organization may be forced, or simply 
choose to alter its initial ideological platform to adapt to larger changes occurring within 
the socio-political context. Even though the political platform of an organization can be 
altered, emblems often remain unchanged. So, while an emblem reflects specific 
(historical) aspects of an organization, it is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the 
organization. 
 Such is true for the Revolutionary Guards. The IRGC’s emblem was designed 
shortly after the establishment of the organization in 1979. Its designer, Mohsen 
Kolahduz, an original member of the Guards Corps Command Council, also designed 
MIR’s emblem.33 The two emblems are not only products of the same historical moment, 
they stem from the aesthetics and abilities of a single individual. Further, both emblems 
were designed contemporaneously with the establishment of their respective 
organizations in early 1979. For the IRGC, this means that the chief fixture of its 
corporate identity was created before the organization had a clear function or place in 
post-revolutionary society. The emblem was designed to represent a militant, Islamic, and 
anti-leftist revolutionary organization, which is why it more closely resembles the 
standard of a resistance movement (out of which the IRGC in fact emerged) than a 
national military (which is what the organization ultimately became). A sense of 
revolutionism and resistance is also expressed in the political message of the emblem; 
themes increasingly at odds with the organization’s growing political conservatism 
during this period. 
 
                                                 
32 John Manning, The Emblem. London: Reaktion Books, 2004, p.10. 




     Figure 5.1. IRGC emblem 
 
Thus, as the IRGC became an official organ of the Islamic Republic and 
transformed into its leading military force during the war, it retained the guise of a 
resistance movement outside the system of state power. The emblem, in this manner, 
evokes the organization’s political reality. That is, unlike other resistance organizations, 
the IRGC was not established to oppose a system; rather (as its name suggests) it was 
formed to resist opposition to a revolution. Its resistance, then, can be seen as a perpetual 
state of being; an inseparable component of establishing or maintaining an idealistic 
Islamic society. Pro-regime militancy, in this scheme, is therefore framed as the 
expression of the Guards’ resistance: resistance to actual, perceived, and existential 
threats to the Islamic Republic and the values that brought it forth. 
A Militant Iconology 
As explained in the preceding chapters, the IRGC’s roots extend deep into the 
revolutionary movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, most of the early 
Revolutionary Guards and senior Corps commanders had been participants in that 
movement. It is not surprising then that before the Guards developed a visual identity 
specific to the organization its imagery retained some of the aesthetics of the guerrilla 
movement. Its emblem is one example of this; however, many portrayals of guardsmen in 
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IRGC publications highlight this practice as well. I have chosen two related images that 
illustrate this point. These images, shown in Figure 5.2 below, were published in the 
IRGC journal Payam-e Enqelab throughout the 1980s. Although they appear in different 
versions (two of which I show as examples) they were consistently used as signifiers for 
the IRGC or the individual guardsman. In this way, they embody both aspects of IRGC 
identity and self-conception.  
In these images, which seem to be based on a photograph, we see the same 
bearded individual holding a Kalashnikov rifle. He wears a non-descript military-style 
uniform, but lacks the insignia, accoutrements, and stance of a government soldier. The 
man holds a Kalashnikov rifle at his hip, appearing to be either discharging or ready to 
discharge the weapon. By aiming or firing the rifle in such a manner, the individual 
demonstrates a lack of proper martial training, and thus assumes the posture of a guerrilla 
militant. This does not discredit the individual. On the contrary, the man (like his 
Kalashnikov) evokes a revolutionary spirit. He is, in a sense, a prototypical Muslim 
resistance fighter.  
Yet this individual is not used to denote the general militant or even the Muslim 
revolutionary; he is employed as a specific and direct marker for the Revolutionary 
Guard. This is suggested by his uniform (which closely resembles that worn by members 
of the IRGC) and is made clear from the contexts in which these images appear. For 
instance, in one of the earliest printings of this image in Payam-e Enqelab it is placed 
directly next to a poem entitled “Guard” (pasdar).34 The poem, an ode to the guardsman 
by the prominent revolutionary poet Hosayn Esrafili, in part reads: 
 
O who is proud to sacrifice himself 
A scion of the Sarbadaran 
Within the clamor of machinegun fire,  
You are found 
  
Through extolling the virtues of the guardsmen, this poem highlights the same notions of 
militancy and resistance captured in the image. The author connects the militant activism 
of the guardsmen (“found in the clamor of machinegun fire”) with the notion of an 
Iranian-Shiite tradition of resistance (“scion of the Sarbadaran”)—a reference to an 
                                                 
34 The image and poem are published in Payam-e Enqelab, no. 24, 17 June 1981, p.81. 
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uprising of mostly Persian Shiites against Turko-Mongol rule in 14th Century 
northeastern Iran.35 In this way, the image stands for a visualization of the poem’s subject 
(the guardsmen) if not an illustration. This is made obvious by the image’s placement 
within the same text box as the poem and its blatant title. Thus, the editors make the 





Figure 5.2. Guard icons from 1981 and 1985 
  
 
Just as this version of the image is meant to signify a guardsman, when 
multiplied, the image stands for the entire organization. The second example above 
illustrates this point. Here, Payam’s graphic designers inversed and triplicated the 
original image to make it appear to represent a broader force or even an armed 
brotherhood. In the example provided, the triplicated image—which is the more common 
of the two—is included in a section on poetry by rank-and-file guardsmen submitted to 
the journal for publication. If the meaning of the image was not plain enough to the 
reader, the editors include a text box below it stating: “Gifted to the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps.” Thus, the editors indicate that the image signifies the 
IRGC.36 
So what can these two images, which are akin to clip-art, tell us about the 
organization? These images, after all, played a minor role in the pages of Payam-e 
                                                 
35 The Sarbardaran uprising was one of the many historical events re-imagined as proto-revolutionary after 
the Islamic revolution. On the Sarbardaran period, see John Masson Smith, Jr., The History of the Sarbadar 
Dynasty: 1336-1381 A.D. and Its Sources. Paris: Mouton, 1970. Also see, “The Jalayirids, Muzaffarids, 
and Sarbadars,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, volume 6, The Timurid and Safavid Periods. 
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986. 
36 This image is published in Payam-e Enqelab, no.139, 22 June 1985, p.73. 
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Enqelab. They were not to my knowledge widely used in other materials and certainly 
did not gain the type of public attention that photographs of guardsmen did during (or 
even before) the war. Nevertheless, I have chosen to discuss these particular images 
because they embody a certain militant-revolutionary aesthetic that lies at the center of 
IRGC identity. They do not overly express the sacred or the righteous. These guards are 
not the same type of religious warriors the guardsmen became synonymous with; rather 
they resemble the politically-driven Muslim activists that founded the organization in the 
midst of revolution. In other words, these images emphasize one facet of the guardsman 
which has also helped define the organization: militancy. The fact that these images were 
printed multiple times over several years indicates that they continued to hold meaning 
for the editors and designers who employed them. They continued to signify the guards to 
the organization, even as the latter began to favor more overt religious motifs and 
symbols to describe its soldiers. 
Imagining Karbala and its Warriors 
As the above visual examples have shown, the IRGC partly defined itself with a militant 
aesthetic. However, with the onset of the Iraq conflict, guardsmen increasingly took on 
more of a sacred guise. For instance, photographs of rag-tag Iranian soldiers with 
headbands displaying religious slogans were ubiquitous in Iranian and international 
media during this period. Such photographs and similar artwork were used extensively in 
Guards’ publications to capture the multitude of experiences and emotions related to 
fighting (living, praying, and dying) on the frontlines. Graphic designers also frequently 
altered photographs, transforming them into new compositions that could more directly 
communicate the values of the organization and spirit of the war effort. An expressive, 
and overlooked, body of imagery adorns the pages of Payam-e Enqelab. These visuals 
are important in that they, perhaps more so than any other medium, epitomize how the 
IRGC conceived of itself and the war during this period.  
Following the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran’s clerical leadership, 
IRGC productions framed the Iraq conflict as a war between Islam and its chief 
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antagonists (i.e., America, Western imperialism, and Zionism).37 Though many Islamic 
metaphors were used to describe the conflict, the most salient and powerful metaphor 
used was that of Imam Husayn and his final stand against the Umayyads at Karbala. This 
metaphor allowed for the war to be re-imagined as a modern Karbala, wherein Iran’s 
forces were both reliving and redressing the Imam Husayn’s heroic struggle against 
oppressive forces. As Hojjat al-Islam Mahallati, Khomeini’s representative to the IRGC, 
explained: 
Our revolution emanates from Husayn’s Karbala . . . and our dear Imam is 
the Husayn of our time . . . [When] we gaze upon our war fronts and upon 
the areas that the Corps controls, [we see that] these are [manifestations 
of] love for the Imam Husayn and that our path is the same path as the 
Imam Husayn.38 
In this way, depictions of the Guards and rhetoric surrounding their wartime mission 
became increasingly framed by the Karbala metaphor. 
Entwined with the radical-internationalist calls for the liberation of Jerusalem, the 
Karbala metaphor infused even more religious symbolism into the discourse fueling the 
Iraq conflict. In this scheme, Saddam Hussein’s secular Baathist regime became seen as 
an obstacle in Iran’s Islamic quest for emancipating Palestine from Zionist control. While 
Karbala was employed as a metaphor for the larger engagement with Iraq, the militaristic 
liberation of Karbala also became a symbolic (and at times literal) wartime goal.39 Thus, 
as the popular wartime slogan “the path to Jerusalem runs through Karbala” expressed: 
Karbala was considered both a destination and a way station in the Islamic revolution’s 
cosmic struggle against imperialism and Zionism.  
IRGC visual imagery played an important role in conveying these themes to rank-
and-file guardsmen. For example, the cover of a December 1981 issue of Payam-e 
Enqelab depicts the quest for Jerusalem and the slogan “the path to Jerusalem runs 
through Karbala” (Figure 5.3).40 The image shows a political map of the Middle East 
                                                 
37 On Khomeini’s wartime rhetoric and its relationship to the images produced during the war, see 
Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging, 272-91. 
38 Interview with Hojjat al-Islam Mahallati, Payam-e Enqelab. no.135, 27 April 1985, p. 31. 
39 Hiro, Longest War, 177. 
40 This slogan was a popular theme in IRGC wartime imagery. For instance, an IRGC billboard displayed at 
the warfront during this period shows a guardsman carrying the Islamic standard toward a depiction of 
Imam Husayn’s shrine in Karbala, and behind or through that shrine is the Dome of the rock. Above this 
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with Iran on the right side, Iraq in the middle, and Israel on the left.41 Within Iran is a 
small photograph of a convoy of Toyota pickups transporting groups of guardsmen. 
Emanating from the guardsmen is a bold, rainbow-colored arrow that stretches through 
Karbala (a point on the arrow difficult to discern in the copy below) and across Iraq and 
Jordan to Israel. The point terminates at a Star of David within which sits a picture of 
Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. Beneath the point in the arrow designating Karbala, and 




     Figure 5.3. “Path of Jerusalem . . .” 
 
The simple mechanics of this image allow for a clear communication of the 
slogan it visualizes. With the country of Jordan obfuscated and nearly consumed by the 
Star of David and the arrow, Iraq (or Karbala) is seen as the literal and figurative obstacle 
standing between the Muslim warriors of Iran (represented by the truckloads of 
                                                                                                                                                 
scene is the phrase “the path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala” in Persian. A photograph of this 
billboard is published in Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging, 286. 
41 Payam-e Enqelab. no. 47, 12 December 1981, (cover). 
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guardsmen) and the liberation of Jerusalem (represented by the Dome of the Rock). The 
rainbow coloring of the arrow also suggests that the ultimate objective in this effort is 
peace and justice in the region. 
A similar photograph from Payam-e Enqelab (Figure 5.4 below) approaches this 
idea from another perspective. In this image we see a familiar scene: a Toyota pick-up 
transporting a group of guardsmen seemingly to the warfront. Most of the guardsmen 
point their Kalashnikov rifles in the air in an almost victorious manner. The guardsmen 
appear to range in age; some have full beards while others lack facial hair. True to the 
supply and equipment shortages that plagued the Iranian armed forces, each of the 
guardsmen wears a slightly different uniform. Some are wearing wool hats, some steel 
helmets, while some lack headgear altogether. Most of the men look in the direction from 
which they came, while another, who appears to be the youngest soldier, seems to gaze 
directly at the photographer (or viewer). The driver of the pickup, who is leaning out of 
his window and appears to be gesticulating with his left hand, appears to be looking at or 
past a road sign. 
 
 
   
       Figure 5.4. “Road to Karbala” 
  
As novelist and cultural critic Susan Sontag suggests, photographs “are a way of 
imprisoning reality, understood as recalcitrant, inaccessible; of making it stand still.” But 
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they can also “enlarge a reality that is felt to be . . . perishable, remote.”42 By itself, there 
is little remarkable about this photograph. It is similar to countless other wartime 
photographs that depict guardsmen on their way to the front, posing for cameras, exuding 
a sense of confidence and certainty in their mission. What makes this image more 
interesting is how the designers chose to “enlarge” the reality it captures by inscribing a 
deeper meaning to an otherwise familiar scenario. That is, the information on the road 
sign that the driver seems to be acknowledging has been altered. Although the original 
text on this sign is unknown, superimposed next to the IRGC emblem (an original part of 
the sign) is the phrase “the road to Karbala” written in red—the color most associated 
with martyrdom and sacrifice.43 This simple yet evocative alteration adds a religious 
dimension to the image that would not otherwise be apparent. While this photograph 
captures these guardsmen “accurately” as soldiers in a modern war, by modifying the text 
on the sign the image also presents these soldiers as warriors travelling toward a 
destination that is as much spiritual as material. Here, Karbala is more than just a 
metaphor for the war or a symbolic gateway to Jerusalem; rather, it is a spiritual 
condition, an aspiration of martyrdom, a victory in and of itself. In a sense, these soldiers 
can be seen as the reinforcements the Imam Husayn never received, given a chance to 
rewrite or redress history by retaking, refighting, or simply re-experiencing Karbala 
through fighting on the frontlines of the Iraq war.  
As the war dragged on, Iran’s initial enthusiasm for aggression and its confidence 
in a quick victory over Iraq had all but evaporated. While Iranian forces had some 
successes, such as the 1984 capture of Iraq’s oil-rich Majnun islands, the heavy cost of 
Iranian lives and Iraq’s broad retaliation campaign—which targeted Iranian tankers in the 
Persian Gulf, launched surface-to-surface missiles against Iranian population centers, and 
used chemical weapons against Iranian troops—injured Iranian moral. The breadth and 
severity of Iraq’s aggression, which threatened to cripple the Iranian economy, also 
dampened hopes for victory.44 By 1986, however, Iran’s fortunes seemed to be 
improving. In February, the Iranian military launched a major offensive against Iraq that 
resulted in the capturing of Iraq’s strategic Faw peninsula—a marshland that rests 
                                                 
42 Susan Sontag, On Photography. New York: Picador USA; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001, p.163. 
43 Payam-e Enqelab. No. 50, 23 January 1982, (inside back cover). 
44 Hiro, Longest War, 129-52. 
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between the Shatt al-Arab and Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island in the Persian Gulf. Although a 
modest gain considering Iran’s overall objectives, the capture of Faw rekindled hopes for 
a victorious conclusion to the war.45 The victory in Faw was also framed as a key step 
towards liberating Karbala and Jerusalem. As one popular slogan put it: “God willing, as 
the victory of Khorramshahr has led to the liberation of Faw, a victory in Karbala will 
lead to an advance on Jerusalem.”46 
 This renewed hope, and the melancholy that preceded it, is captured in an IRGC 
poster published in an April 1986 issue of Payam-e Enqelab.47 This image (Figure 5.5 
below), a photographic collage, shows a group of guardsmen seated on the ground, most 
of whom are gazing slightly to their right. It is unknown what seems to have captured 
their collective consideration, but one may assume that they are perhaps listening to a 
speech or being addressed by one of their commanders. The background of the image is 
abstracted and made to contrast with the center, which is an untouched rectangular 
section of the original photograph. This section, which is posited as a “clear” view into 
the photographed scene, invites the viewer to focus on a single soldier, a communications 
specialist, who rests his chin on his hand appearing to be engaged with what lays before 
him. Below this soldier is a Persian phrase that reads: “Karbala is waiting . . .” 
Outwardly, this poster uses a photographic composition to evoke the sentiment 
and expectations spelled out in the phrase “Karbala is waiting . . .” That is, the object of 
the guardsmen’s collective gaze and imagination, the image tells us, is Karbala. The 
guardsmen seem to be aware that Karbala is in their future; it is, as the ellipses suggest, 
waiting . . . for them. If we look at this image in another way, and consider what Barthes 
calls the “obtuse” meaning of images, it begins to suggest other possibilities.48 The text 
tells us that Karbala is waiting. Waiting, we assume, for guardsmen to liberate that 
consecrated land from secular Baathist control. However, if you look at their faces, it 
seems obvious that the guardsmen are waiting too. They are, perhaps, waiting to take 
their revolution and the divine justice it embodies to Karbala, to Jerusalem, and to the rest 
of the Muslim world. In other words, they are waiting to fulfill what has been promised 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 167-80. 
46 Payam-e Enqelab. No.162, 24 May 1986, (back cover). 
47 Payam-e Enqelab. No.159, 12 April 1986, (back cover). 
48 Roland Barthes, The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art, and Representation. Trans. 
Richard Howard. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991, p.54-59. 
 122
them by their religious, political, and military leaders. They are waiting for victory; a 
victory that has so far eluded them; a victory that perhaps seems no closer now than four 




      Figure 5.5. “Karbala is waiting . . .” 
 
While the recent successes at Faw encouraged Iran’s military leaders, the faces of 
these soldiers do not seem to exude confidence or hope. Rather they seem to express a 
sense of concern, melancholy, or even pessimism. Karbala, after all, is not only a 
destination, it is a spiritual reality; a condition that centuries of Shiite literature, poetry, 
and imagery suggest is one of divine intoxication.49 If Karbala is still waiting, it is 
because these guardsmen have not reached (or attained) it yet. Although such a reading 
likely conflicts with the graphic designer’s original intentions, it nonetheless speaks to 
the general mood and tenor of this composition—a mood more reflective of Iranian 
society during the final years of the war. 
                                                 
49 On the development of the Karbala metaphor and associated rituals in Shiite Islam, see Kamran Scott 
Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran. Seattle and London: University 
of Washington Press, 2004, p.3-14. Also see, Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South 
Asian Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
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The feeling of pessimism, doubt, or melancholy evoked by this image was in 
some sense prophetic. The war, of course, ended in stalemate, leaving the economies and 
cities of both countries in ruin. The near-goal of liberating Karbala was not achieved, and 
the far-goal of emancipating the Palestinians and the holy city of Jerusalem was put off 
indefinitely.50 While Iran eventually succeeded in regaining its territory, it failed to 
topple the Baathist regime and ignite an Islamic revolution among its coreligionists in 
that country. Thus, the metaphors that inspired the war effort and the rhetoric that 
mobilized millions of soldiers and activists fell hollow. Yet, as the war failed to live up to 
the expectations of those fighting it, it succeeded in developing a new class of national 
and spiritual hero. That is, by the end of the war, the IRGC soldier and the Basij 
militiaman had come to assume a strong and powerful new identity. No longer urban 
militants, but not yet purely professional soldiers, guardsmen and basijis emerged from 
the devastation of war as a new caste of warrior; a new breed of Islamic fighter. 
                                                
Although there are numerous visualizations of guardsmen and basijis from this 
period, the example below (Figure 5.6) vividly articulates how these soldiers came to be 
portrayed during and after the war.51 This image, published soon after the Iran-Iraq 
conflict, encapsulates some of the key sentiments that have defined guardsmen in postwar 
government-sponsored memorials, tributes, and literature. In this image, which appears to 
be either a painting or drawing—and may be based on a photograph—we see the profile 
of a guardsman. We know he is a guardsman or basiji by his uniform and headband, 
which bears an invocation to Imam Husayn in Arabic. The man holds his right hand over 
his heart in a sign of humility, devotion, and piety. The notion of spiritual piety is further 
reinforced with the depiction of the Shrine of Imam Husayn in Karbala in the background 
of the image.  
 
50 By this I mean any notion of a direct military confrontation with Israel was shelved by Iranian leaders 
after the war. However, Iran has continued to support organizations such as Hizballah and Hamas, which 
do engage in direct armed conflict and terrorism against Israel. 




Figure 5.6. Warrior of Karbala 
 
The obvious theme of this image is the commemoration of Ashura, but the 
symbolism employed also conjures up impressions of martyrdom and sacrifice.52 This is 
denoted by the association to Imam Husayn and his martyrdom at Karbala, and suggested 
by the stylized clouds encircling both the shrine and the guardsman. Although these 
clouds are inspired by a style popularized through the miniatures of early modern Iran—
and are thus a particularly Iranian marker—clouds in general are a common motif in 
artistic depictions of martyrs.53 Similar to how the Karbala metaphor was employed in 
wartime rhetoric and propaganda, this image portrays the guardsman as a modern 
incarnation of the Karbala hero. In a sense, he represents the vast multitude of guardsmen 
and basijis killed during the Iraq conflict and serves as a bridge between these individuals 
and their spiritual ancestors. That is, just as Imam Husayn and his companions suffered 
martyrdom in the path of a cause deemed righteous, so too had the soldiers of Iran. Yet, 
taken a step further, this parallel plays out in a perhaps unintentional irony: both the past 
and present Karbala narratives are essentially tragedies. Although Imam Husayn achieved 
a moral victory with his stand at Karbala, he lost both politically and militarily. Similarly, 
                                                 
52 On the visuality of Muharram and Ashura, see Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging, 70-85. 
53 For instance, see the collection of martyrdom posters in Abulfazl A‘li’s Honar-e Grafik dar Enqelab-e 
Eslami, pp. 69-83. 
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while Iran could claim a moral victory by at least regaining its territory and forcing Iraq 
to sue for peace, it failed to accomplish its broader strategic goals, and was unable to 
fulfill the many promises it had made to its soldiers and citizens from the outset of its 
1982 counter-invasion of Iraq (e.g., liberating Karbala, emancipating Jerusalem, igniting 
an Islamic revolution in Iraq, toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein, etc.).  
While this image may engender such a reading, particularly from a viewer far 
removed from the conflict and its horrors, it is at its heart a deeply spiritual composition. 
Released from the context of warfare, and with depictions of militancy notably absent, 
the guardsman takes on a purely spiritual guise. Although we still conceive him as a 
military soldier, he is lionized for his religious devotion. In this manner, he represents the 
hope and fidelity of those who were inspired to fight in a war for reasons both religious 
and patriotic. Like the heroes of Karbala, he is a willing martyr for whom the ultimate 
sacrifice is also the ultimate reward. The guardsman thus becomes a pillar of faith. No 
longer does homage to revolutionary militancy befit him; rather, within the reflection of 
his figure, the notions of spirituality, Shiite tradition, and Iranian patriotism assume 
primacy. 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter with a discussion on Guards’ publications partly due to their role in 
articulating IRGC thought. By providing context and arguments for the organization’s 
ideological commitments, these publications helped enunciate what the IRGC stood for 
and what it meant to be a part of. Yet, as the effectiveness of books and journals relies on 
various social and individual conditions (such as literacy, education, or even the desire to 
read), they can be inadequate or at least ineffective vehicles for the mass communication 
of ideological and political messages. Further, IRGC literature often mirrored the content 
of texts produced by other governmental offices and clerical institutions. Thus, while text 
may have helped articulate ideas important to the organization, it did not necessarily help 
distinguish the organization from other official and semi-official sectors of the Islamic 
Republic.  
Visuality, on other hand, did. While only a limited amount of guardsmen and the 
public may have read a particular book produced by the IRGC, numerous Iranians (and 
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non-Iranians) became familiar with visual representations of the organization. In this 
way, visual imagery—whether produced by the organization or simply depicting its 
members—has come to partly define perceptions of the IRGC. The visual medium, in 
this sense, provides a “clear” view of the Revolutionary Guards. Photographs, for 
instance, help identify guardsmen, and the emblem proclaims the organization’s 
commitment to the revolution. Visuality in these examples is a site in which perspectives 
of the IRGC can be easily located. However, these images are also obscured by what is 
not denoted by their signs or text. In this way, IRGC visuality both defines and confuses 
conceptions of the organization. 
My discussion on visuality began with an analysis of the IRGC emblem, which I 
argue essentializes the organization more than any other visual graphic. But the emblem 
is not simply a logo for the IRGC brand; rather it is a story of the organization through 
which information on its history, birth, and values is expressed. The emblem’s mix of 
sacred and secular symbols also presents a tension that is common to Guards visuality. 
Early IRGC iconography, for instance, primarily envisions both the individual guardsman 
and the organization through a lens of the militant (or militancy). This contrasts with 
wartime imagery, which often emphasizes the sacredness of the guardsman through 
castings of metaphor. Here the guardsman is no longer just a militant activist; rather he 
has become a pious soldier in a religiously-imbued war. The Karbala narrative employed 
to describe the Iraq conflict continues the analogy comparing the Guards to the Imam 
Husayn and his companions. Thus, what began with the shared commemoration of 
Guard’s Day and the birth of Imam Husayn played out to dramatic effect on the 
battlefields of Iran and Iraq. The Iraq war provided the IRGC (and the Islamic Republic 
more broadly) the conflict it needed to legitimize its appropriation of the memory of 
Imam Husayn, and to complete the symbolic transformation of guardsmen into the 
warriors of a new Karbala drama. By the end of the war, the sacred guise of the 
guardsman had come to eclipse his role as a soldier of the regime. 
However, the omnipresent tension between the sacred and the secular is also what 
animates IRGC visuality. For example, there is nothing inherently sacred about a 
Kalashnikov rifle, a steel helmet, or a Toyota pickup. But if that Kalashnikov is seen as a 
tool of divine justice; if that helmet is adorned with a prayer; and if that Toyota is 
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transporting devout warriors to liberate a hallowed site, then each of these items 
transforms into a symbol of the sacred. The opposite can also be true. Just as symbolism 
can add religious sentiment, it can also be seen as superficial, inaccurate, or cynical. One 
viewer may recognize guardsmen at the warfront as actors in a religious struggle; another 
may view that struggle as political, economic, or even social, thereby removing any 
semblance of religiosity or sacredness from the conflict and its participants. While I have 
suggested interpretations of IRGC visuality that follow what may have been the 
designers’ original or “obvious” intent (i.e., I tend to lean towards readings of the 
“sacred”), I have also suggested the possibilities of more skeptical or desacralized 
understandings. Taken holistically, IRGC images present the organization’s many 
contradictions. Yet, it is within these contradictions, or within the blurring of the sacred 
and secular, that the shades of IRGC identity are best located.  
It should be emphasized that IRGC visuality during this period was more than an 
articulation of organizational identity; it was the product of a profound ideological and 
religious movement. As such, IRGC visuality embodied the central characteristics of 
military power in Iran. First and foremost, it should be clear that while military power 
was employed toward political ends (both in terms of repressing internal dissent and in 
terms of conducting warfare) it was rooted in the notion that it served a far greater 
spiritual purpose. Religion not only gave meaning to the brutality and horror of war, it 
legitimized the government’s costly quest for victory. To this end, the intertwining of 
governmental interests and religious legitimacy allowed the IRGC to flourish in the post-
revolution and act seamlessly across social, cultural, religious, and political arenas. The 
perceived proximity of the IRGC and its associated forces to religious authority and their 
abiding spiritual devotion distinguished these organizations from the state’s conventional 
military. Finally, the mass sacrifices made by the soldiers of these revolutionary armed 
forces during the war further enhanced the perception that these organizations not only 
acted with a religious mindset but also defined what it meant to be faithful devotees of 
the Imam. In this way, identity formation was more than a wartime phenomena; it was 





Politics of Demobilization: 
Veterans and Militarism in the Postwar Decade  
(1989–1999) 
 
[O]n the one side stands a generation born during the eight-year war that declares with 
confidence that Iranian society can no longer be controlled or cowed by cannons, tanks, and 
reference to the vestiges and values of the people’s militia [the Basij] that helped to ‘win’ the 
war. On the other side stands a generation that sacrificed its life and livelihood in order to save 
the nation from Iraqi aggression. As such, in the official ideology, it is represented as the 
austere and yet benign guardian of values that helped Iran survive in spite of international 
aggression and collusion. It watches with distressed, and at times angry, eyes those whose 
memory of the war is either amnesiac or, even worse, blemished. Furthermore, it sometimes 
has to act violently, but only because no one else does and because essential values are 
violated. Its dilemma remains one of figuring out a way to pass on the memories, experiences 




The Guards Corps sacrificed their lives so as to defend the boundaries of religion, honour and 
the country. It stood firm in the face of the entire forces of arrogance. The services rendered 
by the Guards Corps were so great that the Imam graciously said ''I wish I were a 
revolutionary guard''. . . Today, you and I should follow the same line. We should sincerely 
and virtuously support our great leader, His Eminence Ayatollah Khamene'i . . . Turning our 
back on the Velayat will lead to the collapse of the system. . . If the two trends of our 
revolution . . . join forces, they would surmount every counter-revolutionary movement, 
inside and outside the country. Otherwise, whichever group assumes power would be thirsty 
for the blood of both revolutionary trends and would crush both trends.2 
 
—Ahmad Khomeini, January 1990 
 
 
Demobilization is a moment of potential crisis . . . veterans are the unique element in this 
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The end of the Iraq war ushered in a period of uncertainty in Iran. While the war had 
been a scourge to the Iranian economy, it had also provided the country’s various factions 
a unifying priority. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989 dealt another 
significant blow to the revolutionary state. With the war over, and Khomeini’s 
incontestable authority no longer available to quell factional differences or suppress 
dissenting opinions, the central stabilizing factors in the Islamic revolution were lost. In 
the midst of this, Iran was faced with the challenge of transitioning from a nation at war 
to a nation at peace.4 For eight years the war had been the central “revolutionary” cause 
of the Islamic Republic. To be a revolutionary and to be a true devotee of the Imam was 
to be a volunteer guard or basiji on the frontlines. The war not only forged the identities 
of the IRGC, Basij, and other associated organizations, it had come to define the values 
of an entire generation of combatants.  
Now, with the war over, the futures of both these revolutionary armed forces and 
their members were in limbo. As neither the Guards nor Basij had a clear peacetime role, 
there were rumors that they would be either dissolved or absorbed into the regular 
military which remained mobilized to protect Iran’s borders. This would have been the 
most direct and dramatic solution to demobilization. However, realizing the value of 
these ideologically-committed institutions and the vast human-resources they contained, 
Iran’s leaders created new areas of extra-military involvement for these organizations and 
expanded their domestic responsibilities. In this way, Iranian leaders partially addressed 
the problem of demobilization by providing the IRGC, its forces, and veterans more 
broadly new outlets of religiously and nationally-imbued service. Yet, as these policies 
gave these organizations and veterans a stake in non-military affairs, they also further 
entwined their interests to the politics of the conservative faction.  
The promotion of Ali Khamenei to office of Supreme Leader was part of the 
growing disintegration of the Khomeinist movement. No longer united around Khomeini, 
and no longer fighting a war, the ideological differences among Iran’s post-revolutionary 
                                                 
4 On the problems of demobilization see, Alec Campbell, “Where Do All the Soldiers Go? Veterans and the 
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leaders increasingly became the source of political disputes. Khamenei’s promotion—for 
which he lacked the proper religious credentials—also signaled which political faction 
held the upper hand: conservatives. The conservative-right faction is a loose coalition of 
bazaari (traditional petite-bourgeoisie) associations, clerical organizations, religious 
groups, veterans groups, and governmental bodies that largely support the “absolute” 
(motlaqeh) rule of the guardian jurist, favor traditional commercial practices, and oppose 
social liberalization. This faction, whose members dominate the clerical ranks of the 
Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council, were responsible for engineering the 
appointment of the like-minded Khamenei to the office of Supreme Leader. Under 
Khamenei, and in an alliance with newly-elected president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
and his modern-right faction, the right took the lead in forming Iran’s postwar 
reconstruction policies; policies which often brought the rightist factions into conflict 
with the more populist-oriented left. While the latter faction retained many of the radical 
and populist commitments that were promoted in the early days of the revolution, it also 
became increasingly interested in social progress and democratic development. By the 
late 1990s this leftist faction took on the “reformist” (eslahgara’i) label and sought to 
open up Iranian society both socially and politically. 
Disputes between these amorphous political currents intensified through the 
1990s. With the election of the reformist cleric Mohammad Khatami as president in 
1997, the fear of a less religious and more democratic Islamic Republic provoked 
widespread unrest among conservatives and far-right hardliners. Some of the most 
outspoken critics of reformism were current and former members of the Revolutionary 
Guards and Basij. Although many of the rank-and-file members of these organizations 
actually supported Khatami’s presidency and the reformist agenda, the organizations 
themselves and their senior commanders were uncompromisingly aligned with Khamenei 
and his conservative constituency. Following their commanders and the conservative 
clergy, IRGC and Basij war veterans considered social and cultural reform to be a direct 
challenge to the Islamic values they had fought and sacrificed to protect. The ideas of 
social liberalization, democracy, civil society, and a more conciliatory approach to 
foreign affairs were seen as foreign intrusions that threatened Islam and the guardianship. 
In this way, these organizations, their members, and associated veterans’ groups like 
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Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), viewed reformism (and the social 
liberalization efforts that preceded it) as a dangerous new enemy and worked to combat it 
and its proponents both rhetorically and physically.  
As Iran’s leading military body, the IRGC provided the conservative faction 
considerable resources, particularly in the usage of physical coercion in combating 
perceived threats, such as social liberalization and Islamic modernism. While the IRGC 
and conservative elements utilized vast economic and political resources in expanding 
their interests as well, these resources, unlike clerical bodies, the military, and security 
services, were not dominated by conservative leadership; indeed, with the election of 
Khatami the executive branch of government came under reformist control during the 
latter part of this period. In this way, the right’s postwar push for influence, which relied 
on the alignment of religious leadership and military-backed coercive force, was linked to 
and benefitted from Iran’s approach to demobilization. The result, witnessed in the 
conservative campaign against Khatami and reformism, was the near-monopolization of 
coercive power by the IRGC and its conservative patrons, and the empowerment of 
militarism in Iran. 
Extra-Military Deployments: Postwar Reconstruction under Rafsanjani  
Ayatollah Khomeini’s absence opened up the door to a new order of leadership in the 
Islamic Republic. Although Ali Khamenei now bore the titles of Supreme Leader and 
Guardian Jurist, he was still generally considered a middle-ranking cleric, and despite his 
powerful allies he lacked a natural support base.5 This differentiated the nature of his 
religious authority from Iran’s high-ranking and influential clergy, who attained their 
                                                 
5 The lack of an appointed successor—and with the previous successor Ayatollah Montazeri disgraced and 
marginalized—presented the regime with its most serious threat since the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s 
forces. The Assembly of Experts, the clerical body charged with selecting the next Supreme Leader, 
recognized that no suitable candidate existed who was both politically untarnished and possessed the 
necessary religious standing (marja’ al-taqlid) mandated by the constitution. The Assembly ultimately 
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reshaping one of the fundamental principles of Khomeini’s concept of the “Guardianship of the 
Jurisprudent.” On Khomeini’s succession, see David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: 
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stations through the support of seminary students and lay constituencies. Khamenei’s lack 
of standing within both the clerical and lay communities limited the scope and influence 
of his authority, particularly during the first few years of his tenure. This empowered 
President Rafsanjani, who—with the office of the Prime Minister abolished in 1989—
strengthened the role of the presidency and exercised a greater measure of influence than 
his predecessors. Khamenei firmly backed Rafsanjani and allowed him to take the lead in 
shaping postwar policies. Khamenei’s support was influential in the implementation of 
Rafsanjani’s ambitious national reconstruction campaign (towse‘eh) and first Five Year 
Plan. In this way, the alliance between the two leaders, which lasted through Rafsanjani’s 
first term, created a form of “dual leadership” at the top of Iranian society.6 However, as 
Khamenei began to establish his own alliances with the traditional right factions—
including conservative clergy, bazaari merchants, and IRGC leadership—he took a more 
critical stance toward Rafsanjani and publicly criticized much of the policies of the 
latter’s second term. 
Cooperation between the two clerics brought together the major wings of the 
right: the traditional or conservative right (represented by Khamenei) and the modern 
right (led by Rafsanjani). Rafsanjani and the modern right promoted policies aimed at 
modernizing Iran’s economic and industrial sectors, while tempering its radical-
revolutionism in the areas of social and foreign affairs. This involved a move toward the 
privatization of state-owned industries, promotion of domestic manufacturing, 
strengthening and stabilization of the rial, and favoring expertise over ideological 
orthodoxy in managerial positions. In most of these areas, Rafsanjani and his cadre of 
technocrats were supported by the conservative clergy and the bazaari merchant class of 
the traditional right. However, the modern right also pushed for higher taxation, increased 
regulation of commercial markets, and a softening of austere Islamic social regulations. 
This brought Rafsanjani a fair amount of support from the left-leaning factions, but also 
brought him into conflict with the traditional right and hardline (far-right) factions—a 
conflict that ultimately ended the alliance of the two rights by 1995.  
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The rightist coalition strengthened the conservative faction and enabled it to seize 
control of many governmental institutions and newly privatized bodies during this period. 
Concerning the former, the most significant developments occurred in the areas of 
elections. Reacting to conservative lobbying efforts, the Guardian Council (GC) clarified 
its reading of Article 99 of the constitution which regarded its role in overseeing 
elections. The GC’s new reading, reached in December 1991, afforded the conservative-
dominated body “approval supervision” of elections (a role that had been the mandate of 
the left-dominated Interior Ministry), a significant alteration from the GC’s previous role 
as “observer”. Conservatives also sponsored laws in the summer of 1990 that changed 
election procedures to the Assembly of Experts (AE) in their favor. The new law gave the 
GC similar approval status over candidates to the clerical body, in that the religious 
qualifications (ejtehad) of the candidates had to be approved by either the conservative 
clerics of the GC or Khamenei. These two laws gave the GC unprecedented power in 
disqualifying candidates—based on ill-defined and unappealable accusations of an 
insufficient commitment to Islam, the Guardian, or personal moral failings—to all elected 
bodies and the Majles (parliament), which came under rightist dominance after the 
barring of hundreds of leftwing candidates in the 1992 and 1994 elections.7 Khamenei 
took advantage of his position by appointing conservative allies to the GC and other 
prominent positions, such as the appointment of former IRGC Minister Mohsen 
Rafiqdust to head the powerful Foundation for the Oppressed and Wounded Veterans 
(bonyad-e mostaz‘afin va janbazan) in 1989.8 By appointing Rafiqdust, a member of the 
conservative-bazaari Allied Islamic Society (jam‘iyat-e mo’talefeh-ye eslami) and 
Rafsanjani’s brother-in-law, Khamenei removed yet another prominent left-leaning 
activist (former Prime Minister Mir-Hosayn Musavi) from a position of influence.9 
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Part of Rafsanjani’s reconstruction (towse‘eh) campaign was the streamlining of 
the military and security apparatuses. Regarding the latter, the three major domestic 
security organizations—the police, gendarmerie, and revolutionary committees 
(komitehs)—were merged to form the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF, niruha-ye 
entezami).10 While this measure was aimed at reducing redundancy, it was also part of 
Rafsanjani’s de-revolutionization plan. By bringing the security forces under the direct 
influence of the Ministry of Justice, and thus centralizing its command and bringing it 
under direct governmental control, the internal conflicts that arose from factionalism 
endemic to these organizations were reduced. The elimination of the revolutionary 
committees was also a blow to the radical-left, which had considerable influence within 
them. The merger met stiff resistance from the left, such as the protest of former Interior 
Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who lambasted the decision to dissolve the 
revolutionary committees in a Majles session, saying “if we lose the revolutionary 
committees, we will lose our revolutionary identity.” 11  
Changes to the military sector had a similar cause and effect. In 1989, the IRGC 
lost its ministry and was forced to merge with the regular armed forces to form the new 
Ministry of Defense and Armed Force Logistics (MDAFL). Further, the Supreme 
National Defense Council was established to take over military, security, and foreign 
policy decision making—areas that the Guards had great influence in during the war. 
Although the IRGC remained separate from the regular forces and retained a leading 
position in military matters, the loss of an independent ministry caused many Corps 
members and supporters to fear that the move presaged the dissolution of the 
organization itself.12 Like the establishment of LEF, the IRGC ministry merger was part 
of a larger process instigated by Rafsanjani aimed at reducing redundancy, increasing 
professionalization, and asserting centralized state control over governmental 
institutions.13 This meant centralizing the command structure—achieved through the new 
ministry—and mitigating the radical tendencies of the IRGC. In confronting the latter, 
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Rafsanjani, backed by Khamenei, imposed a system of ranks on the IRGC parallel to 
those used by the regular armed forces.14 While this move was publically supported by 
IRGC commander-in-chief Mohsen Rezai and other conservative commanders, it went 
against the founding revolutionary principles of the organization, which considered ranks 
and rigid hierarchical structure to be one of the most corrosive features of secular and 
imperialist militaries. By rejecting ranks at the outset of its establishment, the IRGC 
claimed to be creating an organizational culture that reflected its Islamic and 
revolutionary values.15 Although the imposition of ranks was an unpopular development 
for guardsmen and basijis, Guards commanders emphasized that ranks were necessary for 
the IRGC’s development as a proper military organization. As Mohsen Rezai explained, 
“If we want to make the IRGC a military force, then we must have grading [i.e., 
ranks].”16 
While seeking to contain radicalism, the postwar reorganization of the military 
sector also served to extend the IRGC’s overall reach and domestic influence. Part of this 
was a result of the actual expansion of the IRGC, which brought two new forces under its 
command: the Basij Resistance Forces (niru-ye basij-e moqavemat, formerly the Basij-e 
mostaz‘afin) and the Qods Force (Jerusalem Force, niru-ye qods).17 While these units 
gave the organization important footholds into both domestic affairs (Basij) and foreign 
military engagements (Qods Force), it was outside of military matters where the IRGC’s 
                                                 
14 “Military ranks for Guards and Basij personnel,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 6 May 
1990, BBCSWB, 8 May 1990. 
15 Payam-e Enqelab. No. 4, March 1980, p. 33. In this March 1980 article on the tenets of IRGC ideology, 
the Guards distinguish their organization from traditional (secular) militaries by lambasting the corrosive 
nature of hierarchy and ranking systems. “Ungodly and autocratic” armies are criticized for stressing “rigid 
discipline and blind obedience” among their ranks. These characteristics, they authors, lead to the 
“ignorance,” “moral corruption,” and “low self-esteem” (khod kam bini) of soldiers, which in turn pacifies 
the ranks into obeying the corrupt policies of imperialist nations. “Were not the massacres in Vietnam, 
Algeria, Palestine, Eritrea, etc., committed by these very same ignorant and weak-kneed people?”, the 
authors asks. They also argue that the hierarchical structure of armies encourages the “privilege and 
snobbery of commanders,” prevents brotherhood and camaraderie, and fuels “hostility and rancor” among 
subordinates. The authors continue that these characteristics are not only descriptive of modern 
(imperialistic, autocratic, socialist, and revolutionary) armies and militias, but that they were at the root of 
the collapse of historical empires, particularly that of the ancient Sasanids. Thus, the Guards argued that a 
rank-free organization would be able to avoid these pitfalls. Further, by following Islamic principles, 
fraternal bonds between commanders and regular soldiers would be fostered.  
16 “Guards Commander on grading and on the new Basij and Qods Forces,” Voice of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran (Tehran), 17 April 1990, BBCSWB, 20 April 1990. 
17 While the official name of the Qods Force is Niru-ye Qods, it is sometimes referred to in the Persian 
press as Sepah-e Qods (Qods Corps). 
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most important postwar expansion took place.18 Rafsanjani encouraged the IRGC to 
utilize its unique resources and vast membership (especially war veterans from the Basij) 
in the postwar reconstruction campaign to help develop Iran’s industrial capacity.19 
Rafsanjani’s encouragement, as well as a possible understanding that the IRGC would be 
responsible for much of its own funding, brought the Guards into the center of Iran’s 
industrial and economic arenas.20 The IRGC had been involved in construction and 
commercial activities since early in its career, but postwar opportunities, particularly in 
the area of industrial development, opened up avenues for the organization to take a 
leading role in the country’s reconstruction. Through the 1990s and into the present, the 
IRGC became the chief recipient of lucrative state contracts and formed a multi-billion 
dollar industrial and commercial empire.21 The organization’s focus on development 
during this period was articulated as an evolution of the IRGC’s militaristic mandate: “At 
this time when the frontlines against imperialism have become the trenches of economics 
and the spreading of development, [the Guards] are actively involved in this blessed 
arena and [their work] is markedly pronounced.” 22 
The most important IRGC enterprise that began in this period is the Khatam al-
Anbia engineering firm (Seal of the Prophets, Qaragah-ye sazandegi-ye khatam al-
anbia). Established in 1990, Khatam (as it is often referred in English) brought together 
                                                 
18 The establishment of the Qods Force centralized the IRGC’s foreign operations under a single command. 
While the Iran took a more pragmatic approach toward foreign affairs in the postwar period, it continued to 
develop and deepen contacts abroad. The military side of these endeavors was largely under the IRGC’s 
command, and after 1990, was part of the Qods portfolio. In a April 1990 interview, Mohsen Rezai 
explains the reasoning behind the Qods Force’s establishment and its areas of responsibilities: “[T]he Qods 
Force, which is for assisting Muslims, Islamic states or Islamic governments, should they ask for help in 
training or advice. That is now a global custom. If an Islamic state, government or people need to be put 
through some training, well, the corps will go there and give them training; it will take measures to provide 
training support for world Muslims or Islamic states. There was a need for a force to perform this task, and 
the Eminent Leader commanded the corps to set it up. This force is now being set up and is mainly for 
helping Islamic governments and Islamic nations when there is a need to train them and transfer experience 
to them.” See, Rezai’s interview with Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 17 April 1990. 
19 “Rafsanjani urges IRGC to play a role in Iran’s reconstruction and development,” Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Tehran), 7 January 1992, BBCSWB, 9 January 1992. 
20 Mohsen Sazegara, a founding member of the IRGC and critic of the present Islamic Republic regime, 
argues that the IRGC was asked by Rafsanjani to produce much of its funding in the postwar period. See, 
Sazegara, “Sepah va seh enheraf,” http://www.sazegara.net/persian/archives/2006/07/060723_154435.html 
(Accessed 27 October 2008).  
21 For an overview of the IRGC’s commercial endeavors, see Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the 
Pasdaran: Accessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. RAND National 
Defense Research Institute, 2009, pp. 55-75. 
22 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 349, November/December 1996, pp. 23. 
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many of the IRGC’s engineering and construction units into a single company to focus on 
national industrial and agricultural construction projects.23 It had undertaken 367 state-
funded projects by 1995, including major industrial projects like the Mashhad-Sarakhs 
railway in northeastern Iran and the Kharkheh dam (Iran’s largest dam and hydro-electric 
facility) in Khuzestan (southwest Iran), and lesser projects in construction (e.g., it 
repaired the roof of the Friday mosque in Tehran) and agriculture (e.g., it designed 
several different types of tractors).24 Khatam and other IRGC affiliated firms became the 
leading contractors in the oil sector, undertaking significant projects like the Hamedan-
Sanandaj pipeline.25 By 2007, Khatam had completed 1220 governmental projects and 
had 247 projects ongoing26—such as the development of the South Pars gas field.27 The 
IRGC also grew increasingly involved in public works during this period through its 
affiliation with several charitable foundations (bonyads). Although the IRGC is best 
known for its connections to the powerful Foundation for the Oppressed and Wounded 
Veterans (Iran’s largest financial institution) and Martyrs Foundation, it also worked with 
smaller organizations on public works projects—such as the Foundation for Mutual 
Assistance (bonyad-e ta‘avom), which, for instance, the IRGC helped build a regional 
fishery complex.28 Finally, through its control of various shipping companies, the IRGC 
became a major importer of legal (and arguably illicit) commercial goods.29  
Through all of these endeavors, the IRGC became inexorably tied to Iran’s 
economy. For this reason, the organization and its leaders—who profited from the 
lucrative government contracts and commercial importing—became involved in 
protecting their financial interests. Initially, this meant supporting Rafsanjani (who 
encouraged and enabled the Guards’ economic role) and most of his policies; however, as 
                                                 
23 A short history of the engineering firm can be found on its website, 
http://www.khatam.com/default_farsi.asp (Accessed 12 August 2008). 
24 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 336, 19 April 1995, pp. 12-17. The Kharkheh dam was completed in 2002 and is 
said to be the sixth-largest earthen dam in the world. See, http://www.payvand.com/news/01/apr/1077.html 
(Accessed 17 February 2009). 
25 “Development projects implemented by IRGC,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 15 
January 1994, BBCSWB, 25 January 1994. 
26 Wehrey et al., Pasdaran, 61. 
27 “Qaragah-ye sazandegi-e khatam al-anbia dar towse‘eh-ye maydan-e pars-e jonubi sherkat kardeh ast,” 
http://www.aftab.ir/news/2004/jul/11/c2c1089539101.php (Accessed 15 July 2008). 
28 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 336, p. 13. 
29 “New shipping company to operate in the Gulf,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 25 
January 1993, BBCSWB, 2 February 1993. Also, on the Guards illicit and black market activities, see 
Wehrey et al., Pasdaran, 64-66. 
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Rafsanjani took measures in his second term aimed at undermining the bazaari 
merchant’s monopoly on commercial pricing, the IRGC joined the traditional right (to 
which many of its commercial interests were linked) in opposition.30 Opposition to 
increased governmental oversight of the commercial sector, as well as resistance to the 
relaxation of Islamic social policies (also initiated by Rafsanjani with support from the 
left), moved the IRGC into a firm alliance with the traditional right and their patron, the 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. By the mid-1990s, the IRGC actively worked against 
proponents of these issues, and became dramatically antagonistic toward the left under 
Rafsanjani’s successor, the reformist Mohammad Khatami, after his election in 1997. 
Commanding “Right”: Legal and Religious Justifications for Coercive Activism 
Entrance into the various areas of development gave the IRGC a significant national role 
outside of its militaristic raison d’être. To this extent, extra-military enterprises helped 
legitimize the organization’s continued existence in the early years after the war when 
questions regarding the future role of the organization and its possible dissolution were 
rife. Development work also provided the organization a partial solution to the question 
of demobilization. As has already been mentioned, the issue of how to deal with massive 
amounts of war veterans is a recurring problem that has plagued postwar societies 
throughout history.31 For Iran and the IRGC, this problem was compounded by a 
shattered national economy and an exorbitant number of partially and/or untrained 
soldiers, who had little opportunity for employment at home. Further, with military 
funding scarce, it would have been difficult to attempt to train, arm, and absorb the 
massive ranks of the basijis (many of whom were either too young, too old, or otherwise 
unfit to serve as proper military soldiers) into the IRGC or regular forces. On one hand, 
                                                 
30 On the relationship between Rafsanjani and the bazaari merchant class during his presidency, see Ali M. 
Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change. London: Chatham House, 2006, 
pp. 52-79. Also, on the history and place of the bazaari merchant class in Iran, see Arang Keshavarzian, 
Bazaar and state in Iran: the Politics of the Tehran marketplace. Cambridge: and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.  
31 Alec Campbell, “Where Do All the Soldiers Go? Veterans and the Politics of Demobilization,” in 
Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in State Formation. Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 96-117. Also, for an interesting comparison to the 
Iranian case on the issue of demobilization and the role of veterans in a postwar period, see Norma Kriger, 
Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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the prospect of a couple hundred thousand unemployed war veterans presented an 
obvious problem for the IRGC and Iran’s leaders. On the other, the IRGC and the Basij 
had cultivated an extensive community of patriotic, religious, and loyal adherents to the 
revolution and the Supreme Leader. This network, and the vast human resources it 
contained, was seen as too valuable to simply demobilize.32 
For this reason, IRGC commanders, with the support of Rafsanjani and 
Khamenei, created new avenues of service for war veterans. Development initiatives 
were important in this regard, with guardsmen and basijis working in all areas (from 
engineers and architects to mechanics and laborers) of IRGC operations. However, this 
was only a partial solution, and one that did not address the unique blend of military 
training and ideological zeal possessed by these soldiers. To this end, the IRGC and Basij 
also focused on increasing their institutional presence in national and local security.33 For 
instance, thousands of guardsmen were moved into the LEF, including both rank-and-file 
soldiers and the officers who were appointed to top command positions.34 While this 
endeavor and those below were instigated jointly by IRGC commanders and Rafsanjani 
most of the new policies initiated were geared toward strengthening the Basij and giving 
it an expanded role in domestic affairs. The Basij was seen as an important institutional 
vehicle for the defense of revolutionary values and the promotion of the “culture of the 
defense”—a term used to denote the ethos of religious and nationally-motivated 
militancy and sacrifice fostered during the Iraq war.35 The postwar program of the Basij 
emphasized the organization’s responsibilities in defending local infrastructure (e.g., 
airports and public buildings), serving as security for governmental officials and clergy, 
and helping train all sectors of society in military matters.36 Instead of being full-time 
soldiers living in and operating from military barracks, basijis were integrated into Iran’s 
                                                 
32 For instance, see “Khamenei and Ahmed Khomeini on importance of Revolutionary Guards’ role,” Voice 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 28 January 1990, BBCSWB, 30 January 1990. 
33 Omid-e Enqelab. No. 243, October/November 1991, pp. 18-19; also, Payam-e Enqelab. No. 334, January 
1995, pp. 12-14. 
34 “Some 5,000 revolution guards to be transferred to Law Enforcement Forces,” Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Tehran), 6 February 1992, BBCSWB, 8 February 1992. 
35 On the state’s efforts to promote these sentiments through various government organs and media, see 
Farideh Farhi’s “The Antinomies of Iran’s War Generation,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War. 
Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick, eds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 101-120. 
36 The latter is in connection with the formation of a “20 million man army,” the goal of a massive popular 
defense force called for by Khomeini in 1979.  
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social fabric. Though some basijis served fulltime, many others had a limited 
commitment or served the organization while simultaneously pursuing their education or 
employment.37 Through these members the organization established a basiji presence in 
places like schools, guilds, professional organizations, factories, mosques, and farms.38 
Universities were of particular importance to the organization, which established Basij 
student organizations as a way to promote the organization and its values on campus.39  
Despite its foray into non-military areas, the Basij remained a martial force. As 
Basij commander, Brig-Gen. Ali-Reza Afshar, explained: 
 The Basij can primarily be summed up in this way: it is an armed 
guardian and an armed defender of the dignity of the revolution. Wherever 
the enemy threatens, an armed basiji is present. In truth, the Basij is a 
military force. By military it is not meant that the Basij should only 
involve a small portion of society. Why? Because defense and jihad are 
essential parts of religion [foru‘-e din] and the lawful charge of all the 
faithful . . . This is the culture of the defense. In terms of logic, if a person 
is threatened he must act to defend himself. Even animals do this.40  
In this statement, Commander Afshar stresses the militaristic (or “armed,” mosallah) 
nature of the Basiji’s activities and its position as a defender of the revolution. 
Concerning the latter, Afshar is speaking to both the material and existential (i.e., cultural 
or ideological) threats to the regime and the values cultivated during the war (“culture of 
the defense,” farhang-e defa‘). While the Basij continued to have a military role—it is an 
official branch of the land forces—it became the IRGC’s frontline force in defending the 
organization’s interests (and those of its conservative patrons) at the local level. As 
Afshar explains, the Basij is to confront threats reflexively and with armed intervention. 
This does not suggest that the Basij is to employ lethal force against threats 
indiscriminately, but rather that its capacity to use lethal force exists as both a deterrent 
and as a tool when required. The underlining implication is that physical coercion 
(whether implied or actual) is the backbone of the Basij’s defense strategy. 
                                                 
37 “IRGC commander on Basij grading system,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 26 
November 1991, BBCSWB, 28 November 1991. 
38 For a valuable ethnographic study of a conservative mosque’s congregation, including the role the Basij 
play within it, David Thurfjell, Living Shi‘ism: Instances of Ritualisation Among Islamist Men in 
Contemporary Iran. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006. 
39 “Iran commanders on duties and organization and Guards Corps and Basij forces,” Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Tehran), 29 December 1990, BBCSWB, 4 January 1991. 
40 Omid-e Enqelab, no. 240, 6 September 1991, p. 20. (Emphasis added). 
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In order for the Basij’s defense-minded domestic activities to be successful, the 
organization’s legal mandate had to be expanded to include law enforcement 
responsibilities.41 Although the organization (like the IRGC) was involved in aspects of 
law enforcement since its inception, it was not until November 1993 that the Basij was 
granted the credentials to legally perform arrests in this domain.42 The basis of the Basij’s 
law enforcement role was articulated as implementing the Islamic injunctions “the 
propagation of virtue and the prohibition of vice” (Persian: amr be ma‘ruf va nahy az 
monkar). This phrase, also known as “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” 
embodies two important Muslim duties derived from the Quran.43 Its simple yet powerful 
message—that an individual Muslim has the responsibility to not only encourage moral 
actions within his community but also to take a role in preventing immorality—has made 
it a recurrent theme in classical and modern Islamic philosophical debates. Early Shiite 
scholars for instance debated whether the injunction was even applicable in the absence 
of the Imam (the argument being that only the infallible Imam had the authority to 
implement the injunction with perfect justice). The majority of later Shiite jurists, 
however, accepted its implementation with limitations regarding who could rightfully 
give permission to punish an amoral act, particularly if lethal force was required. After 
the revolution, most senior clerics followed Ayatollah Khomeini’s thinking on the 
subject, which considered the granting of permission for physical or lethal punishment to 
be the exclusive domain of a qualified jurist. The establishment of the Islamic Republic 
however, made such permission and the implementation of the injunction more broadly 
the domain of the state.44  
The doctrine of “the propagation of virtue and the prohibition of vice” (or PVPV, 
as I will abbreviate it) became a significant political tool in the post-revolutionary 
                                                 
41 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 301, 3 February 1993, p. 51. 
42 “Basijis to begin judicial activities,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 21 November 1993, 
BBCSWB, 22 November 1993. 
43 For an exhaustive study of this injunction in Islamic thought, see Cook’s, Commanding Right and 
Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. For a more general 
discussion, see Cook’s Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003.  
44 On classical Shiite debates on PVPV see Cook’s Commanding Right, pp. 252-301; for contemporary 
debates, see pp. 530-549. 
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period.45 This is particularly true with regards to the IRGC, who adopted these twin 
duties as one of its founding tenets: 
Propagating virtue and prohibiting vice are revolutionary principles that 
have become permanent elements of the doctrine [maktab] of the Islamic 
Revolution. The mojahed and guardian [pasdar] of Islam must always 
oversee the carrying out of these Islamic commands and not allow the 
people, the state, or the powers to deviate from the Islamic line and 
principles. . . Propagating virtue and prohibiting vice are two principles 
that give Muslims—especially the faithful and mojahedin guardsmen—not 
only the right but also the duty of authority to carry out laws.46 
Following the logic that Islamic organizations had the duty and authority to enforce legal 
codes, PVPV, or morals policing, became a key justification for the IRGC and the Basij’s 
domestic enforcement efforts. In 1992, the government expanded its role in morals 
policing by establishing the Office for the Vivification of the Propagation of Virtue and 
Prohibition of Vice (setad-e ehya-ye amr be ma‘ruf va nahy az monkar)—an official 
organ charged with leading the state’s morals policing campaign.47 Headed by senior 
cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and staffed by basijis, this committee worked in 
conjunction with security forces, judicial authorities, and non-governmental veterans’ 
groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah to implement this doctrine at the local level.48 As an 
ideologically committed organization with hundreds of thousands of members, “the 
Basij”, in the words of Hojjat al-Islam Ebrahim Ra’isi, Tehran’s Revolutionary Court 
prosecutor, was considered “the most suitable revolutionary apparatus for the 
organization, coordination, and carrying out of PVPV.”49 In inaugurating the 
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example of how Khomeini’s thoughts on the subject are presented in the postwar period, see: Amr beh 
ma‘ruf va nahy az monkar az didgah-ye Imam Khomeini. [Tehran?]: Mo’asseseh-ye tanzim va nashr-e asar-
e Imam Khomeini, 1998. For works on PVPV that are either influential and or directly related to the IRGC 
and Basij, see: Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, Rahbari-e nasl-e javan. [Tehran?]: Kanun-e khedamat-e 
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46 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 4, March 1980, p. 33-34. 
47 “New committee formed for ‘propagation of virtue and prohibition of vice,” Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Tehran), 19 July 1992, BBCSWB, 22 July 1992. 
48 On the office’s current work and approach toward PVPV, see its official websites:  
http://www.kh-setadehya.ir/ (Accessed 31 March 2009); http://www.ehya.ir/ (Accessed 31 March 2009). 
49 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 301, 3 February 1993, p. 51. 
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establishment of the new office, Brig-Gen. Afshar similarly proclaimed to Basij 
members: “You are the agents who will reform society and eradicate its vices.”50 
As PVPV was commonly upheld as the duty of each individual Muslim, its 
implementation by the state required some degree of professionalization.51 In addressing 
a crowd of basiji PVPV agents, or morals police, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi-
Kermani, Khamenei’s representative to the IRGC, explained that the inherent “shades of 
transgression” made implementing the doctrine a delicate matter. Hence he argued the 
individuals who worked as morals police “must have a good track record. Must have 
outstanding Islamic morals and be admirable. Must be well-informed of PVPV, 
sociology, [and] must know which type of people to strike against.” 52 An IRGC textbook 
on PVPV published by Movahedi-Kermani’s office further explains that the basiji agents 
involved in its implementation should receive “precise and exact training” in religious 
jurisprudence (fiqh) from clerical authorities and be versed in the protocols of PVPV 
before engaging in its implementation.53 Despite the militaristic overtones of the Basij’s 
morals policing mandate, Movahedi-Kermani reminded the organization that carrying out 
the doctrine was not akin to war; rather “the spirit of PVPV is similar to the work of a 
compassionate doctor, such as the Prophet of God who was like a roaming physician 
searching for spiritual illnesses [to treat].”54 In total, however, basijis only needed to 
undergo a two-week training course to qualify as morals police.55 
Despite the establishment of a governmental organ in charge of morals policing, 
and official guidelines for the training of its agents, the actual implementation of the 
doctrine remained loosely-defined. This is due in part to the implicit vagueness of the 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
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injunction, which in contemporary society can encompass aspects of civil law, Islamic 
law (shari‘at), and cultural politics. Examples of how the IRGC conceived of and 
conducted its morals policing operations elucidate some of these points. For instance, a 
report from the Political Office of the IRGC of the Gilan region (northern Iran) discusses 
how a morals policing campaign was initiated in its district. Here, local “basiji brothers 
and sisters” were split into two groups of five to six individuals and sent to places 
throughout the region to carry out PVPV. After two weeks, they reported the following 
successes: 1100 immorally-dressed (bad-hejab) individuals were given verbal warnings 
(a prerequisite to physical coercion); 120 individuals were detained and “guided” 
(hedayat) toward submitting confessions to untold offenses (all were later freed after 
posting bail); 10 cases of irreligious figurines were confiscated and prevented from being 
sold; and 32 seditious (mofsad) individuals were arrested for insulting and provoking the 
basijis. The IRGC of Western Tehran presented a similar report. These basijis split into 
17 teams and coordinated their operations with the LEF and judicial authorities (maraja‘-
e qaza’i). After a two-month campaign they discovered and confiscated five illicit video 
caches, 251 illicit video tapes, three illicit cassette tape reproduction facilities, 465 illicit 
cassette tapes, 332 irreligious pictures, 32 bottles of liquor, 21 vials of opium, one cache 
of side-arms, and 135 bullets. In addition, the basiji teams arrested 91 individuals 
(apparently in connection to the above crimes), all of whom were later released after 
receiving religious guidance (ershad) from the basijis and posting bail.56  
Through operations such as the aforementioned, the IRGC and Basij became 
interwoven in the enforcement of civil laws and religious morality at the local level. 
Although these organizations had been involved in similar activities since their inception, 
favorable postwar governmental policies enabled these organizations to greatly extend 
their domestic presence and reach. This was also achieved through initiatives such as the 
formation of Basij chapters in schools and universities. For instance, by the end of 1993 
the Basij announced that it was active in “68% of all high-schools, technical-schools and 
teacher-training colleges and in more than 44% of boys' and girls' schools” (“more than 
10,000 schools” altogether). The organization further claimed that the formation of these 
                                                 
56 Payam-e Enqelab, no. 299, 1 December 1992, pp. 32-33. 
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school chapters involved the recruitment of over a million new student members.57 On 
the military and security side, Brig-Gen. Mohammad Zolqadr, the Chief of the Joint Staff 
of the IRGC, claimed in 1994 that 1000 Basij brigades had been formed throughout 
Iran.58 A year later, Brig-Gen. Afshar announced that in Tehran alone, the Basij had 
expanded to 186 Ashura (male) battalions, 17 Zahra (female) battalions, and 50 student 
battalions.59 The intended result of this growth was the transformation of the Basij from a 
popular volunteer militia to an extensive paramilitary organization with a strong social 
movement base. The main architects behind this expansion—IRGC commanders, 
conservative clerics, and initially Rafsanjani—positioned the Basij as a bulwark to the 
spread of social liberalization and frontline defense against a swelling movement for 
change in Iran. 
Militarism and Politics: Coercive Activism against Islamic Modernism and Reform 
While the IRGC, Basij, and non-governmental groups employed the doctrine of PVPV 
for a wide spectrum of law enforcement-type operations, combating immorality was the 
dominant theme. This was not simply due to the nature of the PVPV doctrine, which 
concerns encouraging proper Islamic behavior; rather, the morals policing operations 
undertaken by the Basij were part of a concerted conservative political project aimed at 
eliminating manifestations of social liberalization. The IRGC and its related 
organizations had promoted social conservatism since their formations, but in the postwar 
climate the movement to retain or amplify austere Islamic social mores became 
increasingly the province of the conservative right (and thus a political position). 
Although Rafsanjani’s first-term economic policies were largely supported by 
conservatives, his efforts to relax social restrictions were not.60 An early example of this 
was the conservatives’ vociferous protests to the High Council for Cultural Revolution’s 
(a governmental council headed by Rafsanjani) 1992 platform, which aimed at instituting 
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broad social reforms that also minimized clerical influence in cultural affairs. Early 
causalities of conservative outrage were Mohammad Khatami and Mohammad Hashemi 
(Rafsanjani’s brother), widely considered the architects of the government’s social 
liberalization measures. Khatami and Hashemi were respectively replaced as cultural 
minister and head of television and radio by Mostafa Mir-Salim and Ali Larijani—both 
former guardsmen and members of the powerful conservative-bazaari coalition, the 
Allied Islamic Society (jam‘iyat-e mo’talefeh-ye eslami). Under Larijani, Mir-Salim, and 
other officials appointed by Khamenei (such as Ayatollah Jannati as the head of the 
PVPV office, Guardian Council member, and Tehran’s Friday prayer leader), 
conservatives developed methods to confront social liberalization in all its forms. Central 
to this was the empowerment of hardline veteran activists—such as basijis and 
hezbollahis (a general term for unaffiliated far-right activists)—through morals policing 
endeavors. In this way, the Basij and IRGC worked in concert with the conservative right 
to combat leftist and modern-rightist influence in the postwar era. Through a confluence 
of shared values and interests, these organizations became a fixed element of the 
conservative camp and the leading forces against social and religious reform.61 
The clashes over policy intensified in Rafsanjani’s second term when Rafsanjani’s 
new economic agenda, which included increased taxation and other measures aimed at 
weakening the bazaari’s traditional monopoly of the commercial sector, split the alliance 
of the two rights. Now at odds with conservatives, Rafsanjani was forced to rely on the 
support of the left which helped the latter promote its social and democratic reform 
agenda. In a political partnership, the modern-right and left worked together to curb the 
growing power of the conservatives. Despite conservative efforts, which included the 
barring of numerous left-leaning candidates by the Guardian Council, the modern-right 
and leftist axis made significant gains in the 1996 Majles elections. Although the 
conservatives retained a majority in the Majles, and dominated most government and 
security institutions, they were unable to stem a popular movement for change that led to 
the election of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997. Khatami’s election came as a shock to 
conservatives and moderates alike. With the backing of the Supreme Leader, the 
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Guardian Council, prominent clergy, powerful bazaari leaders, and the commanders of 
the IRGC and Basij, many observers had assumed that the conservative candidate, Majles 
speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, was all but assured victory.62 Khatami’s election and the 
popular social forces that brought him to power—dubbed the 2nd of Khordad movement 
after the date of the election on the Iranian calendar—simultaneously announced hope for 
his supporters and confirmed the conservatives’ worst fear: the modernist Islamic 
ideologies of the modern-right and left were succeeding.63 
Leading up to and after Khatami’s election, conservatives vigorously attacked 
what they deemed to be the ideological tenants of an emergent (or returning) liberal 
movement.64 Though primarily concerned about center-left policies that weakened 
bazaari and clerical influence, conservatives charged “liberals” (or the modern-right and 
leftist axis) with leading a Western-backed conspiracy to destroy the revolution. Liberals, 
conservatives argued, were actively working to discredit Islam by openly questioning the 
validity of guardianship and by promoting Western social mores and political practices 
such as democracy.65 Further, conservatives contended, liberals were striving toward a 
détente with the US and were thus leading Iran back toward foreign control. All of these 
themes were summed up in the central conservative claim that liberals were at the head of 
a Western “cultural invasion” (tahajom-e farhangi) that was undermining the revolution’s 
Islamic character. Calls against the “cultural invasion” of non-Islamic, Western values 
became a rallying cry and the basis for anti-liberal activism.66  
                                                 
62 Menashri, Post-Revolutionary, 85-89; Ansari, Iran and Democracy, 108-109; Moslem, Factional, 240-
251. 
63 On a critical survey of the reformist thought, see Ansari, Iran and Democracy, 141-168. 
64 “Liberalism” as a term employed by the conservatives in the postwar era was seen by some as a 
reawakening of the “liberal” ideologies of the Bazargan provisional government.  
65 The election of Khatami was seen as a direct challenge to the leadership of Khamenei who had openly 
endorsed Nateq-Nuri. This symbolic challenge to Khamenei was compounded by the views of reformist 
leaders, such as Mohsen Kadivar, who openly questioned the “absolute” (motlaqeh) authority of the 
guardian and suggested that the latter’s authority should stem from the will of the people. Other Islamic 
intellectuals, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, argued for new understandings of Islam’s relationship to 
democracy and civil society, which provided little room for the unchecked authority of the Supreme 
Leader. After his election, Mohammad Khatami made similar, though less overt claims, such as suggesting 
the guardian jurist should play more of a supervisory role in society and be held accountable to the laws 
and mandates of the constitution. Reformist positions were also taken up by Khamenei’s chief rival, 
Ayatollah Montazeri, who spoke out against the “absolute” reading of the guardianship and supported 
Khatami’s reformist initiatives.  
66 Farhang Rajaee, Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2007, pp. 166-171. 
 148
Conservative leaders positioned faithful guardsmen and basijis as the frontline 
defense against this foreign intrusion and its backers.67 For instance, after the left and 
modern right made gains in the 1996 Majles elections, the conservative Majles speaker, 
Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, announced that “liberals” posed a “serious threat to the 
revolution,” adding:  
If liberal ideology becomes dominant in the country, Islamic laws will not 
be implemented and we shall return to the helplessness and dependency of 
former times. . . This is not a superficial danger. Nor has it ended. Because 
of this, it is necessary for basiji volunteer(s) and hezbollahi forces to 
eradicate this ideology by being vigilant and continuously present in 
different arenas . . . Any ideology that prevails over the next Majlis will 
also prevail over the next government. The Majlis with a liberal 
government would prepare the way for [trampling] the values and 
principles of the revolution.68  
As Nateq-Nuri and others charged the IRGC and Basij with combating liberalism, these 
organizations worked to form their own understandings of this ideology and the cultural 
invasion that lay behind it. An article published in a Basij research journal argues that the 
foundation of cultural invasion is the spread of Western thought in Islamic societies. The 
author, Mohammad Hosayn Jamshidi, identifies the ideologies and “principles” (osul) 
that form the intellectual basis for anti-Islamic, liberal policies as humanism, rationalism 
(‘aql-gara’i), scientism, secularism, materialism (binesh-e maddi), naturalism (tabiyyat-
gara’i), individualism (fard-gara’i, esalat-e fard), and utilitarianism (esalat-e sud). By 
outlining and discussing the intellectual elements of liberalism, this article presents a 
scientific view of the Western cultural threat to Islam in Iran. Yet, past this academic 
veneer, Jamshidi’s conclusion is unequivocal: “Cultural invasion is a type of culture 
war.”69  
Working within similar logic, Mohsen Rezai made numerous speeches to the 
IRGC and Basij telling them to be vigilant in their defense against liberalism. Rezai 
described liberalism as a cancerous disease that would eat away at the revolution from 
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within. He referred to the positions of the left and modern right as a form of “American 
Islam,” which aimed to spread Western values under the guise of Islamic modernism. In 
contradistinction to liberals, true revolutionaries, Rezai argues, were those who were 
faithful to Islam, the institution of the guardianship (velayat-e faqih), and the 
revolutionary forces (i.e., IRGC and Basij).70 After Khatami’s election, Rezai continued 
to emphasize the importance of the guardianship and Khamenei’s leadership to the 
revolutionary system: “If the policies of the leader are implemented by the whole 
country, there will be no reason for enemy cultural combatants [i.e., liberal-reformists] to 
profit from a cultural vacuum and permeate [vared shodan] our society.”71 Thus, in 
Rezai’s view, the only remedy for the disease of liberalism was total obedience to the 
institution and views of the (conservative) Supreme Leader.  
As their PVPV and law enforcement responsibilities attest, the IRGC and Basij’s 
role in defending revolutionary culture was more than an ideological or cultural 
endeavor. Yet commanders were careful not to explicitly call for these organizations to 
employ militaristic means in combating liberalism. Instead, they issued general 
statements that spoke to the organizations’ responsibilities to protect Islam, the 
guardianship, and revolutionary values. The tone and context of these statements, 
however, did not hide the notion that preventing the spread of liberalism would require 
physical coercion. For instance, Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, IRGC joint chief of staff, 
argued: 
The Guards Corps is not merely a military force which sits in its barracks 
waiting for the enemy's military attack; the status of the Guards Corps in 
the constitution is to safeguard and protect the values of the revolution. 
Therefore, it cannot look indifferently at [the Western] cultural onslaught 
and the sinister influence of the lackeys of the West and of the liberals in 
the ranks of this sacred system. . . In the name of [reform], some people 
want to . . . weaken all the fundamentals and values of this revolution, for 
the preservation of which so many martyrs and war disabled have 
sacrificed their lives; and they want to please [imperialist] arrogance by 
turning their backs on the sacred aspirations of the revolution.72 
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Mohsen Rezai made similar arguments and pledged that the IRGC and Basij should not 
allow liberals to undermine the Islamic tenants of the revolution. In a July 1996 speech to 
the Basij, Rezai warned: “The liberals have no right to take advantage of the political 
nobility and tolerance of the revolutionary forces.” He continued: 
The basijis are duty-bound to defend the values of the revolution, the 
leadership and the clergy, and there is no doubt that they will perform this 
duty under any condition whatsoever. . . While maintaining their serious 
presence on the arenas of the revolution, the basiji and revolutionary 
forces should not allow themselves to be drawn into violence. . . The 
activities of the basij forces should be within the framework of the law.73 
Both Zolqadr and Rezai emphasize the IRGC and Basij’s obligation in combating all 
manifestations of liberalism. As military organizations, armed coercion is certainly 
understood as a component of such work. Rezai reminds basijis that violence in and of 
itself is not what is asked of them and that their activism should be firmly bound by the 
law. However, as a security force, the law supported basiji violence and physical coercion 
in the policing of certain civil laws and Islamic social morality through PVPV. In this 
way, Rezai’s call for legal and non-violent action is more a call for the institutionalization 
of activism rather than an argument against coercive violence. That is, Rezai is reminding 
his audience to not act outside the legal bounds of their organization to combat 
liberalism—something basijis had been accused of doing—but to do so through available 
institutional mechanisms.74  
As this policy aimed to constrain vigilante activism on the part of the Basij, it 
allowed space for non-governmental groups less encumbered by issues of legality and the 
facade of impartiality to employ more severe tactics against social liberalization. The 
result on the ground (preceding and following the election) was a surge of violence 
involving groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah and other fundamentalist hezbollahi gangs. 
Ansar-e Hezbollah (Ansar, hereafter) began as a veterans’ association devoted to 
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advancing veterans’ rights and social conservatism in the postwar period.75 The group 
has often been mischaracterized as an IRGC apparatus due to its veteran membership and 
close association with local Basij units, 76 but instead of taking direction from IRGC or 
Basij commanders, the group’s activities were coordinated by its civilian and clerical 
patrons—including the group’s co-founder, former IRGC commander Hosayn 
Allahkaram and its chief clerical overseer, Guardian Council secretary Ayatollah 
Jannati.77 In this way, the group serves as an example of how non-state organizations 
became important avenues for the political expression of ideologically-motivated 
veterans. With the backing of powerful clerics, and with the assent of Khamenei, Ansar 
not only gave hardline veterans an outlet for political activism, it also served the interests 
of the conservative establishment.78 Employed as “pressure groups,” Ansar and other 
hezbollahi gangs were organized by powerful bazaari leaders and influential clergy to 
harass the conservative-right’s political opponents and their constituencies.79 Of the 
numerous incidents involving Ansar activists, including several clashes with student 
groups on university campuses, the torching of Tehran’s Qods cinema for screening an 
“un-Islamic” film in May 1996 is an illustration of the group’s use of violence in political 
protest.80  
Khatami’s landslide victory—he received nearly 70% of the vote—brought 
conservative forces to the realization that the modernist discourse promoted by the 
reformists had not only garnered mass appeal, it had also penetrated the revolutionary 
forces. Indeed, reports have suggested that large numbers of guardsmen and basijis 
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openly supported Khatami in the election.81 Even though the IRGC and Basij retained a 
core of veterans committed to conservative social values, other veterans and a new 
postwar generation had largely become supportive of Khatami’s message of change.82 
Such evidence seems to have convinced Khamenei and conservative leaders that they had 
failed to act decisively enough to combat liberalism. As a result of the conservative 
failure in the presidential election, the door was opened for hardliners—who advocated 
the implementation of more extreme measures against liberalization—to take a leading 
role in rightist political activism. In the case of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezai, the architect of 
the organization’s conservatism, was asked by Khamenei to step-down from his role as 
commander-in-chief to take an appointment to the Expediency Discernment Council (a 
governmental body that serves as an intermediary between the Majles and the Guardian 
Council). Although Rezai officially retired to take this appointment and to pursue 
personal efforts in the “cultural struggle [mobarezeh-ye farhangi] of the country,” his 
replacement by Yahya Rahim Safavi, a more hardline IRGC deputy-commander, was 
seen as an endorsement by Khamenei of the far-right and its uncompromising politics.83 
This change of leadership suggested the start of a new direction in IRGC policy and 
served notice that Rezai’s more cautious approach to political activism was no longer 
favored by the Supreme Leader. 
With the support of Khamenei and other powerful conservatives, Safavi and a 
new cadre of hardline staff commanders led their troops—as part of a larger conservative 
campaign—into direct opposition of Khatami. Through 1998 and 1999, hardline forces 
from Ansar and the Basij to the judiciary, Majles, and intelligence agencies worked to 
intimidate and destroy the reformist project. This included politically-motivated 
imprisonments of key Khatami allies like Gholam-Hosayn Karbaschi (Tehran’s mayor) 
and Abdollah Nuri (Khatami’s Interior Minister); the closings of several reformist 
newspapers;84 and a series of physical attacks and murders against journalists and 
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intellectuals.85 These acts provoked vigorous denunciations from reformist leaders and 
the reformist press. These verbal protests were in turn countered by conservatives, who 
accused their opponents of serving the interests of Iran’s enemies by unleashing 
dissension in society. The IRGC responded to this dissent with a more threatening tone. 
For instance, in a February 1999 speech to Basij battalions in Yazd (central Iran), IRGC 
commander-in-chief Safavi told his subordinates:  
The enemy declares that there are power and political struggles in Iran, 
while no such thing exist(s) in the country. Using your political-
revolutionary vigilance, be wary of the internal and external sedition and 
await orders from the leader [Khamenei]. Once an order is given by the 
leader, the seditious individuals will not be able to survive.86 
Political turmoil erupted in July 1999 following the closing of Salam, a reformist 
newspaper that had published a document suggesting the existence of a conservative 
conspiracy to censor the pro-Khatami press. Outrage over the closing and the suspicion of 
an anti-reformist cabal led to a July 8 protest by student activists on the campus of Tehran 
University. In response, hezbollahi assailants stormed a student dormitory on the 
university’s campus and indiscriminately attacked students, throwing some out of 
windows. Though Khamenei criticized the assailants and called for justice, news of the 
incident sparked a series of anti-conservative and anti-Khamenei student protests 
throughout the country.87 Each protest was met with a counter-protest of student basijis 
and hezbollahi activists. As the protests and counter-protests intensified, so too did the 
rhetoric of conservative leaders, who criticized the protestors for spreading disunity and 
for undermining Islam and the position of the guardianship. By July 12, the IRGC and 
Basij had moved into cities and campuses throughout Iran to provide security and prevent 
more uprisings.88 This show of force came on the same day that a letter signed by twenty-
four senior IRGC and Basij commanders was delivered to President Khatami threatening 
aggressive action if the disturbances were not stopped. The letter, which was later sent to 
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the conservative Jomhuri-e Eslami newspaper and published, criticized Khatami for 
allowing his supporters to run amok and freely criticize the Supreme Leader. Arguing the 
protests would lead to the destruction of the guardianship and Iran’s Islamic culture, the 
commanders emphasized Khatami’s duty to veterans and the families of war-martyrs to 
protect these revolutionary values. The commanders argued, “You know full well that 
despite our capabilities, we are impotent because of [the] concern with expediency.” 
They continued with an ultimatum:  
How long should we observe the situation with tears in our eyes? How 
long should we suffer in silence and practice democracy through creating 
chaos and insulting each other? How long should we have revolutionary 
patience while the system is being destroyed? . . . 
Mr. President: If you do not make a revolutionary decision and if you do 
not fulfill your Islamic and national mission today, tomorrow will be far 
too late. It is unimaginable how irretrievable the situation will become.  
In the end, we would like to express our utmost respect for your 
Excellency and to declare that our patience has run out. We cannot 
tolerate this situation any longer if it is not dealt with.89 
 The implication was clear: further unrest would result in an IRGC-led coup d’état.  
Conclusion 
The IRGC’s ultimatum to Khatami signaled that the various policies that had encouraged 
the organization’s broad participation in postwar society had also emboldened its position 
as a political actor. Through the intervention of Rafsanjani, Khamenei, and other 
prominent leaders the IRGC was spared the inglorious proposition of either having a 
dramatically reduced role in postwar affairs or being dissolved altogether. Instead, in 
acknowledgement of the organization’s potential to mobilize and sustain a mass of 
ideologically-committed troops, Iran’s leaders chose to strengthen the organization by 
providing it access to government contracts and by facilitating its presence in public 
institutions. In the industrial sector, Rafsanjani’s policies helped establish the IRGC as 
the state’s leading contractor. Through firms like Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC was 
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entrusted with some of the largest and most lucrative projects in the postwar period. 
Similarly, through its involvement with powerful charitable-cum-commercial enterprises 
(such as the Foundation for the Oppressed and Wounded Veterans), and through its own 
shipping and importing companies, the IRGC became heavily invested in economic 
production and policy. This not only enriched its commanders, it also tethered them and 
their organization to the economic interests of the conservative-bazaari mercantile class, 
which already shared many of the same religious and social concerns.  
Postwar policies also gave the IRGC and its associates a wide-spectrum of 
operational activity in the social arena. A key development in this regard was the 
organization’s new law enforcement duties connected to the establishment of the Office 
for the Vivification of PVPV. With license to make arrests and detain individuals in the 
name of religious virtue, the IRGC, Basij, and war veterans’ groups were given a unique 
mandate in socio-cultural affairs. The role of the Basij was particularly significant as it 
was the institution most encouraged by Rafsanjani and Khamenei to propagate Islamic 
cultural values. With its expansion into schools, universities, and other public institutions, 
the Basij became the leading proponent and enforcer of PVPV at the local level. 
Likewise, veterans groups were aided by the patronage of Khamenei and other 
conservative clerics, who positioned themselves as the leading advocates for the veteran 
community. The conservatives fostered this relationship through various avenues of 
support, such as by consistently pushing for the expansion of the IRGC and Basij’s 
operational purview and by sponsoring activities of veterans’ groups like Ansar-e 
Hezbollah. Even though Rafsanjani’s policies facilitated the IRGC and Basij’s 
permeation of Iranian society, as he and the modern right broke with the conservatives 
over economic and social policies it was the latter who benefited from the domestic 
expansion of these organizations.  
The close and active relationship between conservative leaders, clergy, 
revolutionary forces, and veterans groups formed an influential network that combined 
massive ideological resources (such as the office of the Supreme Leader, clerical bodies 
like the Guardian Council, and pulpits throughout Iran) with the vast human and military 
resources of the IRGC and its associates. While conservative leaders utilized institutional 
resources to strengthen the revolutionary forces and extend their domestic reach, these 
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organizations afforded the conservatives privileged access to state and non-state 
mechanisms of armed coercion. The near-monopolization of coercion by these forces 
enabled the conservatives to effectively challenge popular democratic will, a fact evident 
in the IRGC’s ultimatum to Khatami in July 1999. By interfering in the political system 
through a threat of force, this episode promulgated new political roles for the IRGC and 
militarism in Iran. 
To conclude, how does the above relate to the question of demobilization in the 
postwar period? First, it should be clear that instead of demobilizing and disarming the 
ranks of the IRGC and Basij, Iranian leaders chose to maintain and even expand their 
mobilization, particularly in extra-military sectors. That is, Iranian leaders partially 
addressed the problem of demobilization by creating new areas of operation for the 
IRGC, its forces, and veterans in general. Yet, in expanding the operational mandates of 
the IRGC and by giving it important footholds into industrial, commercial, and law 
enforcement sectors, the domestic standing and political influence of the IRGC was 
dramatically enhanced. Further, the same postwar policies that provided extra-military 
roles for the IRGC and Basij also gave them an added stake in non-military affairs and 
caused a political rigidity that tied these organizations to conservative interests. Thus, by 
approaching the issue of demobilization in this way, Iranian leaders created additional 







Gifts for the Enemy: 




We've seen really since 9/11 that the chief beneficiary of America's global war on terror 
in the Middle East has been the very country that it considers to be a major part or a 
founding member of the axis of evil. And that basically tells us that there's an enormous 
incoherence in American approach to the Middle East. . . They simply haven't managed 
to work out a strategy and a policy that will work and will achieve results.1 
 
—Ali M. Ansari 
 
 
What war is lies partly in the eye of the beholder [and] what armed forces do goes well 
beyond most people’s definitions of war-making.2 
 




The attacks of September 11 changed the course of US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
The Bush administration’s slow and cautious assessment of the region quickly 
transformed into a hurried effort to identify and confront terrorists and terrorist-
supporting states. As the architects of Bush’s Middle East policy, neoconservatives inside 
and outside the administration recognized the opportunity 9/11 afforded them to 
implement their vision of a secularized and benign Middle East more favorable to Israel 
and its place in the region.3 The Bush administration’s blueprint for its post-9/11 foreign 
policy was laid out in the president’s 29 January 2002 State of the Union address. Closely 
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following the aggressive agenda initiated by his advisors, President Bush emphasized the 
need to combat “terror” around the world and made clear that the US strategy in the 
“Global War on Terror” would be to target states that harbored and supported terrorists. 
He announced that the chief foes in the war on terror (outside of Al Qaeda and its 
associates) were Iraq, Iran, and North Korea: the so-called “axis of evil.” These states not 
only supported terrorism, Bush claimed, but they were hostile actors on the world stage 
whose attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction threatened democracy and 
freedom around the globe. Bush’s admonitions to the axis states soon translated into 
political and military action against Iraq, culminating in the invasion of that country in 
March 2003. The quick collapse of the Baathist regime served notice to the remaining 
members of the axis that the Bush administration was willing to use military force—and 
risk America’s international standing—to advance its geo-political agenda.  
Although the Bush administration succeeded in driving the Taliban from power in 
Afghanistan and overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, its war on terror inadvertently 
strengthened many of the states and actors it had aimed to weaken and contain. In the 
Middle East, Iran has been a clear beneficiary of US foreign policy. This point has 
already been argued by several authors and acknowledged by the current US 
administration;4 however what has not been adequately examined is how US foreign 
policy post-9/11 has benefitted the IRGC. After the fall of Baathist Iraq, no state was 
seen as more antagonistic to the US and its interests than Iran, and no element inside Iran 
was considered a more direct threat to US influence in the region than the IRGC. From its 
central role in Iran’s nuclear industry and its development of long-range missile 
technology to its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, the IRGC and its 
subsidiaries have been considered the main vehicles for Iranian aggression and 
fanaticism. Yet, as I argue in this chapter, the war on terror not only failed to contain the 
IRGC it was a boon to the organization and both directly and indirectly encouraged its 
political involvement, contributed to its domestic expansion, and facilitated its influence 
in foreign conflicts. As US policies provided the space and means for the expansion of 
                                                 
4 See for example, Seymour Hersh, “The Redirection: Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our 
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IRGC influence abroad (such as empowering Shiites in Iraq and toppling the Taliban in 
Afghanistan), the Bush administration’s hostile rhetoric and threats of military 
confrontation created the perception in Iran that a US (or Israeli) attack was imminent. 
Further, suspected US covert operations in Iran, seemingly confirmed by US journalists, 
gave credence to the notion that the US was actively trying to topple the Islamic regime. 
This not only aided hawkish-conservatives in Iran—and in part facilitated the election of 
Ahmadinejad—it legitimized the regime’s paranoid politics and the domestic expansion 
of the IRGC. 
I view the Bush administration’s mishandling of its Iran strategy as linked to its 
misperceptions of Iran as a political actor. While religious zeal and ideological 
perceptions certainly influence aspects of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, scholars 
have convincingly shown that Tehran’s postwar approach to regional affairs has been 
pragmatic and generally free from religious and/or ideological considerations.5 An oft-
cited example is Iran’s close relationship with “Christian” Armenia and its rivalry with 
“Shiite” Azerbaijan. One can also point to Iran’s selective support for Muslims and 
Muslim resistance movements—such as Iran’s active support for Bosnian Muslims 
during the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s but its lack of support for Chechen rebels 
during the same period—as evidence of its pragmatic approach to religiously-imbued 
foreign affairs. By viewing Iran’s foreign policy as the consequence of irrational 
fanaticism, the Bush administration relied on uncompromising policies and the threat of 
military force to contain Iranian ambitions instead of seeking diplomatic (i.e., rational) 
compromise on the basis of common strategic interests (such as a stable, Taliban-free 
Afghanistan or a “debaathificated” Iraq). Consequently, instead of encouraging Iranian 
compliance with Western demands, US policies and aggressive tactics served to 
embolden Iran’s hawkish leaders, expand IRGC influence, and constrain attempts to halt 
Iran’s nuclear development. 
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War, Fear, and a Nuclear Iran 
The 9/11 attacks inspired a rare display of sympathy for the United States across Iran. 
Spontaneous candlelight vigils in Iranian cities accompanied statements from President 
Mohammad Khatami condemning terrorism and the attacks.6 This goodwill was short 
lived. As the US began building up a campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, Iranian politicians and pundits publically warned against any US military 
action in the Muslim world. For instance, a news site connected to the conservative 
Islamic Propagation Organization stated: “Any unilateral military action against innocent 
Afghans may help to boost the image of Uncle Sam at home, but it will surely tarnish the 
U.S. image on the international arena for its flagrant violation of international law.”7 
Likewise, while condemning the 9/11 attacks, the reformist Aftab-e Yazd newspaper 
argued that 9/11 “should not become an excuse to make the world insecure, and create 
warlike events.”8 Yet, as Iran was condemning US aggression, Khatami’s administration 
was quietly exploring ways in which Iran could assist the effort against the Sunni 
fundamentalist Taliban. Iran had been actively supporting Afghanistan’s Northern 
Alliance for years, and had almost gone to war with the Taliban after the murder of 
several Iranian diplomats in Kabul in 1998. Iran thus had a vested interest in seeing the 
Taliban overthrown in favor of their allies in the Northern Alliance. Although Iran had 
offered the US limited support in its invasion, the shared Iranian and American interests 
in Afghanistan provided the Bush administration an opening into improving US-Iranian 
relations. Despite indirect Iranian overtures to US officials about finding common ground 
on Afghanistan, and despite US intelligence reports that encouraged fostering Iranian 
support in Afghanistan and providing a role for Iran in any engagement with Iraq, Bush 
decided to rebuff the offers emanating from Tehran and take an uncompromising line 
against the Khatami government.9 
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Bush’s labeling Iran a member of the axis of evil provoked a backlash from across 
the political spectrum in Iran. However, it also provided conservatives and hardliners 
added fodder with which to criticize Khatami’s pro-Western policies. In a speech, 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei castigated American foreign policy as “the greatest evil” 
and claimed that he was “proud” that “the most cursed of the world's satans” accused the 
Islamic Republic of being a part of the axis of evil.10 An editorial in Kayhan, the leading 
hardline newspaper, argued that Bush’s recent statements were evidence of America’s 
ingrained antagonism toward the Islamic Republic and proof that the reformists’ attempts 
to improve relations with the US were not only misguided, but detrimental to Iran’s 
national security. The editorial further argued that since the reformists had also criticized 
Bush’s statements they implicitly admitted to their naiveté and strategic failings. Hosayn 
Saffar-Harandi, the editorial’s author, claimed that Bush’s comments vindicated the 
conservative and hardliner position vis-à-vis the West, stating: 
After five years of misrepresentation and enduring all kinds of insults and 
accusations, the critics of 2nd Khordad Front now feel vindicated. It has 
now become clear that as the result of unilateral efforts to make friends 
with the foreigners and to open a dialogue with them, one cannot close 
one's eyes to international realities and to have vain hopes that the satanic 
nature of America and her allies would change.11 
By contending that Khatami had misjudged the nature of America’s foreign policy, 
hardliners and conservative pundits were able to paint themselves as the more realist 
political camp. Their vocal declarations against a détente with the US, once seen as 
ignorant and alarmist by reformists, were now trumpeted as reasonable and informed. 
In this way, hardliners and conservatives used Bush’s comments and the prospect 
of an American attack as added justification to undercut Khatami and his already weak 
reformist administration. Despite being reelected by an overwhelming majority in the 
summer of 2001, Khatami was a near-powerless leader. Conservatives continued to 
control the most important state institutions and used their influence to block all 
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significant attempts of political and social reform initiated by the president.12 An example 
of Khatami’s powerlessness came the day after his election when Ansar-e Hezbollah 
activists violently attacked a pro-Khatami celebration arresting many of the president’s 
supporters and injuring numerous by-standers including BBC journalist John Simpson.13 
Khatami’s inability to have any influence within the police (who either participated in 
these attacks or stood aside as they took place) was evidence of his broader ineffectuality 
and basic lack of support within the military and security services. As the war on terror 
began to take shape, the growing fear of American aggression spawned additional attacks 
on pro-Khatami elements and other forms of perceived western influence. For instance, 
prominent critics of the conservative establishment—such as academics Hashem 
Aghajari in 2004 and Ramin Jahanbegloo in 2006—were jailed for criticizing Islam and 
accused of spying for the West to undermine the regime.14  
More dramatic was a string of murders in Kerman committed by a small group of 
basiji activists in 2002. The six basijis, who were also members of the Office for the 
Propagation of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice, had admitted to killing five individuals 
but were also suspected in thirteen additional murders. Each of their victims was killed 
on the basis of prohibiting vice and in an attempt to stomp out the “cultural invasion” of 
Western immorality. Two of the victims, a young couple engaged to be married, were 
killed because they had been suspected of routinely engaging in premarital sex. Another 
victim, a married woman, was buried up to her chest and stoned to death for suspected 
adultery and other immoral acts.15 In the subsequent trial the accused justified their 
killings by claiming the victims were sinners whose immorality was punishable by death 
under Islamic law (mahdur al-dam). They specifically identified prominent hardline 
cleric Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi as the religious authority whose guidance on the 
matter they had followed. Although the six basijis were found guilty and sentenced to 
death, the Supreme Court in Tehran refused to accept the ruling and sent the case back to 
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another regional court in Kerman to be retried. After two more trials and two more guilty 
verdicts, a fourth trial in 2007 finally found the basijis not guilty and acquitted the 
defendants of their crimes (a ruling accepted by the Supreme Court). In the end, the court 
agreed with the defendants that the victims had indeed been immoral Muslims whose 
actions were justifiably punished by death.16 As the basijis were licensed members of the 
Office of PVPV they had in essence carried out their civic duty. 
The judiciary’s role in acquitting these activists signaled that rightwing vigilante 
activism had the tacit support of both state institutions and the Supreme Leader (whose 
silence on the rulings was seen as implied support for the basijis). In this way, 
conservative clergy from the judiciary and Guardian Council to the Supreme Leader 
actively supported anti-reform activism at the local level and in the political realm. This 
activism and related criticism of Khatami took on new urgency after Iran’s secret nuclear 
enrichment program was made public in the fall of 2002. Although information on Iran’s 
enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water plant in Arak was disclosed to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August of that year by the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran (the political front for the Mojehedin-e Khalq 
Organization), US government officials did not seize upon the issue until December.17 As 
a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran’s failure to disclose its 
secret facilities (themselves legal under the NPT) put Iran in violation of its international 
agreements. Consequently, Iran was pressured by the US, the so-called EU-3 of Britain, 
France, and Germany, and the IAEA to make additional concessions on its nuclear 
program, including suspension of its enrichment program and allowing for snap 
inspections of each of its facilities by IAEA monitors.18 These additional demands were 
made alongside the Bush administration’s aggressive rhetoric toward Iraq, accusing the 
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fellow axis of evil state of a secret WMD program and of supporting terrorism. Even 
though both Khamenei and Khatami denied Iran had any intention of developing nuclear 
weapons and argued that such weapons were against Islamic law, Iran knew that US 
intelligence had evidence suggesting Iranian scientists possessed designs for a suspected 
nuclear device.19  
The Khatami administration found itself in an impossible situation. Any apparent 
compromise with the West over Iran’s nuclear program would be vociferously opposed 
by the conservatives and much of the Iranian public. Further, the Bush administration’s 
invasion of Iraq on the grounds of a similar secret WMD program made the continuation 
of nuclear enrichment a risky proposition. Europe’s clear objection to Iran’s enrichment 
activities, backed by the implied military threats of both the US and Israel, gave Iranian 
leaders few options at resolving the crisis outside of succumbing to Western demands. 
While Iranian diplomats engaged the IAEA and the West at negotiating tables in Europe, 
Khatami’s cabinet began to pursue a covert deal with the US. This effort culminated in a 
proposal faxed to the US State Department by the Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim 
Guldimann, who was in charge of American affairs in Tehran.20 The contents of the fax 
contained the outline of a proposed resolution to Iran’s nuclear situation—a text 
purportedly approved by both Khatami and Khamenei.21 In it Iran demanded a non-
aggression pact with the US, “rectification” of Iran’s status with the US (e.g., removal 
from the axis of evil and an end to hostile rhetoric), abolishment of all sanctions against 
Iran, “full access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology, and chemical 
technology,” recognition of Iran’s special relationship to the Shiite shrine cities of Najaf 
and Karbala in Iraq, recognition of Iran’s “legitimate” regional security interests, and 
repatriation of MKO terrorists to Iran from Iraq. In exchange, Iran would fully cooperate 
with the IAEA, accept additional protocols and effectively prove that it did not have an 
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active WMD program or have any intention to start one, take action against any Al Qaeda 
members in Iran, coordinate with the US to ensure a stable, secular, and democratic Iraq, 
cease material support for Palestinian militant organizations including Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, encourage Hizbullah to become a solely political organization in Lebanon, and 
accept the Saudi Arabian initiative for a two-state solution in Israel and the Palestinian 
territories.22 
Reaction to the missive in the Bush administration was mixed. The hawks, 
including Dick Cheney and John Bolton, rejected the offer immediately, considering it a 
weak attempt from a nation obviously frightened by American’s recent military success 
in Iraq. To them, the offer was proof that their strategy to reshape the Middle East 
through the use of force was working.23 Others in the State Department, particularly 
Richard Haass, the director of policy planning, advised state secretary Colin Powel that 
the offer may be worth pursuing. While not convinced of the proposal’s provenance, 
Haass felt that the only way to find out if it had merit would be to pursue it through 
diplomatic channels. Secret talks were already taking place between Iranian diplomat 
Mohammad Javad Zarif and US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad on 
possible ways to exchange intelligence on terrorist organizations. Zarif wanted to 
exchange MKO members in Iraq, who had been disarmed by US forces shortly after the 
defeat of the Baathist regime, for Al Qaeda suspects who were detained and under house 
arrest in Iran after fleeing US forces in Afghanistan. At the time the US was not willing 
to exchange terrorist suspects with Iran, but it asked Iran to interrogate its Al Qaeda 
suspects for information about a possible attack in the Persian Gulf. If Iran had any 
intelligence on such an attack it did not share it with the US, but after four bombs 
exploded in an American housing complex in Riyadh on 12 May 2003 the US was 
convinced that the Al Qaeda suspects in Iran had had foreknowledge of the operation. 
The US blamed Iran for not investigating the matter and the Bush administration 
promptly called off all talks, thus killing the proposal. What may have been a significant 
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opportunity for a fundamental shift in the relationship between the US and Iran died 
before it even began.24  
With a direct deal with the US no longer possible, the EU-3 and the IAEA were 
left to work out a resolution with the Iranians. Khatami’s position, however, had grown 
more tenuous. While attempting to placate the conservative opposition and the Iranian 
public with bold refusals to compromise Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Khatami was also 
navigating negotiations with the West in search of such a compromise.25 As could be 
expected, when Khatami agreed in November 2004 to temporarily halt enrichment as a 
goodwill gesture during talks with the EU-3 and the IAEA, he was immediately slammed 
by conservatives and hardliners. Mohsen Rezai, Expediency Council secretary and 
former IRGC commander-in-chief argued that Khatami’s diplomats had given Europe too 
much “top secret” information on Iran’s nuclear program and had thereby undermined 
Iran’s “deterrence” capabilities.26 In a speech to Revolutionary Guards commanders, 
senior cleric Ayatollah Nuri-Hamadani claimed that by agreeing to cease uranium 
enrichment Khatami’s administration had helped advance America’s plot against Iran.27 
Similarly, prominent hardline cleric Hojjat al-Islam Mohsen Doagu called the agreement 
the “worst in the history of the Islamic Republic” in a Friday prayer sermon.28 The 
hardliner onslaught against Khatami not only undermined his attempts to reach 
compromise with the West, it also played a role in their overall political revival. To this 
extent, American and Western pressure on Khatami contributed to the downfall of 
reformist influence in Iran to the benefit of conservative and hardline forces. 
Electing Ahmadinejad 
By politically marginalizing Khatami and the reformists, conservatives were paving the 
way for their own return to dominance in the electoral realm. Aided by mass 
disqualifications of reformist candidates and low voter turnout, conservative and 
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hardliner politicians took the majority of seats in the 2003 Municipal Council elections 
and in the 2004 Majles elections. Yet it was the upcoming presidential election that 
conservative and hardline leaders most wanted to capture.29 The election of June 2005 
was the first since 1997 that would not include Mohammad Khatami as the reformist 
candidate.30 Without Khatami the reformists lacked a consensus leader which 
consequently divided the movement. The bulk of reformists threw their support behind 
two political veterans: former Majles Speaker Mehdi Karrubi and cabinet minister 
Mostafa Moin. While both of these individuals had strong reformist credentials, neither 
possessed the popularity, charisma, or public recognition of Khatami. The weak field of 
candidates opened up the door for the return to politics by former president Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani who soon became the leading candidate in the election. Despite his 
public rivalry with reformists and hardliners, Rafsanjani presented himself as a moderate 
candidate who could bring balance to Iran’s ideological divide. Armed with a pragmatic 
platform, and already one of Iran’s most powerful and well known figures, Rafsanjani 
was considered by most political analysts and pre-election polls to be the likely winner of 
the 2005 presidential race. 
For their part, conservatives and hardliners saw the presidential campaign as a 
way for the fundamentalist or “principlist” (osulgara) coalition to capture the executive 
branch. They too, however, lacked a candidate with the sufficient credentials and 
popularity to challenge Rafsanjani. The hardline candidates included former IRGC 
commander-in-chief Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the National Security Council and 
former guardsman Ali Larijani, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s little-known 
mayor of two years and a former guardsman and basiji. The leading principlist candidate, 
however, was Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf—a former IRGC commander, Tehran’s police 
chief, and the rumored preference of Khamenei. Qalibaf had gained public notoriety (and 
reformist scorn) for leading the crackdown on student protestors of the University of 
Tehran in 1998, but presented himself as a principlist candidate with modern and 
youthful sensibilities.  
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Qalibaf’s use of “nationalist” (i.e., non-Islamic) symbols and modern attire in 
courting the youth vote gained him detractors among hardline leaders. Suspicions 
surrounding Qalibaf and the type of president he would become seem to have been 
behind a quiet but substantial shift of principlist support for the unheralded 
Ahmadinejad.31 As a former IRGC member and avid supporter of war veterans, 
Ahmadinejad had already formed a staunch support base among Basij members. A pre-
election poll conducted by the Basij student association of the University of Tehran, for 
instance, found more basijis favored Ahmadinejad than other candidates (the reformist 
Moin came in second).32 Despite the support of many individual basijis across Iran, 
however, Ahmadinejad did not have the explicit endorsement of either the Basij or the 
IRGC. This was due to the IRGC’s official neutrality in political matters and because the 
organization was likely split between the four candidates that came from its ranks: 
Qalibaf, Rezai, Larijani, and Ahmadinejad. Instead of endorsing a specific candidate, 
IRGC leaders sought to influence the votes of its members by articulating the qualities 
and characteristics that the preferred candidate should posses. Khamenei’s representative 
to the Guards, Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Movahedi-Kermani, highlighted six key 
attributes of the type of presidential candidate one should vote for: 1) someone who 
above all else heeds the religious demands of the people and is accountable to them; 2) 
someone who is obedient to the Supreme Leader and serves at his pleasure; 3) someone 
who lives a modest life and understands the suffering of the poor and dispossessed; 4) 
someone who will lessen the gap between the wealthy and impoverished; 5) someone 
who speaks on welfare and the economy at least as much as piety, attainment, chastity, 
and truth; and 6) someone who does not seek to attract votes with empty slogans.33 
Beyond these characteristics—all of which evoked Ahmadinejad’s candidacy—
guardsmen and basijis were to vote their conscience.  
Fears that the Revolutionary Guards would somehow interfere with the election 
process were abundant. Part of this fear stemmed from comments made by the Guardian 
Council that volunteers from the Basij would be in charge of guarding polling stations on 
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election day.34 This was a worrisome notion to reformist leaders, who publicized the 
issue with the hopes of discouraging possible machinations. Interior Minister Abdol-
Vahed Musavi Lari publically confronted the Guardian Council on this point and warned 
of possible interference by state “military” organs (a clear reference to the IRGC and 
Basij).35 IRGC leaders countered these accusations with a calculated media effort. 
Ayatollah Movahedi-Kermani assured the public that the IRGC was a non-political 
institution that did not harbor bias for any presidential candidate.36 The Basij Public 
Relation’s office took this a step further and promised the Basij would personally lead 
investigations into any suspected election fraud should any take place.37 Yet these 
statements did not mean the members of these institutions would not vote or campaign 
for the candidate of their choice. On the contrary, an IRGC spokesman promised that 
members of both organizations would participate in the elections en masse as voting was 
both their right and civil duty.38 The principlists’ contention that high election turnout 
would be a powerful counter to US aggression also made voting a particularly patriotic 
endeavor for members of these organizations.39  
The first round of voting ended on 17 June 2005 with Rafsanjani leading with 6.1 
million votes (just over 20% of votes cast), Ahmadinejad in second with 5.7 million, and 
Karrubi in third with 5 million. While Rafsanjani and Karrubi’s numbers generally 
followed those suggested by pre-election polling data, Ahmadinejad’s strong showing 
came as a surprise. Questions regarding Ahmadinejad’s numbers began to arise on 
election night as a discrepancy of 6 million votes between the results given by the 
Guardian Council (which claimed 21 million votes had been cast) and the Interior 
Ministry (which claimed 15 million votes had been cast) had been announced on state 
television.40 Why the Guardian Council was even involved in election results, which had 
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previously been the purview of the Interior Ministry, was not clear. That the conservative 
Guardian Council’s numbers seemed to favor Ahmadinejad further cast suspicion on the 
results. Karrubi instantly claimed that the Basij and IRGC had committed fraud in the 
elections (a claim that an IRGC spokesman vigorously denied).41 He pointed to the 
province of South Khorasan as a “most peculiar” (‘ajibtar) example, which with 270,127 
eligible voters had registered 298,000 votes.42 Rafsanjani also registered a protest with 
Khamenei and told the Supreme Leader of his intentions to withdraw from the election. 
Khamenei, who publically praised the election and condemned Karrubi’s accusations, 
convinced Rafsanjani too stay in the running as his withdrawal would be fodder for the 
Bush administration’s political pressure against Iran.43  
The second round of voting on 23 June produced equally surprising results with 
Ahmadinejad trouncing Rafsanjani by nearly 6 million votes. Although turnout was less 
than the first round (60% versus 63%), somehow Ahmadinejad had managed to capture 
nearly all of the votes that had gone toward hardliner candidates in the first round while 
also managing to seemingly receive many of the votes that had previously gone to 
reformists candidates.44 Rafsanjani on the other hand, despite being endorsed by leading 
reformist organizations and first-round candidate Mostafa Moin, did only marginally 
better in the second round. While Ahmadinejad had certainly developed a much larger 
support base between the first and second rounds by playing to populist sentiment (a 
remarkable feat for less than a week of campaigning), accusations of widespread voter 
fraud continued. Rafsanjani himself issued a statement protesting the results and warned 
that “divine retribution” (enteqam-e elahi) awaited those responsible for the election 
fraud.45 
After the elections, suspicions that the Basij and IRGC were somehow responsible 
for Ahmadinejad’s success were rife. With fears of these organizations tampering with 
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the voting process expressed by the Interior Minister even before the elections took place, 
and with the Basij in charge of guarding voting facilities and encouraged to fully 
participate in the voting process, such suspicion was not surprising. However, with the 
curious role of the Guardian Council in the election process and public praise for the 
results by Khamenei and other conservative clergy (despite the public protests of the 
reformist candidates, Interior Minister, and Rafsanjani),46 the notion that a cabal had 
brought Ahmadinejad to power was not unreasonable. Indeed the existence of such a plot 
for a “white revolution” (as Ahmadinejad’s election was sometimes called) may have 
merit. Citing well-placed sources, prominent Iranian journalist Kasra Naji argues that 
conservative and hardline politicians met with the Supreme Leader at his residence a few 
nights before the first round and decided on supporting Ahmadinejad over Qalibaf due to 
the latter’s questionable commitment to hardline positions. Basijis, most of whom did not 
become aware of the plan to support Ahmadinejad till the morning of the first round 
election, were enlisted to see to it that he got a substantial number of votes. Naji cites one 
basiji as admitting to voting numerous times in the first round using the birth certificates 
of deceased citizens.47 While the existence and dimensions of such a plot are impossible 
to determine, what is clear is that the IRGC and Basij actively worked toward the election 
of Ahmadinejad in both rounds (something all but admitted by IRGC commanders).48 To 
express its joy at Ahmadinejad’s election and the view that this occurrence was a direct 
blow to US aggression, the IRGC issued an official congratulatory statement: 
Undoubtedly, the winners of this great and historic test are each and every 
proud and pious Iranian who, despite propaganda attacks and the 
psychological operations of the American and Zionist media and 
broadcasting organizations, accepted the invitation of the wise and learned 
leader of the Islamic Revolution, Grand Ayatollah Khamene'i (blessed be 
his excellency), and in an unprecedented act of public participation, 
suitably determined the destiny of the country and themselves. . . The 
hegemon[ic] powers of the world will try to use different methods to 
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portray this everlasting epic as colorless, but this will not be forgotten in 
the historical memory of this nation and other free and great nations.49 
With Ahmadinejad’s election, the IRGC and Basij witnessed one of their own rise to 
power and gained an outspoken and uncritical supporter in the presidency. Ahmadinejad 
demonstrated his gratitude to his allies by giving ten out of twenty-five of his cabinet 
seats to IRGC and Basij members and several more to war veterans.50  
Iran’s Rise as a Regional Power 
As aggressive US policy encouraged a revival of hardline power in Iran, US policies 
toward other states in the region and more globally helped facilitate the expansion of 
Iranian influence outside its borders. For instance, the antagonistic relationship between 
the Bush administration and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela decreased US influence within 
the South American state and opened up the door for Chavez to seek closer ties with 
other international partners. While Iran’s relationship with Chavez’s Venezuela had 
grown stronger during Khatami’s presidency, Ahmadinejad publicized Iranian-
Venezuelan relations as a new anti-imperialist front. Strengthening Iranian-Venezuelan 
relations was more than simple political showmanship, however, as both oil-rich 
countries increased investment in each other’s infrastructure and commercial enterprises. 
Indeed, in 2007 the Chavez regime listed Iran as its second largest investor after the US 
with $9.1 billion invested annually.51 Also, in 2006 the semi-official Petropars firm was 
awarded a lucrative contract by Chavez to develop drilling operations in an off-shore 
Venezuelan oil field.52 Another significant development has been the growing military 
cooperation between these countries which has led to a burgeoning IRGC presence in 
South America.53  
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Even though Iranian influence has grown in places like South America it has been 
in the Middle East where the expansion of Iranian power has been most pronounced. For 
instance, in Lebanon, where the Iranian regime and IRGC have a long history, Bush 
administration policies under the war on terror bolstered Iran’s role in that country. 
Following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 by suspected Syrian agents, 
the Bush administration joined a popular movement in Lebanon composed of mostly 
Christian and Sunni activists in calling for Syria to end its nearly thirty-year occupation 
of Lebanon.54 The so-called Cedar Revolution that led to the removal of Syrian forces 
from Lebanon was hailed by the Bush administration as a sign of the global spread of 
“freedom.”55 The Bush administration considered the removal of Syrian troops a serious 
blow to Hizbullah.56 However, while the Syrian presence enabled certain Hizbullah 
operations against Israel, it was also the main bulwark to the spread of Hizbullah’s 
power. This fact was made clear in the aftermath of the July 2006 war between Israel and 
Hizbullah. Even though Israel was able to inflict significant damage on Lebanese targets, 
it was unable to achieve its stated aim for the Lebanon campaign which was the 
destruction of Hizbullah. By simply outlasting its enemy on the battlefield, Hizbullah 
now claimed to have defeated Israel twice—once in forcing Israel to quit its 18 year 
occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000 and secondly in Hizbullah’s moral victory in the 
2006 war—something Arab state militaries had not been able to do. With Syrian power 
no longer able to curb Hizbullah ambition, the organization translated the political capital 
it had gained after the 2006 war into an aggressive push for power in Lebanon.57 In May 
2008, after a nearly 18 month boycott of the government Hizbullah was able to win a 
concession from the Lebanese government which gave the organization a veto over 
executive decisions.58  
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As a close client of the Iranian regime, Hizbullah’s assent in Lebanon has given 
Iran and the IRGC greater influence in that country and in the politics of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Bush administration’s policies regarding the latter also facilitated another 
expansion of Iranian influence. That is, in 2005 the US began pushing for democratic 
elections in the Occupied Territories. The elections of 25 January 2006, however, did not 
produce the result Bush had hoped for. In a rejection of perceived corruption by the 
secular Fatah organization, Palestinians gave the Sunni-fundamentalist Hamas 
organization a resounding victory.59 Hamas, like Hizbullah, describes itself as a militant 
resistance organization and is listed by the US State Department as a proscribed terrorist 
group. Instead of recognizing the results and supporting the Palestinian democratic 
process it had advocated, the Bush administration quickly called for a boycott of Hamas 
and more importantly cut off all funding to its government. While the Bush 
administration continued to support Fatah, the vacuum created by its abandonment of 
financial support for the Hamas-led administration opened the way for Iran to step in 
once again. Buoyed by a steep rise in oil prices through 2008, Iran was able to become 
the leading financial supporter of the Hamas-led government and gained yet another 
significant foothold in the Palestinian-Israel conflict.60 
While these are examples of how specific US policies toward the Middle East 
directly benefitted Iran and expanded the reach and breadth of its foreign influence, the 
US occupation of Iraq has had the most significant impact on Iran and the IRGC’s 
regional roles. Though the Bush administration counted on America’s military 
involvement in the region to frighten Iranian leaders into complying with Western 
demands on the nuclear issue, the presence of US troops in Iraq (and to a lesser extent 
Afghanistan) made the US vulnerable to Iranian forces. That Iran would respond to any 
US aggression by targeting the latter’s interests in the region was highlighted by Iran’s 
military leaders well before the US invasion of Iraq. For instance, in response to Bush’s 
axis of evil speech, IRGC Brig-Gen. Mohammad Zolqadr warned: 
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If the Americans show madness and attack us, we will not defend 
ourselves only within our borders. We have a long and powerful arm, and 
we can threaten American interests anywhere. There is no need for us to 
go very far. There are many American assets in the Persian Gulf. Sixty to 
70 per cent of world energy is produced here. Well, this place is under our 
observation and within our reach. Of course, we do not wish to threaten 
anyone, but if our security is violated, no other place will have security 
either. We have the ability to respond with force to such threats. 
Afghanistan lacks an army, it lacks naval borders, and it lacks the ability 
to hit a strategic target. It is natural that such a country can be easily 
eliminated. Iraq also shares some of the same characteristics. We must 
stress that through immaturity and naivety, the Americans are in danger of 
creating a major incident in the world. We think that they are mainly 
engaged in a political bluff, but if they wish to act they will involve the 
world in a serious crisis. They may be able to start an incident in Iran, but 
its continuation will in no way be under their control.61 
Here Zolqadr intimates Iran’s ability to strike at Western targets outside of its borders. In 
part he is suggesting that if attacked Iran would turn toward the same instruments of 
terrorism—perhaps including Hizbullah or Hamas—that the Bush administration had 
accused Iran of sponsoring. However, with the addition of US forces in Iraq, added 
implications of such a strategy became evident. In Iraq, Iran was able to utilize its close 
ties to expatriate organizations such as the Islamic Dawa Party (Dawa hereafter), Jalal 
Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (after 2006 known as the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq or SICI) and associated 
militias like the Badr Organization to promote its interests in Iraq and keep pressure on 
American forces. In this manner, Iran’s stated threat of retaliation against American 
targets became a key element in its approach to deterrence. And by proving US forces in 
Iraq were susceptible to Iranian sponsored attacks, Iran was able to use the threat of 
escalating violence in Iraq as a substantial deterrent to an American attack against Iran’s 
nuclear facilities.  
While Iran began significant activities in Iraq shortly after the March 2003 
invasion, it was not until the hardline Ahmadinejad government came to power that Iran 
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took a more aggressive approach to securing its interests in that country.62 First news of 
possible Iranian involvement came from British commanders in southern Iraq who began 
to notice that Iranian-manufactured explosives were being used by the Shiite insurgents 
they were encountering. By March 2006, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accused 
the IRGC’s Qods Force—the IRGC special forces wing in charge of Iran’s extra-
territorial military engagements—of fomenting violence in Iraq through its support of 
Shiite militias.63 Soon Iranian involvement was suspected to be behind various attacks 
against coalition forces. In response, US forces were given the green light by the Bush 
administration to arrest and detain any Iranian operatives found in Iraq, and after January 
2007 were authorized to kill or capture suspected Iranian agents.64 While several Iranians 
had been arrested under the suspicion of providing aid to Iraqi insurgents in cross-boarder 
smuggling operations through 2006, the most publicized incident concerning suspected 
Iranian agents were the raids on two Iranian offices in Irbil (northern Iraq) on 11 January 
2007. After the raids, US officials claimed to have detained five Qods Force commanders 
on the suspicion of aiding the Iraqi insurgency.65 Although Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Hoshyar Zebari protested the arrests, and claimed that the Iranians detained were 
diplomats, US officials countered that the detainees had been in charge of mediating 
IRGC support to Iraqi militant groups.66  
Tehran responded with a series of denunciations of the arrests and a consistent 
proclamation that the Iranians detained were in Irbil as part of Iran’s diplomatic mission 
to Iraq. Yet several high-profile incidents that soon followed suggested that Iran was 
willing to back up its verbal protests with an intensification of its operations against 
coalition forces. Less than two weeks after the Irbil raids, five US soldiers were captured 
by a group of militants who had stormed an SICI office in Karbala. The militants, in the 
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guise of Iraqi police, seemed to have slipped past security unnoticed—suggesting 
possible complicity by the SICI guards—and after a brief exchange of gunfire captured 
five US soldiers who had been on official duty at the SICI office. After a brief search, all 
five of the US soldiers were found dead of gun shot wounds on a road 30 miles outside of 
town (the crime scene suggested the US soldiers had been killed during a failed escape 
attempt).67 US forces suspected that the soldiers had been the target of an inside job and 
fingers were ultimately pointed at Iran.68 The fact that the number of US soldiers 
captured matched that of the Iranians detained in Irbil added weight to the theory that 
Iran had hoped to kidnap the soldiers in order to exchange them for their own (a tactic 
honed by Iran and Hizbullah during the Lebanese civil war).69 Tehran officially declared 
to have had no knowledge of the attack; however, in a 12 February editorial in the IRGC 
weekly news organ Sobh-e Sadeq, Ali Rahimi, a senior member of the IRGC’s Political 
Office, suggested that the Karbala raid had been in response to the arrest of Iran’s 
diplomats in Irbil.70 In another incident on 24 March the IRGC arrested 15 British sailors 
for purportedly entering Iranian territory while on patrol in the Shatt al-Arab. Though the 
soldiers were only detained two weeks, outside observers suspected that the arrests were 
in part aimed at pressuring coalition forces to release the five detained Iranians. However, 
as the arrests took place just a day before the UN Security Council voted to further 
sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear enrichment program, it is more likely that the 
detained British soldiers were in some way meant to influence (or protest) this matter.71 
The suspected kidnapping of former FBI agent Robert Levinson—who disappeared from 
Iran’s Kish Island on 8 March—may also be related to the Irbil arrests.72  
Outside of these events, the IRGC’s overall strategy in Iraq has aimed at 
advancing Iran’s interests through the subversion of US influence and control in Iraq’s 
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Shiite districts. To this end, Iran actively supported allied militant groups against US and 
coalition forces. On one hand, the IRGC’s close relationship with SICI and Badr—the 
IRGC helped establish the latter and train its militants during the Iran-Iraq war—and the 
permeation of the members of these organizations into the Iraqi government and security 
forces enabled Iran to have a significant voice in domestic Iraqi affairs.73 On the other 
hand, the IRGC forged relationships with elements of the Sadrist movement in Iraq, 
which unlike SICI and Badr, largely did not participate in the government, were 
vigorously opposed the US occupation, and were also at times in a violent rivalry with 
SICI and Dawa. To this end, Tehran aimed to maximize its influence in Iraq by 
supporting both governmental forces and anti-governmental groups. The utility of such a 
strategy became evident in March and April 2008 as Iraqi state forces under the direction 
of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki began a campaign to root out anti-governmental 
militant groups in Basra that had amassed considerable influence in the region to the 
detriment of the Iraqi government. Al-Maliki’s ambitious plan initially floundered due to 
the inexperience of his troops, their unwillingness to engage fellow Iraqi Shiites in battle, 
and the tenacity of the local Basra militants.74 Unable to achieve his goals militarily, Al-
Maliki, in an unprecedented move, was forced to send a team to negotiate a ceasefire 
with the Basra groups in Qom. The powerbroker behind the deal, as first reported by 
McClatchy’s Leila Fadel, was Qassem Soleymani, the head of the IRGC’s Qods Force.75 
Part of this deal also seems to have included an agreement by Maliki to absorb Badr 
Organization militants into the Iraqi state forces—a move that further entwined pro-
Iranian and IRGC-linked elements with the Iraqi government.76 
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Soleymani’s role in the Basra ceasefire agreement was a powerful symbol of 
Iran’s growing influence in Iraq. Soleymani recognized his own rising stock and after 
meeting with a subsequent Iraqi delegation in May 2008 asked an Iraqi official to take a 
letter to his “counterpart” in Iraq, General David Petraeus—commander of coalition 
forces in Iraq and chief architect of the US-led surge—suggesting that the two meet to 
discuss Iraqi security.77 Petraeus dismissed Soleymani’s letter and offer to discuss 
matters concerning Iraq; however, the message was clear: Iran had amassed considerable 
power in Iraq and would have to be engaged for stability in that country to be achieved. 
This occurrence in a sense was the high watermark of Iranian influence in Iraq during the 
first half-decade of the US occupation. It came on the heels of a partial reversal of Bush 
administration policy which had renewed limited contacts with Iranian diplomats over 
Iraqi security. Through 2007 and 2008 US ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker held three 
meetings with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Kazemi Qomi in Baghdad. Though these 
discussions were confined to issues of Iraqi security and did not lead to a renewal of more 
formalized diplomatic ties between the US and Iran (something Iran has repeatedly 
pressed for), their occurrence was in sharp contrast to Bush’s aggressive rhetoric and 
refusals to engage in unilateral talks with Ahmadinejad’s government. They further 
marked a success for Iran’s strategy in Iraq. By making itself inextricably connected to 
stability in Iraq through the support and training of militant groups, Iran had forced the 
US (and the Iraqi government) to the negotiating table.  
New Approaches to a New Threat 
With Iranian proxies gaining power throughout the Middle East, Rahim Safavi 
announced that in “geo-political” and military terms Iran had become an “extra-regional 
power.”78 This rise, as partly acknowledge by the IRGC, was due in large measure to US 
missteps in the region.79 Yet, while Iranian influence in Iraq and the threat of escalating 
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violence in that country gave Iran a certain amount of leverage over the US, the IRGC’s 
active support for militant groups also strengthened the Bush administration’s case that 
Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism. In this way, even despite the findings of the 
November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that Iran no longer had an active nuclear 
weapons program, the Bush administration continued to suggest that military action 
against Iran remained a possibility.80 This made the notion of a coming war not only 
perceptible to the Islamic Republic, which has always considered the US a military 
threat, but also to sectors of the American public which became actively engaged in 
preventing another conflict in the Middle East. A good example of this is the number of 
books written by academics, intellectuals, and ex-officials from 2005 through 2007 that 
warned of and argued against the Bush administration’s designs for military 
confrontation with Iran.81 These books paralleled the articles written by prominent US 
journalists like David Sanger, Nicholas Kristof, David Ignatius, and Seymour Hersh, 
which indicated that military action against Iran was a growing inevitability. Hersh’s 
articles in particular, published in The New Yorker from early 2005 through summer 
2008, described US plans for an attack against Iran in great detail.82 
With opposition to Middle East wars mounting within the American public, an 
attack on Iran and the start of perhaps another protracted conflict in the region would 
likely have required an act of congress. The US Senate nearly offered the Bush 
administration such consent in the form of amendment 3017 of House Resolution 1585. 
In its submitted form, amendment 3017—co-sponsored by Senators John Kyl (R., 
Arizona) and Joseph Lieberman (I., Connecticut)—made a clear case for military action 
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against Iran.83 Quoting the congressional testimonies of Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador 
Crocker, the amendment produced “evidence” of Iran’s support for anti-coalition 
insurgent groups in Iraq and claimed that Iran—through the IRGC’s Qods Force—was 
turning “Shia militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve 
[Iranian] interests” in that country. The amendment argued that it was “vital” to US 
national security to “prevent” Iran from achieving its objectives in Iraq. To this end, the 
amendment suggested “that it should be the policy” of the US government “to combat, 
contain, and roll back the violent activities and destabilizing influence” of Iran and its 
“proxies” in Iraq (paragraph three). It further called for the “prudent and calibrated use of 
all instruments of United States national power in Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, 
intelligence, and military instruments, in support of the [above] policy . . . with respect to 
[Iran] and its proxies” (paragraph four). Equally significant, the amendment argued that 
on the basis of its training of and support for Shiite insurgents in Iraq, the IRGC should 
be designated “as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act” and placed on the list of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as 
established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under 
Executive Order 13224” (paragraph five).84 The implications of these sections—
paragraphs three through five in the amendment—caused a vigorous debate on the Senate 
floor including a denunciation by Sen. Jim Webb (D., Virginia) who asked for the 
amendment to be withdrawn on the grounds that its wording and the listing of the IRGC 
as a terrorist organization could be used by the Bush administration as de facto 
congressional support for military action against Iran.85  
In order to get the amendment passed on 26 September 2007 last minute revisions 
were made which deleted paragraphs three and four; however, paragraph five, which 
designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization, remained.86 Although the amendment 
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http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/kyl-lieberman.pdf (Accessed 14 April 2009). 
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stopped short of adding the IRGC to the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations (which would have had more extensive ramifications), it enabled the US 
Treasury Department to target the Guards’ financial holdings outside of Iran. As such 
Iranian officials and the IRGC considered the move another step toward a coming US-led 
military engagement with Iran.87  
Iranian officials already contended that a US campaign to undermine the Islamic 
Republic was underway. While Tehran claimed that pro-democratic activism within Iran 
was part of a Western effort to encourage a “velvet revolution”—leading to the arrests of 
several academics and journalists through 2009—officials pointed to the uptick in 
terrorist attacks and violence arising from Iran’s minority ethnic populations as clear 
evidence of US black operations within its borders. Iranian forces had sporadically done 
battle with ethnic insurgent groups and criminal smuggling networks in the border areas 
of the country for years, however since 2005 there had been a steep increase in the 
frequency and boldness of attacks.88 The most serious terrorist attacks were linked to 
Sunni organizations operating within the minority ethnic Balochi community in 
southeastern Iran and across the border in Pakistan. Most significantly, the People’s 
Resistance Movement of Iran (jonbesh-e moqavemat-e mardomi-e iran)—better known 
as Jondollah (Army of God)—claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against the 
Iranian government, including the February 2007 bombing of an IRGC transport vehicle, 
the June 2008 assassination of a district prosecutor in Saravan near the Iranian-Pakistani 
border, the kidnapping and eventual executions of sixteen guardsmen in summer and fall 
2008, the kidnapping of Qods Force commander Zarif Shaybani in March 2009,89 and the 
bombing of a Shiite mosque in Zahedan in May 2009.90 The April 2008 bombing of a 
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religious center (hosayniyyeh) in Shiraz used by the Basij and a local hardline Mahdist 
organization (Rahpuyan) was also linked to Balochi militants.91  
Iranian authorities saw the hand of foreign powers in all of these attacks.92 
Government officials directly blamed US intelligence for supporting Jondollah and for 
participating in its operations.93 Even though such accusations were a near-reflexive 
response to anti-state activism by Iranian authorities, an article published in The New 
Yorker on 30 June 2008 by Seymour Hersh lent credence to Iranian suspicions. In the 
article, which describes US plans for military action against Iran, Hersh suggests that the 
US was supporting groups like the Kurdish Pjak organization, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, 
and Jondollah in a similar way as it had the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.94 In other words, US support for ethnic insurgencies was a prelude to more 
substantial military engagement with Iran. While Hersh argued that military action would 
focus on air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iranian leaders anticipated that the US 
also planned for land and sea-based attacks.  
To prepare its forces, Iranian military leaders were forced to rethink their 
approach to strategic defense. While part of this process began under commander-in-chief 
Yahya Rahim Safavi in late 2005,95 it took on more substantial dimensions under his 
successor, Brig-Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari. Ayatollah Khamenei’s appointment of Jafari 
in September 2007 caused speculation that Safavi had fallen out of favor with the 
Supreme Leader; however, Safavi’s subsequent appointment as senior military advisor to 
Khamenei suggested that he retained some measure of the latter’s confidence. A signal 
that Jafari’s star was on the rise had already come in 2005 when Khamenei entrusted the 
                                                                                                                                                 
incarceration of Abd al-Hamid Rigi, the brother of Jondollah’s leader Abd al-Malek Rigi by Iranian 
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94 Seymour Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield: the Bush administration steps up its secret moves against 
Iran,” The New Yorker, June 2008. The article can also be found online: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all 
95 Fars News Agency (in Persian), 24 October 2005, 
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then IRGC ground forces commander to head the newly-established Center for Strategic 
Studies (markaz-e motale‘at-e rahbordi-e sepah)—a think tank tasked with updating 
IRGC military doctrine. Jafari was promoted to this position based on the unique 
expertise in insurgent tactical warfare he had gained by leading asymmetrical ground 
operations during the Iran-Iraq war.96 Jafari’s appointment to commander-in-chief is thus 
more likely due to his extensive background in guerrilla tactics and strategic affairs—
valuable qualities with prospects of war on the horizon—than organizational politics and 
factionalism (which has also been suggested).97  
Since taking office Jafari has used his background as a strategic specialist to 
restructure the IRGC and Basij into more mobile, more decentralized, and more 
“asymmetrical” (na-motaqaren / na-hamtaraz) military forces. A key element of this 
restructuring campaign has been the expansion of the IRGC’s command structure, 
strategic centers, and areas of responsibility.98 For instance, in July 2008 Jafari 
announced that new individual commands would be established for each of Iran’s 31 
provinces to enable each province the capability to organize and execute its own specific 
defensive strategy without having to depend on orders and planning from IRGC central 
command in Tehran.99 Jafari took a similar approach to IRGC naval operations and 
expanded the organization’s purview over Iran’s naval defenses by bringing the entire 
Persian Gulf region and the Hormuz Strait under direct IRGC command—areas of 
operations that had previously been split between the IRGC and regular navies.100 He 
also established a new strategic studies center and operational training facility for IRGC 
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special naval forces in Bandar-e Anzali (on the southwestern Caspian Sea coast) to 
formulate “asymmetrical” tactics to defend against the US naval threat in the Gulf.101 
Additionally, Jafari announced the formation of a separate IRGC missile command unit 
to help facilitate the effective utilization of Iran’s missile capacity in the case of war—a 
capacity Jafari considered central to Iran’s overall strategic defenses.102 
Though these changes have constituted a considerable expansion and 
restructuring of the IRGC, it is the expansion of the Basij’s role and influence that lies at 
the heart of Jafari’s reforms. Perhaps the most significant change to the Basij was Jafari’s 
decision to bring the force directly under his command. Although the Basij already 
operated as a branch of the IRGC, its focus had been on ideological and cultural affairs. 
By bringing the Basij into his portfolio Jafari elevated the force in military matters to be 
on par with that of the IRGC and regular ground forces.103 To this end, 600 new Imam 
Hosayn battalions (Basij ground force units) were established and integrated into each of 
the 31 new provincial commands, thereby expanding the Basij’s role in regional and local 
defense and security.104 This move was partly aimed at increasing the professionalization 
of the Basij by merging its military operations and training with IRGC ground forces; 
however, it was also aimed at brining a greater measure of the Basij’s cultural and 
ideological strengths into the IRGC.105 Indeed, even though Jafari has greatly increased 
the Basij’s role as a military force he has simultaneously repositioned the Basij as the 
cultural core of Iran’s armed forces. Examples of the latter can be seen in the Basij’s 
continued expansion in cultural and ideological areas. For instance, Jafari appointed 
Hosayn Ta’eb—a former seminary student of Ayatollah Khamenei and the commander of 
the cultural faculty of Imam Hosayn University—to head the Basij partly on the basis of 
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his long history with ideological work.106 Further, the establishment of a new 
“specialized” headquarters under the Basij Student Organization aimed to bridge the 
expanded military capacities of the Basij with its on-going ideological activism in civil 
society.107 These developments are a clear indication that Jafari does not intend to dilute 
the Basij’s ideological base in favor of greater military professionalization. If anything, 
the new structure under Jafari has placed the Basij in the position to better animate the 
ideological resolve of other associated forces. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that US policies toward the Middle East facilitated the expansion of Iranian 
influence in the region and inspired an expansion of the IRGC at home. By viewing Iran 
as an irrational political actor that could not be engaged diplomatically, the Bush 
administration chose to approach the problem of Iran’s nuclear program through coercive 
measures backed by the threat of military force. US sponsored sanctions and aggressive 
rhetoric provoked three key successive responses by Iran’s conservative leaders: 1) the 
intensification of conservative and hardliner activism culminating in the “election” of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; 2) the aggressive support for various Iraqi militant groups and 
operations aimed at subverting US and Coalition influence in occupied Iraq; 3) the 
expansion of the IRGC and Basij at home in preparation for a possible military conflict 
with the US. Collectively these responses subverted the Bush administration’s attempts to 
pressure Iran into accepting Western demands. With US forces bogged down in Iraq and 
vulnerable to Iranian-supported insurgents, the Bush administration was forced to 
forestall and ultimately abandon any military action against Iran. The net result was an 
empowered hardline regime that could rightfully boast that its tactics of supporting 
militancy abroad, suppressing dissent at home, and expanding military power in society 
were effective and legitimate countermeasures to Western aggression. 
The chief beneficiaries of the Bush administration’s miscalculations in Iran have 
been the hardline forces surrounding Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. 
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Indeed, the rise of the former has led to the expansion of the latter. The 2005 election saw 
only former guardsmen stand as the candidates for the hardline principlist camp. 
Ahmadinejad’s victory not only promoted a former guard and basiji to Iran’s highest 
elected office, it marked the ascent of war veterans and former guardsmen to political 
prominence. In a sense, the victory of Ahmadinejad can be seen as the culmination of the 
IRGC and Basij’s gradual permeation of all sectors in postwar Iran. During the 1990s 
these military organizations expanded into numerous extra-military roles and activities. 
This laid the groundwork for their post-2001 achievements in politics and their recent 
concentration on military development. To be sure, the restructuring of the IRGC and 
Basij that has taken place since late 2007 has both expanded their influence over military 
affairs and broadened the scope of their work in general. The strengthening of the Basij is 
particularly significant in that it signals a clear commitment on the part of the Supreme 
Leader and his military advisors to the continued integration of militarism, ideology, and 
culture in Iranian society. 
By the close of 2008, military power had come to dominate key areas of policy 
and decision-making. While this process was in no small measure encouraged by outside 
forces, particularly US foreign policy and regional conflicts, it cannot be severed from 
domestic Iranian political dynamics. As hardliners have taken hold of governmental 
institutions and positions of power, it has been protecting their place in the Islamic 
Republic that is at the root of most domestic and foreign policy decisions in Iran. Even as 
foreign threats remain at the forefront of governmental rhetoric, it is the internal 
opposition that poses the greatest challenge to hardliner hegemony. With this in mind, 
Iranian politics should not be simply understood as the result of misguided outside 
pressures. Such pressures have aided the rise of the right in Iran insofar as they have 
afforded Iranian politicians a semblance of legitimacy for repressive policies at home and 
adventurism abroad, and have encouraged a near-perpetual state of reactionaryism by the 
government. Yet, to see the condition of Iranian politics as the product of non-Iranian 
influence would be both reductive and incorrect. What Iranian politics in the twenty-first 
century have shown is that the power struggle that began in the post-revolution continues 
to unfold. Although it has exposed fractures in Iranian society, this process has 
nonetheless managed to maintain some of the central goals of the Iranian revolution in 
 188
that Iran’s government has effectively kept its regime free from the sort of foreign control 
that marked the Pahlavi Dynasty that it replaced. To this end, the state of the Islamic 
Republic should be seen as the product of its architects and current leadership. For good 








As we shift our focus beyond regime type, the military elite, and the major military 
institutions, and examine conditions internal as much as external to the nation-state, we 
are able to identify several social, cultural, and economic articulations that affect 
positively or negatively the likelihood that the military or other equally significant armed 
forces will be actively involved in politics, even as they influence the form of character of 
the state as well as vice versa.1 
 




The development of military power in Iran has been a multifaceted process with 
important political, cultural, ideological, and religious dimensions. The preceding 
chapters have traced the unfoldment of this process, from the roots of military power in 
pre-revolutionary militancy to the geo-political forces that impact its current articulation. 
While each chapter has focused on a specific theme and time period, together they 
provide a chronological view of post-revolutionary Iran. The complex relationship 
between military power and politics forms the backbone of each of these chapters but has 
only at times been their overt focus. In this chapter, I return to the arguments put forward 
in Chapter I and address the overarching questions of this study. Here I reconsider the 
theoretical framework established by Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira in their 
book Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation. Davis and 
Pereira argue for a new understanding of the relationship between military power, 
coercion, and political development. They emphasize that past scholarship has 
overlooked the roles of armed forces in state development outside of the war-
making/state-making nexus. They are particularly concerned with re-examining the place 
of unconventional or irregular armed forces in politics. As military power has been a 
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crucial factor in the making of the Islamic Republic, and as the revolutionary institutions 
that comprise the core of military power in Iran do not fit the conventional mold, I have 
found Davis and Pereira’s thinking on irregular armed forces valuable for understanding 
the various implications of military influence on the Iranian state. To this end, I return to 
the questions put forward earlier in this study’s introduction and offer my assessment of 
how the Iranian case fits or conflicts with some of the key arguments made by Davis and 
Pereira. The answers provided are intended to bring together the material presented 
heretofore and make overt the arguments that have been thus far only implied. As both an 
analytical and theoretical summation, the discussion below presents the core claims of 
this dissertation as well as its concluding remarks. 
The first question I posed asks: Why is there a blurring of military and police 
forces in post-revolutionary Iran? An aspect of political development associated with 
democratic regimes is the division of coercive forces into institutions of national defense 
(the military) and internal control (the police). Past scholarship has emphasized that a 
clear division between military and police forces is an important outcome of the 
professionalization and institutionalization of a state’s armed forces. These processes are 
considered necessary for a state’s transition to democracy, and as such, the development 
of separate military and police forces is often recognized as evidence of pro-democratic 
progression. Davis and Pereira take issue with this assessment and suggest that a closer 
examination of the development of some Western democracies complicates this 
connection. For instance, Lizabeth Zack’s contribution to their volume shows that the 
French state was slow to develop a national police force and that such a force was only 
established under the Fascist Vichy government. Although this helped assert state control 
over various police forces, Zack argues that the recent trend of local municipal 
governments establishing their own police forces shows that centralized authority is not 
consistent across democratic societies and can even be reversible.2  
Post-revolutionary Iran presents another interesting case for how coercive force 
has been organized by the state. The vague task of “safeguarding the revolution” given to 
organizations like the IRGC and the Basij encouraged their involvement in all areas of 
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Iranian society. Although the post-revolutionary government retained some distinction 
between forces responsible for external threats and those responsible for local law 
enforcement, the purview of the revolutionary forces encompassed both of these areas. In 
the postwar, then President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani sought to centralize state control 
and clarify military and police-type forces by merging the IRGC’s ministry with that of 
the regular military and consolidating the revolutionary committees with the gendarmerie 
to form the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). While this led to a greater specialization of 
Iran’s coercive forces into institutions of national defense and domestic law enforcement, 
and led to greater governmental control over coercive forces—at least with regards to the 
regular military and the LEF—it failed to address the broad operational purview of the 
revolutionary forces. Indeed, instead of narrowing the roles of the IRGC and Basij, 
postwar policies expanded their involvement in extra-military and security sectors. 
Further, the establishment of the Office for Vivification of the Propagation of Vice and 
Prohibition of Virtue and the licensing of its members and basijis to make arrests and 
detain individuals for religious infractions increased the authority of the Basij in the area 
of law enforcement. Also the utilization of mosque-oriented hezbollahi gangs and war 
veterans groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah for the suppression of civil dissent shows that 
there remains a place for non-governmental agents of violent coercion within the Iranian 
state. These non-governmental groups often act with impunity even though they have 
been the source of much anti-governmental violence. 
Although the Iranian state posses institutions like the regular military and the LEF 
that do respect central governmental authority and represent a division of coercive force, 
the broad operational purview of the IRGC and Basij, their significant roles in law 
enforcement and internal security, and the continual employment of semi- and non-
governmental groups in law enforcement-type activities, are persuasive examples of why 
a clear demarcation of military and police-type forces has not been achieved by the 
Iranian state. Indeed, as the IRGC has recently begun a process of restructuring that 
includes an expansion of the Basij’s provincial and local activities, it seems clear that the 
Iranian government is committed to strengthening the capacities of its revolutionary 
armed forces as apparatuses of both external defense and internal control. Thus, even 
though Iran has developed separate military and police-type institutions, and asserted 
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state control over both, it has not been toward a greater democratization of the state. This 
is due to the significant influence of the revolutionary forces in the areas of both military 
and law enforcement, and to the tolerated political violence of non-governmental groups.  
My second question asks: In what ways have war veterans most impacted postwar 
political development? As Davis and Pereira note, the role of veterans in politics has been 
underappreciated in past scholarship. Alec Campbell’s contribution to their volume 
explores the theme of war veterans and the process of demobilization and concludes that 
war veterans have had an important place at various times and places in history. In the 
United States, for instance, Campbell points to organizations like the American Legion, 
which helped lobby the state for greater social services for veterans while simultaneously 
being a vocal proponent of rightwing politics and anti-communist policies. Veterans were 
instrumental in establishing the G.I. Bill, which enabled a whole generation of soldiers to 
seek university education and helped expand the American middle class. In this way, war 
veterans not only became a formidable political force, their actions had a powerful impact 
on America’s social fabric.  
War veterans have played a similar socio-political role in postwar Iran. As I have 
discussed, the experiences of war helped shape Iranian society, its culture, and politics in 
different ways. For the revolutionary forces, the war established a symbolic vernacular 
that became increasingly used in expressions of organizational identity. This identity was 
more than a visual product; it was the culmination and articulation of the various 
ideological, religious, and cultural values forged by many soldiers who fought during the 
war. After the war, these values were at the heart of a new political movement led 
primarily by war veterans associated with the conservative right, which flourished under 
governmental policies aimed at avoiding mass demobilization. During this period, the 
Iranian government strengthened the revolutionary forces and involved their veteran 
ranks in various military and extra-military activities. While such policies emboldened 
the influence of war veterans and their supporters within state institutions, veterans also 
exercised influence through semi and non-state organizations. For instance, the charitable 
foundations like the Foundation for the Oppressed and Injured War Veterans and the 
Foundation for Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, which provide generous social benefits to 
war veterans and their families, have become massive financial conglomerates that act 
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with near autonomy from the government. Further, organizations like Ansar-e Hezbollah 
have become important advocates for veterans’ issues while simultaneously engaging in 
violence in support of conservative and hardline political interests. 
 Although such developments have established war veterans as a significant socio-
political force, it is in their permeation of the governmental sector that has afforded them 
a powerful voice in the Iranian state. Outside of top-ranking positions in all military and 
security organizations, including the IRGC, Basij, LEF, and regular military, war 
veterans can be seen to have captured the executive branch of government with the 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s election, while problematic, was 
nonetheless supported by hardline veterans and their clerical patrons. After achieving the 
presidency, Ahmadinejad appointed war veterans to over a third of his cabinet positions, 
giving them a leading voice in the policies of his administration. In this way, the politics 
of the Ahmadinejad administration both play to and originate from a broader war 
veterans movement. This can be seen in Ahmadinejad’s lop-sided social policies and in 
his uncompromising, at times aggressive approach to foreign affairs. There is thus little 
doubt that war veterans have played a significant role in the politics and conflicts that 
have shaped the postwar Iranian state. Indeed, the present condition of the Islamic 
Republic is to a considerable extent due to the rise of war veterans to positions of power 
and influence.  
 This leads us to a third question: Has the increased professionalization of the 
revolutionary armed forces led to increased civilian control over these military 
organizations? A major argument in civil-military relations suggests that the 
professionalization of military institutions makes them more likely to submit to civilian 
leadership. Such a transformation, most often seen in northwestern European states, is 
generally considered necessary for states to mature and develop into democracies. 
Without a professional military under civilian control the likelihood of states to use 
military power to control their population increases. Davis and Pereira have shown that 
this line of thinking can be misleading if not inaccurate. They use the historical example 
of the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War to show that professional armies 
can be less bound to civilian leadership than non-professional militias (an argument 
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explored by Susan Browne in their volume).3 Though their argument is persuasive, I 
would suggest that Iran’s revolutionary forces provide a more compelling case for the 
contemporary period.  
During the first year and a half of operation the IRGC worked to undermine the 
civilian government as an adjunct of pro-Khomeini clerical interests. As Khomeinists 
came to dominate the government early into the war with Iraq, the IRGC gradually came 
under governmental control and by the end of the war its leaders worked closely with 
civilian leadership. The intense factionalism of the postwar period strained the 
relationship between IRGC commanders and governmental leaders. The election of the 
reformist Mohammad Khatami in 1997 prompted a stern response from IRGC and Basij 
commanders, who began to openly work against the government and even threatened its 
existence during the height of the 1999 student protests. The severe antipathy of these 
organizations toward reformist-minded politics was part of their involvement in the 
suspected anti-democratic cabal that secured Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. 
Though the IRGC and the Basij have been loyal to Ahmadinejad’s hardline government, 
this relationship is based more on shared political and ideological interests than on a 
belief in civilian authority. 
 From this glance, it is clear that the allegiance of the revolutionary forces to 
civilian governmental control has occurred only at times of shared or overlapping 
political interests. What is not clear is what affect increased professionalization has had 
on this relationship. Little effort was made in the first decade of the Islamic Republic to 
professionalize the revolutionary armed forces. Such an effort did not begin in earnest 
until after the Iraq war when the government merged the IRGC ministry with the regular 
military and imposed ranks on the revolutionary forces to encourage greater 
governmental control over these organizations and develop them into more professional 
military bodies. From this point to the present, the IRGC and Basij have slowly moved in 
the direction of greater institutional professionalization. Although this process has not 
diluted the ideological nature of these organizations, it has made them more conventional 
military forces in terms of both martial capacity and structure. To this extent, 
                                                 
3 See Susan Browne, “War-Making and U.S. State Formation: Mobilization, Demobilization, and the 
Inherent Ambiguities of Federalism, ” in Irregular Armed Forces, 232-252. 
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professionalization has no doubt increased in Iran’s revolutionary armed forces; however, 
I would argue that increased professionalization has had little to no bearing on the 
relationship of these organizations to the civilian government. Not only have these 
organizations become more politicized during this period they have become more 
powerful and have regularly used this power to undermine or oppose civilian 
governments. While the IRGC and Basij are now allied with the present government, this 
alliance is based more so on politics than on a respect for civilian governmental authority.  
Further complicating the matter is the place of the Supreme Leader as 
commander-in-chief and Ali Khamenei’s close relationship with specific factional 
interests. So far during Ali Khamenei’s tenure, the revolutionary forces have remained 
firmly in his camp and have received his unequivocal backing in return. As the symbol of 
divine (as opposed to civilian) authority, Khamenei lends a certain legitimacy to these 
organizations which has allowed them to skirt civilian control. I would suggest, however, 
that the relationship between the revolutionary forces and Khamenei—and to clerical 
influence more broadly—is also contingent on shared interests. While these interests are 
outwardly connected to mutual political and ideological concerns, it has been Khamenei’s 
uncritical support of the IRGC and Basij that I believe has most directly contributed to 
their lasting political alliance with the institution of the Supreme Leader. This is to say 
that the present relationships between the revolutionary forces, the civilian government, 
and the office of the Supreme Leader are not set in stone and will be malleable under 
changing political circumstances.  
The fourth question asks: Have the revolutionary armed forces helped the Iranian 
state develop a monopoly of coercive violence? A central component of state formation is 
a state’s ability to organize coercion within its borders. Charles Tilly, for instance, argues 
that the near monopolization of coercion was crucial in the formation of northern 
European states, and that the particular approaches that these states took toward 
organizing coercion directly impacted their political development.4 Responding to Tilly 
and others, Davis and Pereira suggest that the near monopolies of coercion attained in 
northern Europe have not necessarily been attained elsewhere. They further argue that 
                                                 
4 See Charles Tilly, “Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650,” in Irregular Armed 
Forces, 37-81. 
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while the near monopolies in northern Europe were achieved through war-making and the 
establishment of conventional militaries, circumstances outside of war and the roles of 
unconventional armed forces in helping states organize or monopolize coercion has been 
generally overlooked and underappreciated in past scholarship. As the organization of 
coercion has been crucial in the making of the Islamic Republic, it is important to 
understand how this process has unfolded and to what degree the Iranian state has been 
able to monopolize coercion. 
From the surface it is difficult to dispute the notion the Islamic Republic has 
developed a monopoly of coercive violence within its boundaries. Achieving this, after 
all, was one of the original aims of the Revolutionary Guards and their associates in the 
early post-revolution. In this period, the ability to wage violence was shared by a 
multitude of armed militias and the remnants of the conventional military forces. To 
weaken their adversaries and consolidate power under Khomeini, Khomeinist forces 
including the IRGC, revolutionary committees, and other gangs were employed by 
clerical overseers to disarm rival militants, confiscate weaponry from the populace, and 
disrupt arms smuggling networks. Parallel to this, revolutionary authorities subdued and 
weakened the regular military but stopped short of its outright dissolution. The war 
convinced Khomeini and his trusted lieutenants like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani that the 
regular forces were integral to national defense and should be kept separate from the 
revolutionary forces and retain a conventional organizational structure. To this end, the 
regular military continued as an institution focused on national defense after the war 
whereas the revolutionary forces saw their portfolios continue to expand, including in 
areas of law enforcement and domestic security. This process facilitated the IRGC and 
Basij’s penetration of the social sphere and afforded these organizations broad-ranging 
operational authority in law enforcement activities. Up to the present, the effective 
utilization of the Basij in repressing internal dissent has been the clearest sign of the 
state’s ability to organize coercive violence throughout the country. Added to this, the 
roles of the IRGC and LEF in combating various forms of insurgency within the ethno-
religious minority communities of Iran’s border regions gives a further indication that the 
state’s ability to exercise coercive control over its populations is formidable in all areas of 
society. 
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 From such a perspective it is reasonable to conclude that the Iranian state has 
succeeded in monopolizing coercive violence primarily through its revolutionary armed 
forces. However, this line of thinking also presumes a more unitary state structure than is 
seen in the Islamic Republic. That is, though the revolutionary armed forces have 
certainly become the most important state institutions of coercion, their loyalty is only 
partially to the government. While the IRGC and its associated forces seem to work in 
concert with the government in areas of foreign affairs and national defense, their 
domestic activities serve markedly more factionalized interests. This can be seen in the 
Basij’s PVPV activities, anti-liberalization activism, and efforts to suppress reformism. 
The IRGC’s ultimatum to then President Khatami during the student protests of 1999 and 
the suspected involvement of IRGC and Basij forces in the election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005 are also vivid examples of the factionalism of the revolutionary 
forces. What is more, state institutions like the Basij have close associations with non-
state groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah which has engaged in violent activism against 
Iranian government supporters and officials. Groups like Ansar are examples of 
unofficial organizations that are able to exercise coercive violence for political purposes 
despite the illegality of their actions. Contrast the sometimes anti-governmental violence 
of a group like Ansar with the anti-regime violence of an organization like Jondallah—
which unlike the former has been met with severe responses by the state—and the politics 
of tolerated illegal violence and untolerated illegal violence becomes clearer.  
With this in mind, it is difficult if not incorrect to assume that the Iranian state has 
achieved a monopoly of coercive violence. First and foremost, pockets of resistance 
continue in Iran’s border regions despite three decades of stiff government control of 
those areas. These insurgencies are no doubt fueled and facilitated by actors and forces 
outside of Iran’s borders, and while their actions are limited and have generally not 
succeeded in realizing political agendas, they nonetheless remain active. Second, non-
governmental groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah are able to routinely and openly engage in 
violence against the civilian population without fear of legal consequences. Third, while 
governmental forces do possess the means and ability to exercise coercion on behalf of 
the state, their factional loyalties are often at variance with their responsibilities to the 
government. Even though “safeguarding the revolution” continues to be the primary 
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objective of the IRGC and its associated forces, problems arise when “the revolution” is 
understood differently by Iran’s political factions. Therefore, while the revolutionary 
forces have certainly come to dominate the government’s means of coercive violence, 
they have also acted on behalf of powerful anti-governmental interests. For these reasons, 
I would suggest that the revolutionary armed forces have helped the Iranian state achieve 
a near monopoly of coercion, but that rampant factionalism and the ability of non-
governmental groups to partake in coercive violence against the civilian population 
without being held accountable have limited the Iranian state from developing a true 
monopoly of coercive violence. 
This brings us to the fifth and final question, which asks: What factors led to the 
proliferation of military power in post-revolutionary Iran and what does the current place 
of military power tell us about the nature of politics in the Iranian state? The processes 
and conditions that underlie the development of military power in a society have a direct 
impact on how a state is formed. For instance, past scholarship has shown that war-
making has played a crucial role in the development of conventional militaries in Europe 
which in turn have helped engender the various social conditions and political institutions 
necessary for state formation and democratic politics. While Davis and Pereira 
acknowledge the importance of this war-making/state-making scenario in the history of 
northern European states, they suggest that in other parts of the world different conditions 
have often played an equally significant role in the formation and political development 
of states. Their central thesis is that armed forces do much more than make war and that 
these underappreciated areas of military power have figured large in the development of 
states. To this extent, they emphasize the role of irregular armed forces in politics and the 
affect this relationship has had on the political development of states at various times and 
places in modern history. As unconventional armed forces have been at the forefront of 
politics in post-revolutionary Iran, it is important to consider how they have contributed 
to the political reality of the Islamic Republic.  
 Before discussing what political factors led to the proliferation of military power 
in the post-revolution, it is important to first note how and to what extent military power 
in Iran is rooted in ideology or religious belief. To begin with, there is clearly a strand of 
traditional Shiism which embraces the notion that coercive violence can legitimately 
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serve the advancement of God’s will on Earth. Such a relationship is not unique to Islam, 
but the way it is articulated within Shiite culture is specific and related to foundational 
episodes in the religion’s history. Narratives like Ali’s struggle for leadership, the 
martyrdom of Husayn at the plains of Karbala, the self-sacrificial campaign of the 
Penitents, and the visions of apocalyptical battles surrounding the Hidden Imam’s return, 
have secured a place for legitimate and righteous violence in the Shiite tradition and have 
been a source for religious expressions of violence throughout Iranian history. In the 
modern period, plays to Shiite history have helped legitimate the violent activism of 
various militant groups and movements in Iran, but to different ends. For instance, the 
Fada’iyan-e Islam invoked Islamic justice to justify the murders of political leaders in an 
attempt to expunge Western influence from Iranian society and restore religious 
traditionalism to the heart of the Iranian state. The anti-American and anti-regime 
violence generated by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, on the other hand, was as 
inspired by socialist revolutionary politics as it was by Ali Shariati’s radical 
reinterpretation of Shiism as a revolutionary movement diametrically opposed to the 
trenchant traditionalism of clerical authority. Although both of these groups invoked the 
Shiite tradition to legitimize political violence, they had widely divergent understandings 
of the tradition and advocated very different political platforms.  
 Ayatollah Khomeini fused together aspects of both of these currents in his 
political thought. While his theory of the “guardianship of the jurisprudent” advocated a 
form of theocratic government under clerical rule, his political statements often reflected 
a type of socially-imbued populism. In this way, his thinking appealed at some level to 
more traditionally-minded clerics and more socially-minded political activists. Khomeini 
also saw a place for legitimate violence in establishing a true Islamic society, and his 
supporters actively engaged in violence in the post-revolution toward this end. Even 
though violence in the post-revolution often had overt political causes it was exercised 
through a system that purported to be in line with the divine. Although states do not 
necessarily need religion to justify violent coercion, the Islamic Republic, as a theocracy, 
could not but employ religion as the primary justification for the coercive acts of state 
institutions. The experience of war only intensified the relationship between religion and 
violence. An example of this can be seen in how the IRGC shifted its organizational 
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identity during this period from primarily that of a revolutionary armed force to one that 
more closely personified a righteous Islamic military. The countless martyrs and 
sacrifices made by soldiers during the war strengthened the perception that Iran’s 
warriors were as inexorably tied to the unfoldment of God’s will as the early heroes of 
Shiism’s formative period. Thus, in the postwar, the revolutionary forces had little 
difficulty in claiming that they operated on the side of God. This put their opponents, 
regardless of who they were, on the wrong side of a good-versus-evil or right-versus-
wrong contest. In this manner, no matter how political or politicized the revolutionary 
armed forces may be, in their estimation they have and will always operate as forces of 
Islamic justice, which in and of itself frames violent coercion as a religiously (if not 
politically) legitimate act. 
 The religious politics of coercive violence have also helped shape post-
revolutionary conflicts. Early post-revolutionary political disputes revealed the deep 
divisions of the Iranian revolutionary movement. While the various groups that helped 
overthrow the Pahlavi regime showed some semblance of unity in the immediate 
aftermath, their divergent views of what type of state should replace monarchical rule led 
to intense infighting. Many of these groups engaged in political violence to advance their 
interests. As the groups loyal to the Provisional Government concentrated on reviving the 
near-crippled state institutions like the police and military, those loyal to Khomeini and 
the clerically-dominated Revolutionary Council focused on consolidating militant groups 
into the burgeoning revolutionary armed forces. The authority of Khomeini enabled these 
forces to act outside the confines of governmental control and justified their coercive 
suppression of non-Khomeinist elements. With eventual Khomeinist dominance over the 
government of the Islamic Republic, revolutionary armed forces like the IRGC, Basij, 
and committees transformed into state institutions of coercion whose violence was 
simultaneously justified by religious pretentions, official legal statuses, and correct 
political loyalties. Yet, even as these forces were united under Khomeini, as the war 
progressed and divisions within the Khomeinist movement began to arise, the leadership 
of these organizations also began to take sides. This caused the growing conservatism of 
IRGC and Basij leadership through the war and their close associations with conservative 
political interests after the war. The committees were more strongly aligned with the 
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Khomeinist-left, and thus their dissolution in the postwar removed a significant 
counterweight to rightist coercive power within the Iranian state. 
 The lop-sided loyalties of the IRGC and Basij to conservative factions and the 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei put the leftist factions at a severe disadvantage in the 
postwar. Without effective influence in state and non-state institutions of coercion, the 
factions of the left failed to benefit politically from the postwar rise and expansion of the 
IRGC and Basij. Even as the pro-democratic values of the left gained widespread 
popularity under the reformist Mohammad Khatami, the ability of reformists to enact any 
significant or lasting change was prevented by the powerful state institutions that had 
become dominated by the conservative right. This included the revolutionary armed 
forces whose top commanders were appointees of the Supreme Leader and proved loyal 
to his conservative political agenda. The increasing lack of popular support for rightist 
political factions made them increasingly reliant on coercive force to maintain their hold 
over the state. This can be seen in the IRGC and Basij’s open opposition to reformism 
and the Khatami government, their continued involvement in social repression, and their 
roles in the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Thus, the rise of conservative and 
hardline elements to power in the Iranian state has not only paralleled the influential rise 
of the revolutionary forces, it has been backed by the ability of these organizations to 
organize coercive violence and their willingness to exercise that coercion for political 
purposes.  
From the early disputes between Khomeinists and their political adversaries in the 
early post-revolution to the cultural and political conflicts of the postwar period, the 
coercive violence of military institutions has had a crucial impact on the nature of conflict 
in the Islamic Republic. Just as Khomeinists succeeded in consolidating power in the 
post-revolution through their ability to organize and wage coercive violence, the success 
of conservative factions has likewise relied on their influence over the institutions of 
military power. The close relationship between political power and military power, which 
began in the immediate post-revolution and continues to unfold at present, has thus been 
central to the political development of the Islamic Republic. The use of revolutionary 
organs to exercise violent coercion in the quest for political consolidation in the early 
post-revolution set a precedent for the involvement of military institutions in society and 
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politics that has yet to be reversed. This has not only ensured the continued reliance on 
military power by conservative political factions, it has helped propel these factions to 
dominance over the Iranian state.  
To this end, military power in the Islamic Republic continues to be a defining 
factor in state politics. The question remains, however, what does the permeation of 
military power reveal about politics in the Iranian state? First, as I have suggested, 
military power has been key to the unfoldment of political disputes since the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution. Just as it was the effective organization of coercion by the 
Khomeinist bloc that facilitated their dominance in the post-revolution, it has been the 
effective control of military power by conservative factions that has enabled their lasting 
control of the postwar state. In this way, it has been access to and control over institutions 
of coercion that has often made the difference in post-revolutionary political disputes. 
These disputes and conflict more broadly have engendered a process of exclusion that 
continues to shape power in the Iranian state. That is, Khomeinists gained control over 
the state after the fall of the Pahlavi regime by effectively excluding their opponents from 
access to state institutions, positions of influence, and from any claims to religious, 
ideological, or political legitimacy. This process did not end with Khomeinist dominance 
over the state, rather it served to divide the Khomeinist movement into contending 
factions. Armed with the unmitigated backing of Ali Khamenei’s supreme authority, 
conservative and hardline forces have managed to gain control over all major state 
institutions. Control over these institutions has enabled the continued exclusion of the 
reformist and more moderate factions from nearly all areas of power. This has resulted in 
the consolidation of state power by an increasingly small collection of allied political, 
military, social, and clerical forces.  
In this sense, power in post-revolutionary Iran is like a matryoshka doll. What 
began as an enterprise of the Khomeinist movement has gradually become the domain of 
a continually shrinking political elite. As state power in Iran continues to be concentrated 
into the hands of minority interests, the reliance of this political minority on military 
power has increased. Even though Khamenei has ensured the dominance of his allies in 
all major state institutions, and even as those institutions encompass nearly all 
mechanisms of state control, the increasing disparity between the interests of this political 
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minority and that of the majority of Iranian society has necessitated the continued 
political involvement of military power. This process reveals why democratic 
development has been stymied by the expansion of military power in the social and 
political realms. As the politics of those in control of the state moves further and further 
away from that of Iranian society, the elite will rely more and more on institutions of 
coercion to perpetuate their hold over the Islamic Republic. Conversely, as the political 
elite grows smaller, those excluded will increasingly turn toward the promotion of 
democratic development to regain fading or lost influence. With these considerations in 
mind, it is clear that the far-right elements that currently hold power in Iran can only lose 
influence by allowing the exercise of popular democracy in Iran. It is for this reason that 
military power will not only remain a crucial factor in Iranian politics, it will continue to 
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